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EVALUATION OF THE 2006/7 AGRICULTURAL  INPUT 





This report evaluates the 2006/7 Malawi Government Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme 
(AISP). The main objective of the evaluation is to assess the impact and implementation of the 
AISP in order to provide lessons for future interventions in growth and social protection. The 
evaluation combined qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. 
Quantitative data were collected through a national survey in 2007 of 2,491 households who 
were previously interviewed in the 2004/05 Integrated Household Survey,, a survey of retail 
shops selling inputs in six districts and data on stocks and sales from manufacturers, large-scale 
importers and dealers of fertilizers and seeds. The quantitative data was triangulated by 
qualitative data from focus group discussions with smallholder farmers in 12 districts, and key 
informant interviews with government staff, input distributors and beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
households. The analysis is based on descriptive statistics, econometric modelling and livelihood 
and rural economy modelling. An Interim Report in March 2007 provides fuller details of the 
implementation of the programme.  
Evaluation of the impact of the AISP needs to recognise both the context in which it is 
implemented and its objectives.  
Malawian smallholder agriculture is characterised by large numbers of very poor farmers heavily 
dependent on low input maize production on small land holdings which are very short of nitrogen. 
Maize production by these farmers is not normally sufficient to meet annual consumption needs, 
and they depend upon casual labouring and other income earning opportunities to finance the 
purchase of the balance of their needs. In the 2002/3 and 2003/4 seasons when TIPs were 
implemented, around 40% of smallholder households purchased fertilizer on commercial terms, 
with mean purchases of around 65 kgs per household.  These numbers suggest that for more 
than half of the smallholder population, commercial fertiliser purchases in adequate quantities are 
unaffordable, leaving many farmers locked into impoverished livelihoods based on low 
productivity maize cultivation and casual labouring. Food insecurity problems facing such farmers 
have worsened in recent years with national food shortages due to poor production seasons and 
late and expensive government-funded imports leading to large increases in maize purchase 
prices.  
In this context, the government started implementing the AISP in the 2005/06 season with the 
stated objectives of improving smallholder productivity and food and cash crop production and 
reducing vulnerability to food insecurity and hunger. Other objectives are to promote food self 
sufficiency, development of the private sector input markets, and wider growth and development. 
In the 2006/7 programme 2 million seed and 3 million fertiliser coupons were initially allocated to 
districts and areas within districts in proportion to maize (and for ‘tobacco fertilisers’, tobacco) 
areas for distribution to targeted households. ‘Supplementary’ NPK and urea coupons were 
distributed in two subsequent batches, the first comprising 1 million coupons. Coupons were 
supposed to be allocated to targeted households (able farmers who would otherwise be unable 
to purchase inputs) by Village Development Committees at the rate of one NPK (23:21:0) and 
one urea coupon per household, and one D compound and one CAN coupon per recipient 
tobacco farmer. Allocation procedures in practice varied widely between different areas, with 
some local authorities deciding to give one coupon each to a larger number of households. There 
were reports of substantial diversion of coupons in some areas, but few large scale confirmed 
cases.  Farmers were required to redeem fertiliser vouchers and pay MK950 per 50kg bag,   iii 
representing roughly 28% of the full cost, with government paying for the remaining 72% of the 
cost.   
A total of just under 175,000 tonnes of fertiliser and 4,500 tonnes of improved maize seed was 
distributed. Disbursement of inputs in the southern region was late for a variety of reasons (late 
fertilizer procurement, late issue of coupons, late opening of markets) and this, together with 
stock-outs in some markets, led to many farmers spending long periods queuing for their inputs, 
delaying planting and/or fertilizer applications. The total cost to government and donors was 
MK10.3 billion, just under US$91 million, of which 87% was funded by the Malawi Government. 
Fertiliser sales were 17% over budget, due to the issue of supplementary coupons, while the 
Government expenditures were 25% over the budgeted cost (which itself represented just over 
40% of the Ministry of Agriculture budget).  
The analysis of evidence available (a) recognizes the programme’s potential to contribute 
positively to its stated objectives and to wider government objectives for pro-poor growth, and (b) 
indicates that the 2005/6 and 2006/7 AISPs made a positive contribution toward the achievement 
of those objectives. However it also identifies several improvements that could increase the 
programme’s effectiveness and efficiency.  
The positive contributions of the 2005/6 and 2006/7 programs include:  
•  Increased maize output: MoAFS estimated total maize production of 3.4 million tonnes, 
over 30% more than the record harvest of 2005/6. Subsequent price movements and the 
resumption of maize importation from Mozambique suggest that this is an overestimate of 
2006/7 production. Incremental maize production that can be attributed to the 2006/7 
subsidy is estimated at 670,000 tonnes, with a low estimate of just over 5000,000 tonnes 
and a high estimate of just under 900,000 tonnes. The wide range is because the 
estimates are sensitive to estimated rates of displacement of commercial fertilizer sales 
by subsidized sales, and assumptions about the effectiveness of incremental fertilizer and 
seed in improving yields
1.   
•  Improved household food security: Rural households’ own subjective ranking of their 
economic well-being was 8% higher in May/June 2007 than in 2004, and the proportion of 
households reporting a major shock from high food prices in the previous 3 years fell from 
79% in 2004 to 20% in May/June 2007. This results from increased household food 
production, higher rural wage rates and lower food prices benefiting poorer households:. 
Many of these changes can be attributed to the combined effects of the fertilizer subsidy 
programmes (both 2005/06 and 2006/07), the seed subsidy (which in 2006/7 also 
provided substantial amounts of more productive hybrid seed in addition to OPV) and 
widespread abundant, well distributed rainfall. However high maize prices in early 2008 
are likely to have had a negative impact on people’s perceptions of their well-being and 
will have seriously detracted from the benefits of the 2006/7 subsidy, and were not 
reported or expected when field work was conduced in May/June 2007.  
•  An increase over 2005/06 levels in private sector participation in the fertilizer programme: 
Private firms procured around 100,000 tonnes for SFFRFM and 6 companies sold a 
further 50,000 tonnes of subsidized fertilizer through their own retail outlets. Adding in 
non-programme commercial sales, brought the private sector to a total of just under 
180,000 tonnes sold in 2006/07, still below 2004/5 sales of over 200,000 tonnes, but up 
by 11%  from 2005/06 when the private sector was excluded from retail sales of 
subsidized inputs. Independent agrodealers did not participate in the fertilizer subsidy 
program.  
•  An increase over 2005/06 levels in private sector participation in the maize seed subsidy 
program: Not only did all of Malawi’s seed suppliers participate at the procurement level 
but retail sales through both the fertilizer distributors’ retail outlets and the participation of 
                                                 
1  These estimates assume that all incremental fertiliser was applied to maize. A small proportion of 
incremental fertiliser is likely to have been applied to other crops.    iv 
independent agrodealers (who were excluded from the fertilizer program) improved 
access to both subsidized and unsubsidized seeds for many farmers.   
 
The main determinants affecting the programme’s impacts in relation to its costs and hence its 
effectiveness and efficiency in use of scarce government resources were: 
•  the extent to which subsidized fertilizer contributed to additional total fertilizer use rather 
than displacing commercial fertilizer purchases which farmers would have made anyway 
without the subsidy;   
•  the additional maize produced from the additional fertilizer applied to farmers’ fields 
(maize-fertilizer response rate), which is affected by timeliness and method of application, 
maize variety, and rainfall; 
•  coupon targeting, which affects the degree of commercial fertilizer displacement, 
incremental maize output, programme impacts on maize prices and wage rates, and 
direct social protection benefits to poorer households;  
•  implementation design, which affects the degree to which the private sector is involved 
and whether the program contributes to or impedes competition and new entry, especially 
for currently under-served areas; and   
•  national and regional maize prices (affected by weather and a range of national, regional 
and international policy and market variables), and the extent to which additional maize 
supplies produced from the subsidy program reduced maize market prices below what 
they would have been without the subsidy and hence made grain more affordable to the 
majority of smallholder households that are purchasers of maize;  
Results of an economic benefit-cost analysis using a range of assumptions about the values of 
the above mentioned determinants demonstrate the sensitivity of programme impacts to 
management and external conditions. The estimated benefit cost ratios ranged from 0.76 to 1.36. 
These estimates demonstrate that with good management the program can yield favorable 
economic returns. Although these results provide a basis for comparing the programme’s rate of 
return with other alternative public investments, such comparisons are beyond the scope of the 
evaluation. Any use of the results for such comparisons should also take into account some of 
the more difficult to measure benefits of the AISP such as providing immediate social protection 
and stimulation of farm and non-farm growth – benefits that are not directly accounted for in 
results reported above.  
Implementation of the programme does not appear to have had adverse effects on 
macroeconomic stability or on budgetary allocations to other sectors. The large expenditures and 
management demands of the programme do, however, appear to have some adverse impacts on 
the delivery of other services by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security. 
The findings of the study suggest that there is a considerable potential to improve on the 
outcomes of the 2006/07 program. Implementing these improvements will ensure that the 
programme reaches its full potential not only in terms of better programme outcomes but also in 
terms of more efficient use of government resources. There are substantial dangers that without 
explicit action to improve effectiveness and control its costs the programme could become an 
unsustainable drain on resources, pulling down rather than promoting growth, food security and 
poverty reduction. These dangers are illustrated by the results of the benefit/cost analysis and 
are likely to be exacerbated by recent and projected increases in international fertiliser prices. 
The following areas for improvement are highlighted: 
Programme objectives: A more comprehensive and consistent framework of objectives is needed 
to resolve apparent conflicting objectives and to allow appropriate achievement targets and 
budgetary allocations to be set for long and short term plans.   v 
Targeting and displacement of commercial fertilizer purchases: National and household level 
estimates suggest that between 30 and 40 % of subsidized fertiliser purchases  displaced 
commercial purchases; high displacement rates undermine the efficiency of the programme and 
its effectiveness in delivering developmental benefits. Household survey evidence of a positive 
correlation between subsidized fertilizer acquisition and household wealth, land holding, and 
male household heads indicates that district and within-community targeting in 2006/7 led to 
significant quantities of subsidised fertiliser going to less poor households. It also shows that 
subsidised fertiliser received by these households appeared to displace a large proportion of 
commercial purchases typically made by these households in the absence of a subsidy. Ensuring 
that subsidised inputs are targeted more effectively to the poorest half of the smallholder 
population is therefore one means (along with more timely and transparent programme 
implementation, which helps farmers better plan their commercial purchases) for reducing 
displacement, and hence raising the efficiency of government investments in promoting 
productivity, growth, food security, and reduction of hunger and poverty, indeed of all programme 
objectives. At the same time, it is recognised that the targeting of subsidized inputs to different 
groups or types of people is a difficult and sensitive issue. The implementation of the 2006/07 
program and past experience with the TIPs illustrate the practical difficulties and costs of 
targeting. An alternative approach that could also be considered would be to provide a smaller 
subsidy to all households. 
Agricultural sector and programme information needs:  There are fundamental information gaps 
that prevent proper planning and management of the AISP and of agricultural and rural 
programmes. Discrepancies between MoAFS and NSO estimates of farm families and rural 
households are very disturbing, and reliable, rigorous information on smallholder production of 
major crops and of national stocks, flows and consumption of staples is critically important for 
agricultural and food security and market monitoring and policy.  
Engagement of the private sector and timely transparent implementation: Although the private 
sector's market share increased over 2005/06, it has the capacity to supply much greater 
quantities. Allowing the private sector to supply a larger share of the market in the future would 
enable the government to reduce programme costs as well as enhance the long-term viability of 
the private sector. The exclusion of independent agrodealers from the fertilizer subsidy program 
undermines past investments in the development of the agro-dealer network, which was 
expected to increase competition in input markets and farmers’ access to low cost inputs, 
particularly in under-served areas.  Mechanisms need to be developed to take advantage of the 
potential of these small scale entrepreneurs, learning from the successful integration of the 
agrodealers into the seed subsidy program
2.  In addition, uncertainty about the AISP from year to 
year depresses incentives for both fertilizer suppliers and farmers to invest in fertilizer 
procurement in general, and often delays investments. Greater consistency, transparency and 
timeliness in AISP planning and implementation is needed from government, with private sector 
commitment to systems supporting integrity and performance in their engagement in the supply 
chain. This requires a commitment from all stakeholders to the development of a mutually 
beneficial ‘transition strategy’ for greater private sector involvement in input markets. This should 
start with a reduction of government involvement in markets that are already well served by the 
private sector and then move to the design of policies and programs that support private sector 
expansion to under-served areas and more effective use of the growing network of independent 
agrodealers.  
Coordination with social protection policies and programmes: Linkages between the inputs 
subsidy voucher programme and safety nets need to be given greater attention and specific 
coordination mechanisms need to be established at different levels, with coordination in the 
central design of the subsidy and safety net programmes and coordination in local coupon 
allocation, distribution and redemption mechanisms. 
                                                 
2 It is understood that there was substantial agro-dealer participation in the 2007/8 programme.   vi 
Coordination with other policies and programmes: There are strong complementarities between 
the AISP and other investments that support agricultural and rural development, notably roads, 
agricultural research and extension, and the greater stability of maize prices. It is important that 
adequate investments are made in these areas and that AISP costs are controlled and pruned so 
that it does not starve these other investments of resources.  
Opportunities and Challenges. There are opportunities for improving the cost-effectiveness of the 
program and freeing up resources that can be used not only to buffer the program against the 
threat of rising fertilizer prices but also for other complementary investments in rural development 
to help Malawi’s rural households rise out of poverty. As the GOM and its partners continue their 
reflection on the future of AISP in 2007/08 and beyond, it will be important to seek a balance 
between the needs of farmers and suppliers for policy predictability from year to year and the 
needs of the government to keep the program costs under control and ensure high rates of return 
on their investments in the subsidy.  Nonetheless, changes in factors that the GOM cannot 
control (e.g., higher fertilizer prices, a wider range of maize prices, and the weather) have the 
potential to significantly change both the costs and economic and social protection benefits from 
those observed during the 2006/07 season; dramatic changes in external factors could severely 
challenge the GOM’s ability to sustain the programme in the future.  The extent to which the 
country is able to seize the opportunities presented by the AISP and channel the increased food 
security and rural incomes into engines of longer-term growth will be the ultimate sign of 
programme success.  
 
    vii 
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MALAWI 2006/7 AGRICULTURAL INPUT SUBSIDY EVALUATION 
FINAL REPORT: March 2008 
1. Introduction 
This report presents the main conclusions of an evaluation of the 2006/7 Agricultural Input 
Subsidy. The evaluation was conducted for the Ministry of Agriculture by a team from the 
School of Oriental and African Studies London (the team was initially within Imperial College 
London, Wadonda Consult , Michigan State University and the Overseas Development 
Institute, and was funded by DFID Malawi, USAID, and the Future Agricultures Consortium 
(with funding from DFID London).  The main objectives of the evaluation are to  
•  Assess the impact and implementation of the GoM agricultural inputs subsidy and the 
programme of support (programme memorandum is attached) at the national level and 
differential impact on households at the local level.  
•  Provide lessons for future interventions in growth and social protection. 
The evaluation addresses the major processes and factors that affect the impact of the input 
subsidy programme as set out in figure 1.1. At the heart of figure 1.1 is the implementation of 
the input subsidy programme (1). The scale of this and the way that it is done impact directly 
on coupon recipients (2a), on the input supply system (3) which is composed of private sector 
suppliers, ADMARC and SFFRFM, and on the macro-economy and its management (4). The 
livelihoods, activities and welfare of coupon recipients then affects relationships within rural 
communities and local and wider markets (for maize and ganyu) and this impacts upon non-
recipients (2b). All of these components interact with each other and with wider factors in the 
environment, shown on the right hand side of the diagram. Another set of interactions of 
particular importance to this study are likely to arise between impacts of the input subsidy on 
the one hand and impacts of other (formal and informal) social protection measures. 
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activities Other Social Protection measures Other Social Protection measures  2 
The evaluation has been implemented and managed in four modules related to the analytical 
framework set out in figure 1.1, and supported by cross cutting activities.  
1.  The Input subsidy implementation module investigated the scale, cost, modalities, 
timing and (in focus group discussions) targeting of input subsidy distribution. This 
module was addressed extensively in a substantial report presented in March 2007, 
updated in May 2007. The report included extensive recommendations for the 
implementation of future subsidy programmes. This report will present only a very brief 
summary of the main conclusions and recommendations from that report, but also 
contains a new section on access to coupons, drawing on household level survey data 
that was not available at the time of the interim report.  
2.  The Rural household impact module has involved collaboration with the National 
Statistical Office in its conduct of a household sample survey and analysis both of 
household survey data and of in-depth qualitative focus group discussions and semi-
structured household interviews conducted by the team.  
3.  The Input supply system module addressed questions about the impact of the 
programme on the private sector. The March 2007 report focused on impacts at the 
supplier/importer level. The current report summarizes and updates those findings 
drawing on supplementary information provided by suppliers and also adds information 
on impacts at the retail level drawing on further analysis of a survey of retailers in six 
Districts. 
4.  The Macro-economy impact module examines questions about fiscal sustainability, 
budget performance, investment/ social protection trade-offs and impacts on and 
relations with crop price policies, market distortions and projected prices.  
5.  Cross cutting research activities have drawn on a variety of other information sources 
to augment information from the different modules.  
The report is structured in 12 sections related to these modules. Following this introduction is 
a brief presentation in section 2 of background to the 2006/7 agricultural input subsidy 
programme.  This draws heavily on and in places reproduces material from the interim report 
presented in March 2007, but is considered essential context for the remainder of the report. 
Section 3 provides a description of data sources and analytical methodologies used. Section 4 
then summarises the implementation achievements of the 2006/7 subsidy (this topic was 
addressed extensively in the substantial report presented in March 2007, updated in May 
2007 and this report presents only a summary of the main conclusions and recommendations 
from that report) and section 5 provides some general information on the 2006/7 season. 
Sections 6 to 11 provide the major information regarding the impact of the subsidy programme, 
broadly following the modular approach to the study, though recognising strong interactions 
between modules. Section 6 considers impacts on input use and on the input sectors, and 
section 7 examines issues around coupon distribution and factors affecting household access 
to coupons and subsidised inputs. Sections 8 to 10  then discuss impacts on production and 
on rural livelihoods and the rural economy, before section 11 briefly considers impacts on the 
macro economy. Section 12 concludes with a synthesis of the main findings and 
recommendations for future policy and for future investigations.  
Readers familiar with the March 2007 report may not wish to read sections 2 and 4 of this 
report as they summarise material presented in greater detail in the March 2007  report. 
Evaluation of the Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme (AISP) is a complex and challenging 
task as 
•  The programme is highly politicised due to its importance to the people of Malawi and 
its very large cost 
•  There are multiple stakeholders with a wide range of differing interests in different 
aspects of the programme   3 
•  There are multiple potential direct and indirect impacts of the AISP which interact with 
and are dependent upon other major policies, and these interactions occur at multiple 
levels  and involve a variety of different logistical, market, livelihood, fiscal, social and 
political processes which are often highly variable, changing, imperfectly understood, 
and the subject of much debate 
•  There are likely to be dynamic impacts of the program that influence maize production 
and price levels in future years (e.g., the impacts of the input subsidy program have 
undoubtedly affected current maize prices, which influence real incomes, future price 
expectations and land and labour allocation decisions, and these in turn have wide 
ranging effects on economic activities and welfare)   
•  There are significant data and methodological difficulties in undertaking the analyses 
required to provide clear answers about the impact of the programme.  
 
2.  Background to the inputs subsidy programme 
2.1  Agricultural, food security and input policies and performance to 2005  
The importance of agriculture and of maize to the Malawian economy and to the livelihoods of 
most Malawian people is the critical backdrop to the AISP, together with the low agricultural 
and maize productivity, and associated high national and individual/household food insecurity
3. 
Table 2.1 provides some key indicators of this, with large numbers of very poor people 
working on very small areas of land which are predominantly planted to maize. Continual 
cultivation of maize on the same land without addition of organic or inorganic fertilizers leads 
to low yields, and ‘local’ varieties of maize show a lower response to inorganic fertilizer 
(principally nitrogen) than hybrid and, to a lesser extent, composite or open pollinated varieties 
(OPVs). Low yields then lead to inability to afford the purchase of inputs. Purchase of inputs 
on credit is also not possible for most farmers because the costs of credit administration are 
too high, as are risks for both borrowers and lenders, and low volumes of input demand and 
poor infrastructure and high transport costs lead to high input costs and inhibit the 
development of input supply systems in less accessible areas. Highly variable maize prices 
(discussed below) add to the risks of input use (whether purchased with cash or credit).   
There is a major dilemma in maize pricing. Higher maize prices are needed to make 
purchased input use more profitable, but only 10% of Malawian maize producers are net 
sellers of maize, while 60% are net buyers of maize (the vast majority of these are only buyers, 
not making any sales, see table2.2), and hence most people’s livelihoods and food security 
are damaged by high maize prices  High maize price variability damages both producers and 
consumers, as low prices present risks to producer investments in inputs by those producers 
who aim to produce a marketable surplus while high prices present risks to consumers (who 
include the majority of smallholders as noted above). Poor access to international and 
domestic markets (due in large part to historically low public investment in transport 
infrastructure), seasonal scarcities, and poor local market development (due to low and 
uncertain volumes, high costs of transport, uncertain government intervention) have led in the 
past to high intra- and inter- seasonal maize price variation, the latter further depressing 
market development. Risks of high maize prices encourage poor consumers to grow as much 
of their own staple food as possible, even at very low levels of productivity. At the same time 
there are limited higher-return income earning opportunities within or outside agriculture.  
Local markets for horticultural and livestock products and for local services are constrained by 
low incomes (vegetables accounted for 1% of food expenditure shares and 14% of 
smallholder households nationwide reported selling vegetable crops in 2004 (IHS2 data, 
                                                 
3 Reasons for the high dependency on maize as opposed to other food crops are debated, but include 
dietary preferences, different crops’ relative calorific yields per ha in different agro-ecologies, farmers’ 
familiarity with the crop, and long standing strong government policies aimed at promoting maize 
production and input and crop marketing subsidies focused on maize.   4 
Malawi Poverty and Vulnerability Analysis, 2006) .  The development of smallholder 
involvement in export crops in Malawi remains relatively low, in part because of historical 
policy impediments, uncertain government support for private investment to promote export 
crops, and in part because of low public investment in infrastructure and other public goods to 
nurture the development of these markets (Buccola and McCandlish, 1999; Kherallah et al., 
2002;  Brunetti, A.  et al., 1997a; Brunetti, A. et al., 1997b).    
 
Table 2.1: Background Information on Smallholder Agriculture 
 North Center  South National
      
Rural population (% total pop)  10 38  40 88
        
Income and Poverty       
   Median expenditure/capita (MK '000)  17 20.9  16.9 17.5
   Poor households (% rural pop)  56 47  64 52
   Ultra-poor households (% rural pop)  26 16  32 22
        
Nutrition and Food Security       
  Mean rural daily per capita consumption (kcal)  2,253 2,482  2,210 2,332
  Mean rural daily per capita consumption (kcal): poor   1,738 1,811  1,703 1,746
   Incidence of stunting in children (% 6 mths - 5 years)  39.6 47.9  40.8 43.7
   Incidence of underweight children (% 6 mths - 5 years)  16.1 20  17.2 18.3
   Share of calories from own production  0.53 0.58  0.47 0.52
   Median month 04/05 harvest own food exhausted  
(actual)*    September
   Median month 05/06 harvest own food exhausted  
(est.)*     November
   Suffered crop yield loss last 5 years (%)  NA NA  NA 68.8
   Suffered large rise in food prices last 5 years (%)  NA NA  NA 79.2
        
Smallholder Agriculture       
   Landholdings   less than 0.5 ha /hh(%)  12.1 15.4  25.4 19.9
                           0.5 to 1.0 ha (%) /hh  19.3 25.2  28.7 26.3
                           1.0 to 2.0 ha (%) /hh   30.1 33.5  24.9 29
                           more than 2.0 ha /hh (%)  28.8 16.2  7.7 13.4
   Crop cultivation         
      Maize growers (%)  93 97  99 97
         Local varieties (%)  38 55  62 56
         Composite varieties (%)  5 6  7 7
         Hybrid varieties (%)  58 67  59 55
      Cassava growers (%)  45 11  24 21
      Tobacco growers (%)  22 25  6 15
   Fertilizer use (kg/ha)  32 45  24 34
   Access to credit for food crop inputs (%)  2.5 4.2 3.0 3.4
   Access to ag extension (%)  24 12  11 13
Farm households 2006 (‘000) **   388 1,248  1,646 3,282
Rural households 2006 (‘000) (inter-censal growth rates)  255 1,026  1,196 2,477
 
Source: IHS2 2003/4 survey except * (own calculations from NSO AWMS 2006) and ** (Ministry of Agriculture). 
Ministry of Agriculture estimates of % maize that is hybrid are much lower. Divergences in farm and rural 
household estimates are discussed later in section 7.1 
Productivity and investment in productive activities is further constrained by people’s poverty 
and by their vulnerability to a wide variety of (often related) shocks, particularly low crop yields 
(as a result of poor rainfall), sickness (with high rates of morbidity and mortality), high food   5 
prices, and loss of income from employment or remittances. Women, who play a key role in 
agricultural production and rural livelihoods, tend to be particularly vulnerable to these shocks. 
Macro-economic conditions in recent years have also inhibited growth, with high real interest 
rates, high rates of inflation, and significant devaluations of the Kwacha (although macro-
economic management has improved recently).  
 
Table 2.2 Farm maize market position and wealth characteristics.  
Value of household 
assets (USD) 2007 
Household position with 
respect to the maize market 
2006/07 season 
 
% of total 
households 
in sample 
(n=2591)  mean Median 
Sold maize/did not buy (n=185)  7.1%  519.94  127.04 
Bought maize and/or maize 
meal/did not sell (n=1461)  56.4% 211.77 42.04 
Bought and sold – net seller 
(n=80)  3.1% 599.35  157.71 
Bought and sold – net buyer 
(n=105)  4.1% 154.42 69.29 
Bought and sold – net zero 
(n=9)  0.3% 348.18 45.64 
Neither bought nor sold – 
autarkic (n=751)  29.0% 339.99 82.71 
 100%     
  Source:  AISS household survey, 2007.  
 
Agricultural, rural and national economic development are therefore constrained by a number 
of interacting poverty and productivity traps which constrain input and maize market 
development, investments in maize intensification, diversification out of maize into other 
agricultural and non-agricultural activities, the ability of (particularly poor) rural people to 
protect themselves from shocks, and wider local and national economic development.  The 
result is a vicious circle of unstable maize prices inhibiting (a) net producers’ investment in 
maize production, (b) net consumers’ reliance on the market for maize  purchases, and (c) 
poor consumers exits from low productivity maize cultivation. These in turn inhibit the growth 
of the non-farm economy. This vicious circle, illustrated in figure 2.1, is exacerbated by, 
among other things, unstable and changing input and maize marketing policies, weather 
instability, poor road infrastructure, and constrained private sector development.  At the heart 
of this are household, local and national vulnerability and poverty traps. 
Understanding of the nature, causes and relative importance of these problems varies (indeed 
elements of the analysis above are not universally accepted, nor is it suggested that this brief 
summary is a comprehensive account of the complex issues involved). As a result a wide 
variety of different policies, programmes, projects and other activities have been debated and 
implemented by different stakeholders (politicians, government ministries and agencies, 
NGOs, CBOs, commercial organizations, donors, rural people themselves) to address 
different aspects of these problems.  
Input subsidy and maize market intervention policies have been a longstanding and major 
focus of government and donors. From the mid 70s to the early 90s government financed a 
universal fertilizer subsidy, subsidized smallholder credit and controlled maize prices through 
the activities of ADMARC and SACA. This system began to break down with partial market 
liberalization and cash flow difficulties in the late 80s/ early 90s, but then completely collapsed 
in the mid 90s as a result of the coincidence of widespread harvest failure (and credit default, 
in the absence of insurance), multi-party elections (undermining repayment), continuing 
pressure for and partial implementation of liberalization and structural adjustment policies   6 
(constraining government expenditure), and substantial devaluation (raising local fertilizer 
prices).  
 
Figure 2.1 Vicious Circle of the Low Productivity Maize Production Trap 
 
Policy changes also included the liberalization of burley tobacco production (formerly 
restricted to estates), which led to widespread uptake of burley tobacco production by 
smallholders in the central and northern regions and a major cash injection with multipliers 
feeding through into the rest of the non-farm rural economy and the use of tobacco income to 
buy seed and fertilizer for maize production, and market development  (Harrigan, 2003). 
However Harrigan also notes that while there were significant numbers of poorer smallholders 
with very limited land growing tobacco, tobacco began to crowd out maize on these farms. 
This led to fears of declines in maize production when devaluation of the Malawi Kwacha and 
the removal of input subsidies made use of fertilizer un-economic for surplus maize 
production.(see figure 2.6). 
Within Malawi there was then a widespread perception that falling fertilizer support was 
leading to falling maize production and a food and political crisis, reflecting political pre-
occupations with maize production and consumption. Government has, with mixed donor 
support, since 1998/99 reinstated a variety of interventions subsidizing maize fertilizer and 
seed access (principally starter pack, TIP, and APIP), with intermittent interventions in maize 
markets. A number of programmes have also promoted ‘inputs for assets’ where rural people 
work on (for example) community infrastructure schemes and are paid in kind with inputs (or 
with coupons with which they can obtain inputs).   
Analysis of the agricultural performance from the late 1990s is complicated by difficulties in 
separating out the effects of poor rainfall and of the different policy changes responding to the 
perceptions of an impending food crisis. Maize production, overall food production, and per 
capita food production growth all appear to have increased through the 1990s and into the 
2000s (Figures 2.2 and 2.3), despite some years of low production and severe food shortages 
in the 2000s.  Official Ministry of Agriculture estimates indicate that maize production rose at 
an annual rate of 2.1 percent per annum between 1990 and 2005.  Major contributors to the 
reported growth in maize production between 1990 and 2000 are two years of very poor 
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ROADS  7 
rainfall in 1991/92 and 1992/93 and two years of good rainfall with universal distribution of 
small free fertiliser packs in 1998/9 and 1999/2000.   According to FAO statistics, overall food 
production grew at a rate of 3.4% per year, while per capita production grew at 1.9% per year 
(Figure 2.3
4).  However, data on cassava production trends are notoriously unreliable and 
most likely lead to an overstatement of the trend growth in food production observed in Figure 
2.3.  Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that root crop production has increased in Malawi 
and has made some positive contribution to food production growth.  Fertilizer use also has 
risen impressively through the 1990s (Figure 2.4).   
There has also been increasing recognition of the potential role of private input distribution 
systems in the development of smallholder agriculture. From the mid 1990s private input 
suppliers took over an increasing share of the market from ADMARC and SFFRFM 
(parastatals responsible for importing and distributing fertilizers for smallholders) and by the 
end of the 1990s were responsible for over 70% of growing national fertilizer imports and for a 
large proportion of sales to smallholders. However in 2004 there were announcements that 
fertilizer would be subsidized and SFFRFM placed large orders for the purchase of 23:21 and 
urea. This created considerable uncertainty for private sector fertilizer importers and 
distributors and is widely believed to have led to farmers holding back fertilizer purchases. 
Following difficulties in procurement of urea by SFFRFM, government implemented instead 
another TIP programme, for 2 million households, while private sector fertilizer importers 
carried forward significant unsold stocks to the following season. 
                                                 
4 There are apparent discrepancies between FAOStat figures and both Ministry of Agriculture Crop 
Estimates and NSO population growth estimates.   8 
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    Note:  time trend computed from 1985 to 2006 (excluding the 2006/07 harvest). 
    Source:  Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Malawi. 
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Note:  trend estimates based on 1990 to 2006 harvest years (excluding 2007). 













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Recent years have also seen an increasing emphasis on social protection policies and 
interventions. From an agenda that initially focused on relatively small targeted programmes and 
large emergency responses to crises following poor agricultural seasons, social protection has 
increasingly become concerned with addressing chronic and seasonal hunger and with systemic 
vulnerability in rural livelihoods, and hence with maize production, access to inputs, and maize 
markets. Views on the relationship between social protection and agricultural development policy 
objectives and interventions have, however, differed among different donors, government 
agencies, and other stakeholders. This, together with political and economic changes in Malawi 
and changes in donor policies, has resulted in major year to year changes in input supply systems, 
and these have become a major source of uncertainty to all stakeholders.  Pertinent major events 
and changes in policy are summarized in table 2.3. 
2.2  Fertiliser sales in Malawi 
A brief overview of the structure and evolution of the Malawi fertilizer industry was provided in the 
interim report in March 2007, and elements of this are summarised in section 7. It is necessary 
near the outset of this report, however, to present basic information on volumes and structure of 
fertiliser imports and sales.  Figure 2.4 shows a striking trend of increasing fertiliser sales over the 
last 30 years
5, even without the dramatic increase reported for 2005/6 and 2006/7.  Trend growth 
in fertilizer use was 6.0% per year from 1984/85 to 2004/05 . 
 
 Figure 2.4 National Fertiliser Sales, 1972/73-2006/7 
 
  
                                                 
5 Sales up to 1991/2 are ADMARC smallholder sales reported by Conroy 1993, citing Darudec 1991: these 
exclude sales to estates, which are included in data for subsequent years. From 1992/3 total sales are 
reported, to 2004/5 from IFDC and in 2005/6 and 2006/7 from data compiled by David Kamchacha using 
data collection procedures similar to those used by IFDC, with some consistency adjustments using data 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Another feature of change in the Malawi fertilizer industry has been the increasing involvement of 
the private sector. Up to the early 1990’s only ADMARC was permitted to sell fertilizer (at a 
subsidy) to smallholder farmers while private importers supplied ADMARC and supplied 
commercial estates. With liberalization of the sector and the removal of the subsidy in the mid 
1990s, the market opened up, and the private sector became increasingly involved. Table 2.4 
shows the changing extent of private and public sector activity in the fertilizer market over the last 
10 years, distinguishing between public and private sector activity at 3 different stages in the 
fertilizer market chain in Malawi – importation of fertilizer, distribution and sales of fertilizer to 
farmers, and purchase of fertilizer for on farm use. Data presented here for 2004/5, 2005/6 and 
2006/7 differ from those presented in the interim report, following a more comprehensive return of 
fertiliser imports, purchases and sales by fertiliser importers and wholesalers. This has led to 
substantial increases in estimated imports and sales over these two years, above the estimates in 
the interim report.  
A number of points of interest should be noted in table 2.4.and in figure 2.5. First, over the last 10 
years the private sector has had the major share of both importation and sales of fertilizers, and, 
with the exception of 2006/7, private sector imports have been rising. The private sector has also 
had the major share of sales, though these declined in 2005/6 and 2006/7 with the large-scale 
subsidy programmes implemented largely through ADMARC and SFFRFM.  A notable feature of 
the table is the trend of increasing fertilizer imports and an inverse correlation between quantities 
of fertilizer distributed by the parastatals and by the private sector.  In terms of imports, the private 
sector has accounted for an increasing share of total imports over time, and the government has 
often relied on the private sector to import fertilizer used under subsidy programmes.  Total sales 
from 1992/93 to 2004/5 are generally flat, with a rising trend from 2000/1. This, with large 
variations in the volumes of subsidized purchases from one year to the next, ,suggests that a 
significant proportion of subsidized sales displace commercial sales. If this is the case, and many 
in private sector believe this to be so, then it suggests that increases in overall fertilizer use as a 
result of subsidized sales are some way below the volumes subsidized. This very important issue 
for the subsidy programme is examined more extensively later in section 6. It should also be noted 
that the data on fertilizer sales are not as clear cut as the discussion above might suggest
6.  
2.3  Constraints to smallholder fertiliser use in maize  production 
Constraints to smallholder fertiliser arise from two problems, profitability and affordability.  
Profitability of fertiliser use is commonly considered in terms of the Value: Cost Ratio, or VCR, 
which compares the total value of extra output produced by a unit of fertiliser with its cost. The 
VCR depends upon the productivity of fertiliser (the amount of grain produced per unit of fertiliser 
nutrient) and the ratio of crop and fertiliser prices: VCR = O/N * Po/Pn (where   O/N = units of 
output produced per unit of nutrient,  Po is the price of the output and Pn is the price of nutrient). A 
VCR greater than 1 is needed just for extra output to cover the cost of fertiliser needed to produce 
it, but other costs associated with fertiliser use may need a VCR some way above 1 for fertiliser 
use to be profitable: these other costs include extra costs of fertiliser finance and application; of 
harvesting, processing and transport of extra produce; and allowance for production and market 
risks. In developing countries it is generally considered that a VCR of 2 is the minimum required to 
make fertiliser use profitable (Morris et al, 2007), but higher ratios may be needed in risky 
environments. Applying this to maize production and taking nitrogen as the nutrient and a grain: N 
ratio of 15, the price of nitrogen must be no more 7.5 times the price of maize if the VCR is to be 
greater than 2. 
Maize prices are highly variable in Malawi, both within and between seasons (see figures 5.2 and 
5.3), and the price of fertilisers has been steadily rising in nominal terms (see figure 2.6).  As a 
result, the VCR for maize has varied markedly in the last few years, as shown in figure 2.7, 
                                                 
6 In the interim report a less complete dataset gathered from the fertiliser industry and triangulated against 
key informant interviews suggested much lower imports and sales in 2005/6 (estimated at 290,000 and 
224,000 tonnes respectively compared with 367,000 and 292,000 reported above) and in 2006/7 (estimated 
at 209,000 and 259,000 tonnes respectively compared with 247,000 and 303,000 tonnes reported above).   13
depending upon whether peak pre-harvest prices or low post-harvest prices are used for pricing 
maize, and in the latter case it has generally been below 2, while in the former case it has 
generally but not always been above 2
7. This analysis suggests that profitability of fertiliser use on 
maize is a constraint to its use on maize grown for sale at or near harvest. Where maize is grown 
for own consumption then it may be valued more highly, using peak post harvest prices and with 
VCRs greater than 2. Furthermore whereas considerations of risk may lead to a lower subjective 
valuation of VCRs when producing maize for sale, it may lead to a higher subjective valuation of  
VCRs when producing maize for own consumption (as farmers fear the effects of a bad year on 
maize purchase prices).  
 
Figure 2.6 Nitrogen and Maize prices, 1996-2007 
 
Affordability of fertiliser purchase depends upon the cost of fertilisers and farmers’ access to short 
term working capital – in terms of savings, their ability to borrow, and costs of borrowing. Farm 
household liquidity is widely recognised to be a problem for poor farm households around the 
world with on the one hand a ‘hungry gap’ during the cropping period (when farmers need to invest 
labour, seed and other inputs in crop production while food stocks from the previous season are 
running low, and children are particularly susceptible to sickness) and on the other very high costs 
in borrowing and an absence of low cost input finance services. Hungry gap problems at the 
livelihood level are exacerbated by rural economy market effects (depressing wage rates and 
asset prices and raising food prices). These problems are widely recognised as very severe for 
poor rural households in Malawi, causing severe production and welfare problems in rural areas
8.  
                                                 
7 Maize prices used in calculation of the VCRs in figure 2.6 are derived from retail market data: farmgate 
prices are likely to be lower, further depressing the VCR for post-harvest maize sales. Note that fertiliser 
prices have been compared with the previous season’s maize prices to represent information available to 
farmers ex ante.  
8 Table 2.1 for example shows that the median month for maize stocks to run out is from September to 
November, and in 2003/4 one bag of fertiliser was around 10% of median per capita rural expenditure and 
over 20% of median per capita expenditure of the lowest expenditure quintile (calculated from NSO 2005 
and 2003/4 season fertiliser prices from SFFRFM).  























































Figure 2.7 Maize/Nitrogen Value to Cost Ratios (VCRs), 1997-2007 
 
Improving the profitability of fertiliser use in maize production requires lower fertiliser prices (as a 
result either of greater efficiency in fertiliser supply and reduction in transport costs for importation 
and distribution or of a subsidy), higher maize prices, or greater efficiency in the use of fertiliser 
(raising the grain output: N ratio)
9. Changes to maize prices and improved efficiency of fertiliser 
use will not, however, improve the affordability of fertiliser for large numbers of poor rural 
households in Malawi. This requires very substantial reductions in fertiliser prices and/or the 
development of low cost and accessible financial services. The development of such financial 
services for fertiliser use in maize production requires that maize be profitable, that smallholders 
have other sources of cash income that can be used to can repay fertiliser loans when the majority 
of the maize they produce is for home consumption, and that very low cost systems are used for 
loan disbursement and recovery
10.   
2.4    The 2005/6 Input Subsidy  
In 2005/6, following a poor harvest in 2004/5 the government decided that it would implement a 
fertilizer subsidy to promote access to and use of fertilizers in both maize and tobacco production 
in order to increase agricultural productivity and food security. A full description of the programme 
was provided in the interim report. The subsidy was implemented through the distribution of 
coupons, in two stages, the first in proportion according to cropped maize and tobacco areas, 
although actual allocations per ha and per grower varied widely. Coupons were distributed to 
districts and TAs (traditional authorities) by the Ministry of Agriculture. TAs were supposed to 
allocate coupons between villages, to Village Development Committees, who were then supposed 
to identify recipients to receive coupons which they could then redeem, at a reduced cash price, 
for any of the four fertilizer types. There was considerable variation between areas in the criteria 
determining prioritization and selection of beneficiaries, numbers of people receiving coupons, and 
                                                 
9 A ratio of 15 was used in the calculations for figure 2.6, but higher ratios (of 22 to 28) are possible with 
hybrid seed and good management on farmer demonstrations and trials (see table B2, Annex B).  
10 The size of loans needed for fertiliser purchase as compared to annual incomes (and hence very high 
gearing) also raises ethical issues unless loans are accompanied by effective insurance systems.  


































numbers of coupons received per recipient household, and the situation was complicated by the 
government issuing supplementary coupons, which tended to be issued in an ad hoc way late in 
the season. 6,000MT OPV maize seed were also offered for sale without coupons at a price of 
MK150/3kg as compared with a market price of MK500/3kg, although there are some reports that 
some of the OPV seed was of poor quality. 
A total of 147,000 tonnes of fertilizer (or approximately 2.9 million 50kg bags) were to be 
subsidized in the scheme, with 55,000 tonnes each of 23:21 and urea for maize), and 22,000 
tonnes and 15,000 tonnes of compound D and CAN respectively for tobacco. About 70,000 tonnes 
(48%) were supplied by private sector importers and the remaining 77,000 tonnes were imported 
by SFFRFM. All distribution of subsidised fertilizer and seed was by ADMARC and SFFRFM. 
Fertiliser deliveries were late to many areas as a result of late ordering of imports, and distribution 
priority was given to the south and centre where the rains started earlier. However distribution 
within regions was not always consistent and some areas received deliveries exceeding budgeted 
fertilizer sales, while others went short Sales of fertilizer were dependent upon both the distribution 
of fertilizers to unit markets in EPAs and farmers’ holding of coupons to redeem fertilizer.  
Holders of coupons were entitled to redeem coupons for fertilizer at the rate of 1 coupon and 
MK950 for one 50kg bag of 23:20 or urea, and at 1 coupon plus MK1,450 for one 50kg bag of 
Compound D or CAN. It appears that many coupons allocated (but not marked) as tobacco 
coupons may have been used to buy ‘maize fertiliser’. Sales continued into January, and in 
different areas were limited either by a lack of fertilizer stock or by a lack of coupons. In the latter 
case supplementary coupons were used in some areas, but shortages of fertilizer in time for it to 
be useful meant that significant numbers of coupons were not used. ADMARC/SFFRFM report 
total subsidy sales of 131,803 tonnes, which would represent 2.62 million coupons. No information 
has been available on seed sales.  
The programme is reported to have cost MK7.2 billion against a budget of MK5.1 billion. These are 
direct costs of purchase and distribution of fertilizer, net of sales receipts. They do not include 
overhead costs. Benefits from the subsidy need to be evaluated in terms of incremental fertiliser 
use on smallholder maize and tobacco and its direct and indirect impact on production and 
livelihoods.  
In the interim report 2005/6 private sector sales were reported to be more than 50% lower than 
sales in the previous year, suggesting substantial displacement of commercial sales and hence 
incremental fertilizer use on maize as a result of the subsidy was estimated to be around 45,000 
tonnes, considerably less than the subsidized sales of just under 110,000 tonnes of ‘maize 
fertilisers’.  Subsequent upward revision of 2005/6 private sales leads to a downward revision of 
estimated displacement and hence increased incremental fertilizer sales and maize production.   
The widespread popularity of the programme suggests that it is perceived to have had a beneficial 
impact on people’s livelihoods, and again these are discussed later in sections 5 and 7 of the 
report. 
3.  Data sources and analytical methods 
As outlined earlier, the evaluation has been implemented and managed in four modules related to 
the analytical framework for investigating impact as set out earlier in the introduction, and 
supported by cross cutting activities.  These four modules examined input subsidy implementation, 
rural household impacts, input supply system impacts and, briefly, macro economic impacts. Cross 
cutting research activities drew on a variety of other information sources to augment information 
from the modules above.  
Information has been drawn from a wide range of sources in writing this report. Information on 
implementation of the programme is derived from Ministry of Agriculture data: information 
compiled by the Logistics Unit has been particularly important. Fertiliser and seed importers and 
sellers have also provided information, in key informant interviews and an initial data collection 
exercise in January and February, and also for a more systematic compilation of figures on   16
imports, sales, purchases and stocks conducted by David Kamchacha for the study, in the period 
June to August 2007.   
Focus group discussions and key informant interviews were conducted in February 2007 in six 
districts (Rumphi, Mzimba, Kasungu, Lilongwe, Machinga and Blantyre), gathering information 
from a range of stakeholders involved in implementation of the programme and from rural people. 
At the same time a survey of 271 retail outlets was conducted in these districts (see Section 6).  
Much of the analysis in this report is based on smallholder household survey data.  The data is 
derived from two nationally-representative panel surveys, both implemented by the National 
Statistical Office (NSO) of the Government of Malawi.  The Integrated Household Survey-2 (IHS-2) 
was conducted in 2004, enumerating over 11,000 households.  The IHS-2 covered 2 crop seasons 
as some households’ reported information on crop production and input use from the 2002/03 
production season (a relatively good production year), while other households interviewed later in 
2004 reported crop production and input use for the 2003/04 season (a moderate to good crop 
growing season in most areas). 
In May/June 2007, the NSO re-interviewed 3,298 households in 175 enumeration areas in 28 
districts, of whom roughly 3,100 were previously sampled and interviewed in the IHS-2 survey.   
We refer to this 2007 survey as the AISS. Households and enumeration areas within each district 
were selected randomly.  After excluding households with missing information, obvious data errors, 
those stating that they farmed over 20 hectares of land, and those that could not be properly 
matched between the two surveys, the sample was reduced to 2,431 households.  Information on 
community wide variables was also collected with a community questionnaire administered to key 
informants in each enumeration area.  
Thus, final analysis is based on the balanced panel of 2,431 households in the smallholder sector 
that were jointly interviewed in 2006/07 and either 2002/03 or 2003/04.  For 1,101 of these 
households, information on crop production and input use pertains to the 2002/03 and 2006/07 
years.  Information on the remaining 1,330 households pertains to the 2003/04 and 2006/07 years.  
The AISS survey was designed to provide information by district and by major livelihood zone (as 
defined by {Malawi National Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 2005 #17). Details of the 
sample are provided in table 3.1. The sample design provides, with appropriate weightings, 
unbiased national and district estimates based on NSO estimates of rural population by district. 
These estimates (of just under 2.5 million households) are considerably below Ministry of 
Agriculture estimates of 3.3 million farm families. It should be noted that for some of the small 
livelihood zones the sample is too small to draw reliable conclusions (Misuku Hills, northern 
Karonga, central Karonga, Mzimba self sufficient and Pirilongwe Hills all had samples of less than 
100 households (see table 3.1) from 5 or less enumeration areas. Urban, peri-urban and protected 
areas (national parks and reserves) were omitted from the sample.  
There have unfortunately been considerable delays in the processing of the data from this survey. 
This report, and the analysis it contains, have therefore been forced to use data which have not 
been properly cleaned in that queries to NSO regarding large numbers of outliers or 
inconsistencies have not been properly checked back and corrected against data entries on 
questionnaire forms. This has reduced the sample size available for analysis and may also 
introduce bias. Particular problems have been encountered with data on crop areas and 
production. These problems appear to exist, to different degrees, in both the IHS2 and AISS data. 
The Evaluation Team put considerable effort into cross checking and cleaning the IHS2 data on 
crop areas and production while waiting for the AISS data, but time constraints have prevented the 
same effort in cleaning the AISS data. Difficulties arise from use of highly variable and poorly 
defined units for measuring field areas and crop production and also from apparent data entry slips 
with decimal points and coding of units.  The poor quality of the AISS crop area and production 
data, and the late or non-delivery of cleaned data by the NSO means that regrettably it has not 
been possible to use any of the AISS crop area and production data in the analysis in this report. 
Other data collected in the IHS2 and/or in the AISS are inherently less prone to error, and the 
report therefore contains analysis of data on household composition; fertiliser coupon and input 
acquisition and use; assets; food security; subjective well being; and community variables.    17
 
Table 3.1 AISS Sample by district and main livelihood zones 
District  Sample 
households 
 Livelihood  Zone  Sample 
households 
Chitipa  100    Chitipa Maize and Millet  84 
Karonga  98   Misuku  Hills  16 
Nkhata Bay  109   Northern  Karonga  32 
Rumphi  103   Central  Karonga  34 
Mzimba  119    Nkhata Bay Cassava  117 
Kasungu  134    Western Rumphi and Mzimba  102 
Nkhotakota  120   Mzimba  Self-Sufficient  86 
Ntchisi  120   Northern  Lakeshore  178 
Dowa  128   Kasungu-Lilongwe  Plain  719 
Salima  103    Rift Valley Escarpment  228 
Lilongwe  137   Southern  Lakeshore  105 
Mchinji  120    Border Productive Highlands  114 
Dedza  160   Shire  Highlands  371 
Ntcheu  139   Pirilongwe  Hills  77 
Mangochi  172    Lake Chilwa - Phalombe Plain  357 
Machinga  139   Middle  Shire  251 
Zomba  157   Lower  Shire  259 
Chiradzulu  120    Thyolo-Mulanje Tea Estates  168 
Blantyre  126   Total  3,298 
Mwanza  109      
Thyolo  148      
Mulanje  140      
Phalombe  120      
Chikwawa  140      
Nsanje  119      
Balaka  118      
Total  3298      
 
A variety of analytical techniques were used to investigate (a) the patterns and determinants of 
different households’ access to subsidised fertiliser and (b) impact of the subsidy on different 
households and the rural economy. Summary tables of means, medians and cross tabulations are 
used to provide general contextual and comparative information. Information is presented on 
different topics by regions, districts, or livelihood zones (as defined by MVAC).  
Relatively simple cross tabulations of access to coupons against household characteristics provide 
valuable information about what types of household in what areas received coupons and fertiliser 
and what they did with them. Probit analysis of AISS data was used to learn something about the 
determinants of different households’ access to coupons, regressing receipt of subsidised fertiliser 
and, for recipient households, the amount of subsidised fertiliser received against a range of 
different area and household characteristics.   
Impact of the subsidy on fertiliser use, taking account of possible displacement effects, was 
estimated in two ways. First, time series regressions of national commercial fertilizer use on 
national subsidized fertilizer purchases or receipt by farmers were used to estimate the degree of 
displacement and incremental fertilizer use from the distribution of an additional ton of subsidized 
fertilizer. Displacement and incremental use were also estimated at the household level from AISS 
data by comparing changes between 2004 and 2006/7 in commercial fertiliser purchases against 
purchases of subsidised fertilisers.     18
Impacts of the subsidy programme on rural livelihoods for different types of household were 
investigated using livelihood models. Cluster analysis was conducted to identify major livelihood 
types in each of the major livelihood zones identified by MVAC ({Malawi National Vulnerability 
Assessment Committee, 2005 #17). Models described in Dorward ({Dorward, 2003 #18;Dorward, 
2006 #19}) were updated to 2003/4 prices and structural changes were introduced to fit them to 
the purpose of investigating subsidy impacts. Household characteristics for the different livelihood 
types identified by the cluster analysis for the two largest livelihood zones (Kasungu-Lilongwe 
Plain and Shire Highlands Zone)  were then introduced to allow simulation of the direct effects for 
different household types of access to subsidised coupons. Wider effects on the local rural 
economy (on maize prices and ganyu wages) were then investigated by simulating aggregated 
effects of subsidy access on different household / livelihood types (again using methods described 
in Dorward, A.R., 2003; Dorward, A.R., 2006).   
Work on the IHS2 data set has highlighted a particular issue that does not appear to have been 
recognised in published analysis of IHS2 data, problems arising from the phased sampling of 
different enumeration areas. While the IHS2 sample design should provide unbiased district 
estimates of household expenditure and poverty rates, analysis of the determinants of household 
welfare should take account of the timing of household interviews. Substantial variation is 
observed in estimated poverty rates for enumeration areas sampled at different times of year. It 
should also be noted that crop area and production data apply to the 2002/3 season for 
households interviewed earlier in the enumeration programme and to the 2003/4 season for 
households interviewed later in the enumeration programme.  
In addition to the household survey, further key informant interviews and focus group discussions 
were held in six districts in July. These covered issues of household access and use of coupons 
and inputs and of livelihood and community change. Focus group discussions encouraged 
participants to identify different types of household in the community and to discuss the ways that 
the subsidy programme impacted on these different household types. A broadly similar 
classification was found across the different districts, as shown in table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2 Household / livelihood classification from focus group discussions 
Group Characteristics 
Group one  
 
Ochita bwino / 
opeza bwino 
‘well to do’ 
 
Eat three meals a day, including sugar with their morning porridge. 
Produce surplus at harvest, are able to sell crops. 
Do not have to enter market for staple food.  
Have many pieces of land – both owned and rented 
Can afford unsubsidised fertiliser, apply both urea and NPK. 
Have different livestock including cattle for ploughing (and can therefore use manure) 
They have a lot of assets at their homes – cars, clothes 
Have good housing with iron sheets  
They employ people for ganyu. 
Children attend good secondary schools 








Harvests last until January in a bad year or May in a good year.  At least until end of 
rainy season. 
They have about two large pieces of land and may rent another. 
Employ at least one person for ganyu. 
They do not use animal power as own few or no cattle. Have goats or chickens 
They can buy small quantities of fertiliser but benefit from subsidised. 
Some household assets – e.g. bicycle, iron sheets. 
Eat twice in a day. 
They wear clean clothes  
Relatives working in town so may receive remittances 
Children attend primary school and sometimes secondary school 
Try to use technology – e.g. Sasakawa 





Food stocks are variable and last until between August and January. 
Own one large piece of land and cannot afford to rent more. 
Grow more than one crop on the same land. 
Depend on ganyu, especially to get cash or food. 
Cannot afford unsubsidised inputs. 
Few or no livestock. May have some chickens. No animal power. 
Eat one meal per day, sometimes no meals. 
Have very few, often dirty,  clothes. 
No household assets e.g. bicycle. 
Houses are in poor condition – unburnt bricks and grass roof. 






Harvests are very poor sometimes they do not harvest at all i.e. they eat all the maize 
when green. 
Have a small piece of land. 
Often plant only maize. 
Main / only source of income is ganyu. 
No livestock or animal power. 
Few or no household assets. 
Cannot afford subsidised inputs unless share with other households. 
Eat one meal / day and often go the entire day without eating anything. 
Wear torn and dirty clothes. 
Children do not attend school. 
Some are vulnerable like the elderly, orphans and sick that lack assistance. 
Houses are in very poor condition. 
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4.  Planned and actual implementation of the 2006/7 agricultural input subsidy  
Following a widespread public and government perception of broadly successful outcomes from 
the 2005/6 input subsidy programme, there was a general consensus that the programme should 
be repeated in 2006/7, despite concerns about different aspects of the programme among 
agricultural input suppliers and opposition parties.  Programme design was modified to reflect 
lessons learnt and to recognize the interests of some stakeholders who were keen to contribute to 
and participate in the programme. Important changes from the 2005/6 programme involved greater 
involvement of donors and the private sector.  The March 2007 report describes in some detail the 
ways in which the implementation systems for fertilizer and seed distribution were developed and 
the final systems for coupon allocation and distribution, input procurement and distribution, and 
coupon redemption/ input purchase. 
4.1  Programme objectives and stakeholders 
As will be discussed later, a major issue in the evaluation of the 2006/7 AISP concerns clarification 
of its objectives, of the means by which they will be achieved, of the likely period of time over 
which it should be implemented, and of conditions which would allow it to be terminated.  
There is broad agreement that the objective of the programme is to improve land and labour 
productivity and production of both food and cash crops by smallholder farmers with heavy cash 
constraints that preclude their purchase of inputs, to promote economic growth and reduce 
vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and poverty. A further objective emphasised by some is 
promotion of the development of the private sector agro dealer (input) network. These objectives 
are consistent with the National Agricultural Policy Framework (2006) overall objectives and 
purposes, and with results and strategies concerned with sustainable management and use of 
natural resources (2), increased smallholder productivity of food and cash crops (8), and 
promotion of agribusinesses (11). 
Within this broad agreement, however, there are differing understandings about the mechanisms 
by which the programme will promote increased food security and reduced hunger. Thus if food 
security is defined primarily in terms of national food self sufficiency, then the programme should 
concentrate on promoting fertiliser use among those smallholder farmers who will use it to the 
greatest effect – able bodied farmers with land and labour but who would not buy unsubsidised 
fertiliser. However, as Sen and others have emphasized, it is possible to achieve national food 
self-sufficiency while a large proportion of households remain food insecure. Therefore, if food 
security is perhaps more appropriately seen as improved household food self sufficiency (as 
outlined in the Agricultural Communications Branch leaflet distributed throughout the country) then 
the programme should concentrate on promoting fertiliser use among smallholder farmers who are 
most food insecure and who could not otherwise afford to buy fertilizer. These households may or 
may not end up using the fertilizer themselves, but even if they sell it to others, they are better off 
for having the cash from the sale of fertilizer, with better food security through increased ability to 
purchase food even if their food self-sufficiency is not changed.   
Different understandings of ‘food security’ and of programme objectives arise partly because of the 
large variety of stakeholders with interests in and influence on the development and 
implementation of the programme. Each stakeholder may have different long and short term 
objectives relating to the interests of the organisations they are members of, their professional 
training and interests, and their personal (for example social or financial)  interests. Different 
professional and cultural backgrounds and interests of individuals and of organizations tend to 
encourage differing understandings of and emphasis on different technical, social, and economic 
processes and achievements. Programme objectives need to be clarified and, with programme 
implementation, need to seek to provide incentives to different stakeholders to work together in 
ways that will support the most efficient and effective achievement of the programme’s wider 
objectives. Measures are also needed to limit the opportunities and incentives for large scale 
opportunism, either resulting from single instances on a large scale (such as in fertilizer   21
importation), or from many smaller scale instances (such as misappropriation in coupon 
distribution or in input sales at selling points).  
A difficulty in evaluating the input subsidy programme is the way that some of the different 
programme objectives work at cross purposes.  For example, it is sometimes suggested that 
households that might use fertilizer to make the greatest contribution to marketed maize output 
and national self-sufficiency may be those with relatively high purchasing power.  However these 
households may be willing and able to purchase inputs without a subsidy, so that subsidies to 
these households may be more likely to displace commercial fertilizer purchases and thus add 
relatively little to national maize production or marketed output (this question is examined 
empirically later in section 6). They are also likely to be households facing a relatively low risk of 
food insecurity. On the other hand, there are concerns in some quarters that providing fertilizer to 
the poorest and most food insecure strata of households (who would not otherwise be able to 
afford fertiliser) would be unwise because they may not be able to use fertilizer efficiently.  These 
concerns lie behind the targeting criteria suggesting that the 2006/07 fertilizer subsidies should be 
targeted to households that were in the middle income groups -- neither the poorest nor the best 
off.  
4.2 Programme  Development 
The 2006/6 programme design built heavily on experience from the 2005/6 programme. It was 
proposed to use a similar distribution matrix system for allocating coupons as in 2005/6 (‘taking 
into account the agricultural practices of the districts’) and to continue to use local government and 
Village Development Committees (VDCs) to  distribute coupons, but to strengthen the distribution 
to reduce instances of misallocation of coupons by introducing mechanisms to increase the 
transparency of the system, to increase the involvement of government and civil society 
representatives, and to issue clearer instructions on the system.  
From April 2006 there were intensive discussions involving Government, donors and private sector 
importers and distributors as regards the development of systems for implementing the 
programme. There was considerable concern among some donors and among private sector 
companies that a repetition of the 2005/6 system using only ADMARC and SFFRFM for fertilizer 
distribution would further damage the private sector. This led to discussions between Government 
(Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture), donors and private companies. The private sector, 
through recently established fertilizer and seed supplier associations, put forward proposals for 
coupons to have a fixed value which farmers could use to obtain a fixed discount when buying 
fertiliser or other inputs  at private sector outlets or at ADMARC or SFFRFM depots. Under this 
system inputs sold through private sector outlets would be procured and distributed by the private 
sector while ADMARC and SFFRFM would be required to sell at prices that covered their full costs, 
including overheads.  
Government recognised the potential benefits from private sector involvement (from increased 
coverage of selling points to reduce congestion, the promotion of agribusiness, and utilization of its 
ability to source stocks), but expressed concerns about (a) the risks of large unsold ADMARC 
stocks if the private sector made significant sales and (b) the quality of inputs (particularly seeds). 
Government was also concerned that farmers in remote areas, with higher transport and 
distribution costs, would be disadvantaged by variable prices for inputs and that only reputable and 
well established private companies with experience and investments in retail outlets could be 
relied upon to implement the system. 
To enable these concerns to be addressed, DFID offered financial support for (a) the financing 
and administration costs of unsold Government fertiliser stock, (b) the management of coupon and 
input distribution by the Logistics Unit and the maize seed component of the input subsidy 
programme, and (c) technical quality monitoring of seed and fertilizer stocks. DFID’s proposals 
were to enable agreement on private sector involvement in fertilizer and seed distribution.  For 
fertilizers, ‘bona fide’ private input dealers with existing outlets would, with ADMARC and SFFRFM 
outlets, be able to redeem coupons from farmers for fixed farmer payments and claim back a 
subsidy amount per coupon which varied according to the location of the outlet and associated 
transport costs. Reliance on the private sector reduced the need for ADMARC/ SFFRFM to   22
purchase and store fertilizers.  A more liberalised subsidy procedure for maize seed was agreed, 
which eventually led to a system where farmers could exchange a seed coupon for a seed pack 
and without any need for cash. Different suppliers offered different pack sizes of OPV and hybrid 
fertilisers (2kg of hybrid seed or 2 or 3 kg of OPV seed, depending on supplier costs). The seed 
system introduced an element of farmer choice, with competition between suppliers, and all seeds 
sold by ADMARC/SFFRFM were obtained through consignments rather than purchases. 
These agreements allowed progress with financing of the programme, a financing agreement with 
Stanbic Bank (whereby the bank would buy unsold fertiliser stocks from the Government at the 
end of the season but at the same time the Government would undertake to buy these stocks back 
for the next season at the same price), and development of coupon and fertilizer distribution, 
monitoring and control systems and schedules involving the Logistics Unit, colour coded printing of 
coupons (in triplicate with security features), and restricted invitations for transportation tenders.  
By the end of August fertiliser deliveries to SFFRFM depots began but there were still outstanding 
questions regarding (a) contracts for private distribution of subsidized fertilizer, (b) the system for 
seed sales, and (c) donor funding for the seed component. Contracts for private distribution of 
subsidized fertilizer required agreement on the mark-ups to cover distribution costs (for transport, 
handling and storage) in each district. These were worked out at an average 10% mark up on the 
cost of all fertilizers delivered to each of the regional SFFRFM depots. Agreement on this and on 
the limited number of bona fide and established input suppliers which could participate delayed the 
award of contracts until mid November, when the rains started in some areas.  Contracts were 
limited initially to four firms, with two further firms participating later.  
It was also agreed that only a limited number of larger and more established seed sellers would be 
permitted to put forward expressions of interest to participate within AISAM and Rurmark (the two 
associations of independent outlets, some of which are very small). There were also delays in 
agreement to a Ministry stipulation that claims for coupon redemption would only be accepted from 
approved seed suppliers (not from seed distributors) as this was expected to lead to major costs in 
processing of coupons by distributors and then again by seed suppliers and to cash flow problems 
arising from consequent payment delays.  
Donor funding for the seed programme was finalized in late November, and the first tranche of 
DFID finance released as this had been held up by being conditional on the signing of contracts 
between government and private distributors. DFID funding was subsequently extended to cover 
unanticipated maize fertilizer transport costs, with some of this being funded from savings on the 
cost of the Stanbic Bank facility for repurchasing fertilisers, as it became apparent that this would 
not be necessary
11. 
4.3 Programme  implementation 
We consider programme implementation in terms of coupon allocation and distribution to rural 
areas, input procurement and distribution, and coupon redemption for inputs.  
4.3.1  Coupon allocation and distribution 
As in 2005/6, coupons were initially allocated to each district according to a distribution matrix 
constructed by the Ministry of Agriculture with initial district allocations of ‘maize fertilizer’ and seed 
coupons proportional to the maize area in the districts, with subsequent adjustment between 
districts within each region to reflect perceptions of relative strength of demand in the 2005/6 
subsidy programme and then division of coupons between EPAs in each district in proportion to 
each EPA’s maize hectarage.  A similar process but related to tobacco areas in each district was 
followed for constructing the distribution matrix for allocation of coupons of D Compound and CAN 
intended for tobacco. A total of 2.6 million Urea and NPK coupons, 400,000 D Compound and 
CAN coupons and just under 2 million seed coupons were issued under the initial or base 
                                                 
11 This was decided when it became apparent that actual subsidised fertiliser sales exceeded planned sales. 
The Government did, nevertheless, have some fertiliser stocks to carry forward, and used its own (not DFID) 
funds to finance use of the Stanbic facility to store these stocks.    23
allocation. The March 2007 report points out that although this system led to a base allocation that 
provided roughly equal allocations of fertilizer per ha of crop grown between regions, there were 
wide differences in allocations per ha between districts within regions, and differences in 
population density between regions meant that allocations per household were much lower in the 
south (where poverty is greatest) than in the Centre and North.  
As in 2005/6, there was then a second issue of supplementary coupons, with definite information 
on 1 million NPK and Urea coupons (in equal quantities) and some evidence of further allocations 
of an unknown quantity issued beyond that. The first allocation of supplementary coupons went to 
Districts which complained because they had received lower base allocations than in 2005/6.  A 
few southern region districts with base coupon allocations higher in 2006/7 than in 2005/6 
received substantial numbers of supplementary coupons. The Northern and Southern Regions 
both received significantly more supplementary coupons than the central region. This had the 
effect of substantialy increasing the coupon allocations per ha and per maize grower in the North 
as compared with the centre and, to a lesser extent, the south. There are of course household 
food security, productivity, equity, political and practical targeting implications of the regional 
aspects of this distribution, which will be discussed at the end of the report.  
The 2005/6 district allocations were an important factor in both the base and supplementary 
coupon allocations for 2006/7, and it is clear from focus group discussions, key informant 
interviews, press reports and anecdotal evidence that 2005/6 coupon allocations also strongly 
affected people’s expectations for the 2006/7 programme, particularly from November to early 
January. Base allocation, supplementary allocation and the proportion of coupons subsequently 
redeemed for fertilizer were all greater in 2006/7 than in 2005/6. Further details of coupon 
allocation are provided in the March 2007 report.  
Distribution of the ‘base coupons’ was intended to follow well documented procedures. Packs of 
coupon books were parceled up for each EPA in each district, and serial numbers recorded, 
before dispatch to the Chief Executive of each district. Written instructions had been widely 
distributed on how coupon distribution should be administered within districts, involving the 
formation of district, area, and village committees in accordance with standard Local Government 
structures. Instructions set out the ToR and membership of each committee (with representative at 
different levels from local government, agricultural extension staff, political leaders, traditional 
leaders, religious leaders, the police, NGOs and farmers).  ToR varied between the committees at 
different levels but included, as appropriate at different levels, civic education; monitoring and 
reporting on the delivery and distribution of inputs; stamping out malpractices; review, supervision 
or implementation of beneficiary identification and sales; recommending the opening and closing 
of selling points; communication of technical information about input use.  
In each village a specific input subsidy programme committee was also supposed to identify 
beneficiaries, who were supposed to be ‘full time smallholder farmers who cannot afford to 
purchase one or two bags of fertiliser at prevailing commercial prices, as determined by local 
leaders in their areas’. Guidelines also specified that coupons should be issued to identified 
farmers ‘just before they go to a market point to purchase inputs, to minimize chances of abusing 
them’. 
Key informant interviews, information from community questionnaires  and anecdotal evidence 
suggests that a wide variety of different procedures was followed in allocating and distributing 
coupons within districts. The involvement of the DDC and VDC was an almost universal feature, 
but in Mzimba there was only one committee level under the DDC, organizing bulk transport of 
fertilizers for farmers. The extent of involvement of the TAs in the process varied, and was 
strongest in the central region where there were reports of TAs subverting the process in various 
ways (involvement of TAs was reported in 62% of sampled EAs in the central region, as compared 
with 36% and 0% of EAs in the southern and northern regions respectively).  Supplementary 
coupons were then distributed through the District Agricultural Development Office with TAs and 
traditional leaders supplying beneficiary names and agricultural extension staff distributing the 
coupons. In some areas there was disappointment and initial suspicion as a result of smaller 
numbers of base coupons as compared with the previous year. Targeting criteria reported also 
varied markedly between districts, with for example civil servants expressly excluded or included in   24
different districts, and with different emphases put on farmers’ inability to otherwise afford fertilizer 
purchase. Further information on targeting is presented issues in section 7.2.  
4.3.2  Input procurement and distribution  
Subsidized fertilizers were procured and distributed through two channels: through ADMARC and 
SFFRFM depots and through private retailers.   
The bulk of the fertilizers sold under the programme were distributed by ADMARC and SFFRFM, 
through a programme of procurement into three SFFRFM depots located in Blantyre, Lilongwe and 
Mzuzu. SFFRFM requested tenders in April 2006 but this was cancelled with a new request for 
tenders the following month. These contracts were awarded in August, with SFFRFM winning a 
contract to supply a little over a third of the total amount required by government for the subsidy 
programme, with mainly local suppliers/ bidders picking up the balance.  With time it became clear 
that some suppliers would not be able to meet their delivery schedules, and other suppliers picked 
up shortfalls. These adjustments appear to have led to some cost increases for government, with 
average prices at the depots rising from approximately $440 to $454 per tonne. 
Fertilizers at depots were then uplifted to the ADMARC and SFFRFM unit markets for sale to 
farmers. This followed a detailed allocation plan drawn up by the Logistics Unit, which also 
contracted transporters and coordinated transport. Problems included slow staffing and opening of 
ADMARC markets, related in part to delays and short falls in government’s payments for these 
activities, and poor roads, particularly to more remote areas after the rains had started.  
The private companies awarded contracts were responsible for procuring and distributing fertilizers 
sold through their own retail outlets. Delays in agreeing systems and finalizing contracts inevitably 
slowed stocking, but how far late stocking delayed actual input disbursement is not clear, given 
delays in issuing of coupons to farmers and in contract finalization. Only 4 firms were awarded 
contracts to begin with, but this was later expanded to six firms 
Seed procurement and distribution was handled entirely by the private sector from stocks of seed 
produced in Malawi in 2005/6. A limited number of seed suppliers worked through a much larger 
number of distributors. By the end of November suppliers had distributed considerably more than 
expected subsidy programme requirements.  
Total quantities of inputs sold under the programme are shown in table 4.1, which gives a 
breakdown of total sales of the five inputs by region and by sales channel. Exceeding the original 
fertiliser sales target by 16% was made possible by both the issue of supplementary coupons and 
by the holding by private retailers of extra fertilizer stocks above those originally procured for the 
programme.. The overall improved performance against input sales targets as compared with 
2005/6 may be attributed to a number of factors: experience gained by Government, ADMARC 
and SFFRFM from the 2005/6 programme; the involvement of the Logistics Unit in coupon and 
fertilizer distribution; financial support from donors for some elements of the programme; and the 
involvement of the private sector in retail sales. ADMARC and SFFRFM sales accounted for 72% 
of fertilizer sales in the national programme, with private retailers accounting for 28%. The 
ADMARC/ SFFRFM share is higher in the Southern region (84%) than in the Central and Northern 
Regions (65% and 66% respectively). A similar pattern is observed for maize seed sales, though 
the retailer share is considerably higher for seeds than fertilizer, ADMARC/SFFRFM accounting for 
43% of seed sales nationally (with 51% in the Southern region and 38% in the Central and 
Northern regions).   25
 
Table 4.1 Input Subsidy Programme Sales  
(MT, from coupon redemption for seed and for retailer fertiliser sales:  ADMARC/SFFRFM from stock 
records) 
   FERTILISERS MAIZE  SEEDS 
   NPK  Urea  CAN D  Comp Total  Hybrid  OPV  Total 
ADMARC/SFFRFM sales (from stock records)         
 NR  8,175  8,097  2,325 2,115 20,712    
 CR  21,984  25,297  3,187 4,468 54,937    
 SR  23,797  24,169  952 870 49,788    
 Total  53,956  57,564  6,464 7,453 125,437    
Private distributor sales (from coupon returns)         
 NR  4,258  5,124  666 640 10,688    
 CR  12,560  11,097  3,370 2,105 29,132    
 SR  4,151  4,279  517 484 9,432    
 Total  20,969  20,500  4,553 3,229 49,251 MAIZE SEEDS 
Total  sales        Hybrid  OPV  Total
 NR  12,433  13,221  2,991 2,755 31,399 343  195  538
 CR  34,544  36,394  6,557 6,573 84,069 1,295  739  2,033
 SR  27,948  28,449  1,469 1,354 59,220 1,129  796  1,926
 Total  74,925  78,064  11,017 10,682 174,688 2,767  1,757  4,524
              
Original target  65,000  65,000 10,000 10,000 150,000     1,999,985
            
(vouchers
)
Total sales % 
target 115%  120%  110% 107% 116%     91%
Seed sales from coupon recovery, rounding error on OPV total       
 
It should be noted that in some districts ADMARC/SFFRFM sales and private retailer coupon 
redemptions significantly exceeded coupon issues, leading to sales/coupon redemptions of 105% 
of allocated coupons in the central region as a whole. This is associated with the existence of 
further unreported supplementary coupons as described earlier. The Logistics Unit Final Report 
stated that an unspecified number of coupons with serial numbers outside any known range of 
issued coupons have been submitted for redemption and referred to the Ministry of Agriculture. 
This is a serious matter which needs proper investigation.  
A total of 1,825,566 maize seed coupons were redeemed of which 76% were for hybrid seed. 
Total seed sales under the programme amounted to 4,524 tonnes, with 2,767 tonnes of hybrid 
seed and 1,757 tonnes of OPV seed. 
4.3.3 Coupon  redemption   
Fertiliser coupon redemption by farmers required them to take a coupon to a participating supplier 
and submit the original coupon plus MK950 to be supplied with the input specified on the coupon. 
Input sellers were instructed that they should accept only original coupons (the second copy was 
to stay with the farmer) with serial numbers for the district where they are situated
12. Coupons 
were then to be attached to the duplicate cash receipts for the sale, collated and sorted by serial 
number within each outlet and forwarded to the district headquarters (for government outlets) or 
national office (for distributor outlets), which subsequently submitted claims to the Logistics Unit 
for verification and payment processing. For seed sales farmers exchanged vouchers for the 
                                                 
12 Qualitative evidence suggests that this was a problem for some households – particularly when there was 
significant congestion in their own district and / or a neighbouring district centre was closer.   26
desired bag of seed (no cash payment was required). Retailers had to submit vouchers plus the 
cash sales receipt to one of the six participating seed suppliers (Monsanto, Panaar, Pioneer, 
SeedCo, Funwe, and Demeter), who then had to sort them and submit invoices to the Logistics 
Unit. Seed vouchers were often submitted in a two-step process with AISAM acting as a 
consolidator for the agrodealers and the major distributors (e.g., Rab, Farmers’ World, Agora) 
consolidating vouchers for their branch outlets. ADMARC and SFFRFM were supposed to follow 
the same procedures for submitting redeemed coupons but did not depend on this system for 
payment for the fertilizer, and consequently their return of fertilizer coupons was very slow.  
4.4 Communications 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) funded the provision of a communication 
expert to advise the government on a comprehensive communication strategy covering all 
elements of the media and targeting key stakeholders including Parliament, Government, civil 
society, the private sector, extension workers and communities.  
The main objective of the communication programme was to achieve food self sufficiency by 
equipping staff and farming communities with knowledge and skills in recommended maize 
production and storage technologies and sustainable group mobilisation strategies. The 
communication programme largely focused on the promotion of the Sasakawa method of maize 
planting using hybrid and OPV maize seeds with a cluster-green belt concept. Only a few activities 
directly dealt with issues regarding the processes of the fertilizer subsidy: the Agricultural 
Communication Branch (ACB) contributed to the content of the booklet that was used for briefing 
stakeholders, in English, Chichewa and Chitumbuka. Following a press release, briefing sessions 
were conducted in October 2006, with participants including members of District Assemblies, 
Members of Parliament, traditional leaders, officer-in-charge of the Police, district representatives 
of ADMARC and SFFRFM and District Agriculture Development Officers. The communication 
programme also produced 4.4 million leaflets and 1,600 posters as IEC materials for the fertilizer 
subsidy. It was weak in providing information on the processes of the input subsidy and in public 
relations management, given the controversy and malpractices that were reported on the 
implementation of the subsidy. Limited press releases were issued, but most did not help to clarify 
the objectives and the implementation modalities of the subsidy programme. 
4.5 Programme  Cost 
Financial costs of the 2006/7 programme to government and donors are shown in table 4.2 
estimated at MK10.34 billion net of the MK950 per bag paid by farmers to redeem fertiliser 
coupons at ADMARC and SFFRFM retail markets. The major burden of the subsidy (MK9.01) falls 
on the government and the analysis shows over-expenditure of MK1.8 billion above the MK7.2 
billion approved in the 2006/07 national budget (this represented 43% of the Ministry of Agriculture 
annual budget). This excludes government costs in taking up the Stanbic Bank finance 
arrangement (although transport of fertilisers from unit markets to depots is included). The 
additional costs are largely attributed to the provision of extra coupons that entailed supply of more 
fertilizers than planned. Some stakeholders have also argued that the transport rates for 
distributing the fertilizers from SFFRFM depots to parastatal markets were about MK4/tonne-
kilometre above what could have been offered on non-donor procurement. The total expenses 
financed by donors  amount to MK1.33 billion.  
The major cost of the programme was for the supply of fertilisers. The parastatals distributed about 
72% of the fertilizers at a cost of MK9.33 billion including transport, handling and storage costs 
(although the handling costs are likely to be understated as ADMARC and SFFRFM received less 
than approved amounts from the government to cover planned handling and storage and will have 
drawn on other resources to cover this). Final costs of fertilisers delivered into the depots in 
Blantyre, Lilongwe and Mzuzu averaged MK 63,621 or $454 per tonne, with cost once delivered at   27
unit markets averaging $490 per tonne. 
13Private sector costs per tonne sold are also $490, with a 
total cost of MK2.44 billion.
14  
Cost of seed supply amounted to MK0.73 billion. Other programme costs include financing of the 
Districts to support coupon distribution, cost of the Logistics Unit, fertilizer and seed coupon 
production, communication, input quality control, monitoring and evaluation, and the Stanbic Bank 
buy-back arrangement. These costs amount to just over 2% of the net cost of the subsidy.  
However the programme suffered from limited operational support to implementing agencies from 
central government as agencies were generally required to draw on existing resources to 
implement the programme. As a result total costs of the programme are greater than the costs 
stated above, and resource constraints may have affected the efficiency in the delivery of services, 
principally in the operation of markets by ADMARC/SFFRFM and in the distribution of coupons 
within districts. With regard to the former, funding constraints are reported to have led to delays in 
recruitment of staff to operate markets and hence delays in opening of markets and difficulties in 
market operations, as will be discussed later.  However late remittance of funds from farmers 
received by ADMARC and SFFRFM back to government has also been problematic.  
With respect to coupon distribution within the districts, delayed and inadequate funding contributed 
to delayed and inadequate sensitization and use by district assemblies of funds from their normal 
operating budgets at the expense of other planned activities, in order to implement the subsidy 
programme.  
Table 4.2 reports only financial costs borne by government and donors. Wider economic or social 
costs of the programme are set out in section 8 and annex B. 
                                                 
13 Average parastatal cost is calculated as cost per unit procured by ADMARC/SFFRFM, not cost per unit 
sold.   
14 It is not possible to draw conclusions about the relative costs of parastatal and private sector operations 
as ADMARC / SFFRFM storage and handling costs and overheads are likely to be understated, these are 
not necessarily the lowest prices that the private sector would be prepared to accept, and most of the private 
sector retail outlets are in more accessible areas compared to the retail market outlets for parastatals 
(although ADMARC/SFFRFM had a higher proportion of sales than retailers in the Southern Region, where 
costs to depot are lower than costs to depot in the North). (their costs to depot in the central region are only 
slightly higher than those in the south).   28
 
Table 4.2 Cost and financing of the 2006/07 input subsidy (Malawi Kwacha) 
Source of Funding  Description  Final Costs 
(Estimates) Donors  Government
Parastatal Fertilizers        
   Supplies  8,562,896,991 -  8,562,896,991
   Transport   665,729,605 405,000,000 260,729,605
   Handling and storage 105,000,000   -   105,000,000
Sub-total 9,333,626,596 405,000,000  8,928,626,596
Private Retail Fertilizers        
    Supplies and Distribution   2,440,668,665 -  2,440,668,665
Seeds        
   Supplies + Retail Margin  731,592,800 731,592,800  -  
Other Costs        
    District Financing  27,262,192 -   27,262,192
    Logistic Unit 51,537,656 51,537,656    -  
    Coupon Production  15,036,385 13,743,966 1,292,419
    Communications  28,444,360 28,444,360   -  
    Input Quality Monitoring 6,319,075 6,319,075    -  
    Monitoring & Evaluation 40,500,000 40,500,000    -  
    Stanbic  Bank  Finance 
Fees 
54,250,000 54,250,000   -  
Sub-total  223,349,668 194,795,057 28,554,611
Grand Total  12,729,237,729 1,331,387,857  11,397,849,872
Sales Revenue 
ADMARC/SFFRFM 
      
    MK950 Sales Revenue * 2,383,303,000   -  2,383,303,000
Net Cost of Subsidy  10,345,934,729 1,331,387,857 9,014,546,872
         
Funding Sources      
    Malawi Government  -   7,200,000,000
    DFID/EU/Norway seeds  800,000,000   -  
    DFID transport  405,000,000   -  
    UNDP communications  35,000,000   -  
    DFID TA  137,700,000   -  
    DFID Finance Premium  378,000,000   -  
Total Available Funds 
 
1,755,700,000  7,200,000,000
         
Surplus/(Deficit)    424,312,143 -1,814,546,872
 
Note:   * Budgeted. based on sales, no information currently available on funds deposited by ADMARC/ SFFRFM 
Source:   Logistics Unit, DFID, GOM and UNDP 
 
5.  The 2006/7 season 
Before considering different aspects of programme impacts (on the input sector and on rural 
people’s livelihoods within the rural economy) it is important to consider events and conditions in 
the 2006/7 season as important context for those impacts. This section therefore provides 
information from diverse sources on these contextual changes.  
The major points to note about the 2006/7 season are (a) conditions that arose as a result of it 
following a good harvest in 2005/6 (the result of a combination of good rains and the 2005/6   29
subsidy) and (b) the generally good weather conditions experienced in 2006/7
15. In this section we 
focus principally on discussion of conditions resulting from the good harvest in 2005/6, and we 
begin by briefly detailing information on the weather conditions and production estimates across 
different years.  
5.1  Crop production and rainfall 
The 2006/07 season marked the second year of the implementation of the AISP on maize and 
tobacco production. 2005/6, the first year of the AISP implementation, had already shown large 
increases in estimated production of most crops over the poor year of 2004/5, but notably of maize, 
as a result of better weather and fertiliser availability (see table 5.1
16). Maize production in the 
2005/6 year was reckoned at the time to have been a record maize crop for Malawi, and then 
estimates for 2006/7 showed a substantial further increase again (maize crop production estimates 
for earlier years are provided in table 2.2) 
 
Table 5.1 Crop Production Estimates and Rainfall in 2004/5, 2005/06 and 2006/07 Seasons 
  
  
















)    
Production Yield
Maize 1,225,234  0.81  2,576,716 1.59 3,444,456 2.04 33.7 28.5
Cassava 2,197,640  14.30  2,863,212 17.32 3,296,127 18.84 15.1 8.8
Rice 41,270  0.84  92,449 1.77 112,185 1.65 21.3 -6.8
Pulses 209,492  0.39  343,898 0.62 415,551 0.69 20.8 10.4
Groundnuts 141,078  0.57  204,123 0.84 273,757 1.02 34.1 21.7
Tobacco 93,598  0.66  121,570 0.89 111,421 0.94  -8.3 5.4
Cotton 50,363  0.57  58,553 0.94 63,290 1.04 8.1 10.9
Wheat 1,730  0.87  2,011 1.21 4,505 2.26  124 86.4
Sorghum 18,175  0.27  54,307 0.77 63,594 0.86 17.1 11.6
Millet 15,970  0.39  27,295 0.66 32,251 0.72  18.2 9.2
Sunflower 2,672  0.36  5,453 - 5,920 0.79  8.6 -
Paprika 1,218  0.28  2,175 - 1,917 0.45  -11.9 -
Sweet 
Potatoes 
1,081,463 8.38  1,802,685 13.67 2,337,354 15.52 29.7 13.5
Irish Potatoes  404,420  11.41  477,537 13.29 594,667 14.79 24.5 11.3
Rainfall index (expected yield given season’s rainfall as % of yield expected with optimal rainfall)  
% local maize  58%  87% 100%  15.1
% hybrid maize  72%  84% 98%  17.5
Source: Crop estimates from MoAFS; Rainfall index calculated from data supplied by J.Syroka. 
 
The 2006/07 AISP was scaled up by 38,000 metric tones of fertilizers. Fortunately, the 2006/07 
season was blessed with good rains in most parts of the country. The good rains combined with 
access to fertilizers and improved seeds under the AISP resulted in increased estimated harvests 
in the 2006/07 season for all major crops in Malawi, particularly for maize as shown in Table 5.1. 
Generally, production of all major crops, except for tobacco and paprika were estimated to have 
increased between 2005/06 and 2006/07 seasons. Similarly, yields were estimated to have 
                                                 
15 Heavy rains caused flooding and crop losses in some areas. 
16 Although the Ministry of Agriculture national crop estimates data are the most widely used estimates of 
national crop production, crop areas and yields, there are significant discrepancies between these estimates 
and maize production, area and yield estimates from the IHS2. It should be noted that the rainfall index does 
not take account of problems from too much rainfall or cloud cover.   30
increased, with the exception of rice. The national maize production was estimated at 3.44 million 
metric tones in the 2006/07 season. This represents an increase of 0.86 billion metric tones (34% 
increase) over the estimated production in the 2005/06 season. Maize yields were estimated to 
have increased from 1.6 metric tones per hectare to 2.0 metric tones per hectare. According to 
FEWS NET, 2007, a number of indicators suggest that the food security situation in 2007/8 is 
generally good, and that although maize prices in late 2007 rose above those prevailing in the 
previous season, this is because of active buying by traders, associated with exports to Zimbabwe, 
not shortages of supply. Government has repeatedly confirmed that it holds adequate stocks of 
maize, despite reports of local shortages in ADMARC markets and further maize price increases. 
However exports of around 300,000 tonnes out of an estimated increased national production of 
just under 900,000 tonnes should not lead to higher prices: the recent price increases do lead to 
questions about the extent of the increase of the 2006/7 maize harvest, and about how much the 
input subsidy increased yields and how much increases in yield were the result of good weather.  
The data from the qualitative fieldwork (interviews with key informants, focus groups and individual 
programme beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) provide further insights into the 2006/7 season.  
They also enable us to understand how the 2005/6 season and coupon distribution affected the 
fortunes of both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in 2006/7. Some of the qualitative data on 
yields and production should be treated cautiously as interviewees were not randomly sampled 
and sampling may have been biased towards coupon beneficiaries. Differences or corroboration  
between information obtained from the household survey, community questionnaires and the 
qualitative field work are noted where relevant.     
In most districts a good harvest was reported in both 2005/6 and 2006/7, with knock-on effects for 
the wider rural economy (see Section 9 on Livelihoods and Rural Economy Impacts).  Households 
in all well-being groups were reported to have made significant improvements in yields from 
2004/5 as a result of good and timely rains and because of access to cheaper fertiliser through the 
coupon system.   
In February 2007 in Rumphi and Lilongwe, for example, many people still had food stocks from the 
2005/6 harvest and many people were confident that these would last until July.  In comparison, in 
04/05 stocks ran out in November or December when there had been no fertiliser subsidy
17.  
Because many more households had maize stocks during the 2006/7 cropping season, demand 
for ganyu increased whilst supply decreased.  People whose maize stocks had run out did ganyu 
for significantly higher wages than in previous years (ganyu wages are discussed below), or else 
they depended on kin relations and received transfers from relatives.   
There are some notable exceptions to the general pattern of improved production in 2005/6 and 
2006/7.  Some of the exceptions were less serious and affected only certain crops.  For example, 
in Kasungu, there was a dry spell before maize had tasselled.  In Mzimba, groundnut production 
was negatively affected by the level of rain late in the season whilst cassava production was 
affected by pests.  In Rumphi, pests affected bean production.  However in these districts the 
impacts were geographically patchy and limited to only one of a range of crops.  In all cases, 
production was significantly higher in 2005/6 and 2006/7 than in previous years. 
                                                 
17 As will be discussed in section 5.5, survey data do not show substantial differences between these years 
in times when people reported food stocks running out.    31
 
Box 5.1 Maize and rice replanting in response to flooding in Chikwawa 
Women indicated that flooding washed away the crops before they had reached maturity and all the 
categories of households were affected.  The participants indicated that after the floods some people 
replanted maize in the fields and those who had rice fields went ahead to cultivate rice. Some maize 
was replaced to cultivate rice. The maize that was replanted has not yet matured and it is in different 
stages because of the different times at which planting took place. As for those that planted rice, some 
of them have already started harvesting. Those who have rice are exchanging it with maize. For a bag 
of 50kg maize one has to pay 50kg of rice and this is happening at Mapelera market which is at the 
East bank and other areas within the district. 
In the last two growing seasons (2005/06 and 2006/07), people in this community did not harvest 
anything because of floods.  People have to do ganyu to get money for food.  In 2004/05, people did 
not harvest much because of lack of rainfall, most people just harvested food for one month only. 
In terms of food security, I can tell you that this year, I am in a big problem. All my maize was washed 
away with water and now I have tried to replant but the maize is not doing that well due to too much 
sunlight (Case Study Respondent, Chikwawa) 
 
A more serious challenge to the general pattern of improved production and yields was flooding, 
which was found in a number of districts. In Dedza, Karonga, Chikwawa and Ntcheu in particular 
there was flooding after planting.  In the worst cases crops were washed away, elsewhere there 
was washing out of fertiliser.  The impacts were greater on the poor and poorest households 
(categories 3 and 4).  The richest households replanted rice to exchange at harvest for maize but 
poorer households replanted maize which took much longer to harvest (Box 5.1).  The floods were 
reported to have significantly reduced the impact of the fertiliser subsidy on poor households.  In 
Chikwawa, however, households with kumtunda land away from the Shire River were able to use 
fertiliser and were less affected by washing out.  Further north, in Ntcheu and Karonga, the 
impacts of heavy rains were geographically patchy - some households were affected and others 
were not.  Despite heavy rains and some loss of crops, in Karonga, food stocks were reported to 
be lasting longer for the third season running. 
Qualitative field work reports of reduced drought but some flooding and improved food availability 
are corroborated by analysis of community questionnaires. These show very low incidence of 
drought in 2006/7 apart from some reports in Mzimba and the Lower Shire,  but higher reports of 
flooding in parts of Mzimba, the northern lakeshore, southern lakeshore, the Shire highlands, and 
the Lower Shire.  Analysis of community questionnaire results also shows a median response of 
‘better’ regarding questions about changes in household and market availability of staple foods 
and nutritional status of children, with a mean score of 3.7, 4.0 and 3.5 on each of these variables 
(where scores ranged from 1 for ‘much worse’ to 3 for ‘about the same’ to 5 for ‘much better’). 
Perceptions of improved household and particularly market availability of staples were greatest in 
the south and least in the north. In some livelihood zones household food availability was not 
perceived to have improved and indeed to have got worse compared with three years ago (most 
notably Lower Shire but also Mzimba self sufficient, Western Rumphi/ Mzimba and Southern 
Lakeshore) but market availability of staples and to a lesser extent nutritional status of children  
were almost universally reckoned to have improved.  
5.2 Maize  prices 
A major consequence of the much greater maize production in 2005/6 as compared with 2004/5 
was much lower prices through the 2006/7 season as compared with the 2005/6 season, as 
reflected  in the community questionnaire results reported above regarding market availability of 
staples.  
Change in maize prices was an issue that came up strongly in the focus group discussions, as 
regards prices both before and after the 2006/7 harvest. In most locations maize prices were 
reported to be lower than during the same period last season.  In Karonga the price of maize was   32
K150 compared to K250 per pail at the same period (July) in the previous season. There 
respondents noted that the price of maize was already lower in 2006 because there was a lot 
maize.  In Dedza in July maize was K18 / kg compared to K25 / kg in July 2006.   
In Chikwawa changes in prices were geographically patchy.  Some respondents said prices were 
higher than in 2006 because of washing out.  Others had experienced good harvests and in those 
areas maize prices had fallen – from K300 in July 2006 to K100 in July 2007 for a medium basin.   
In Ntcheu a major impact of lower maize prices was reported as less theft: people could afford to 
buy maize and were not forced to steal it in order to eat.  The greatest difference in price was in 
Rumphi (where respondents compared February 2007 with February 2006) where there had been 
a six-fold descent from K1,500 / pail in 2006 to K250 / pail in 2007.  Comparisons between 
locations at different times of the year suggest that there is still significant seasonality in prices. 
This is supported by maize prices reported by key informants in the community questionnaire, with 
median maize buying prices ranging from 25MK/kg in December 2006 to 10Mk/kg in 12.5 MK/kg in 
May 2007.  
Figure 5.1 shows changes in maize prices from the beginning of 2004 in terms of real maize prices 
in selected markets by region, with a comparison of these with ADMARC buying and selling prices. 
The very high prices in the 2005/6 season (following the poor 2004/5 harvest) are very evident, It 
is also noticeable that real price levels and variation in 2006/7 (following the record 2005/6 
harvest) were not very different from the 2004/5 season. Low prices in 2004/5 despite a lower 
estimated 2003/4 harvest (of 1.7 million tonnes as compared with the 2.6 million tonne estimates 
for the 2005/6 season harvest) are explained by effective imports of food aid to avoid price rises 
(FEWS NET, 2004).  
Figures  5.2 and 5.3 place 2007 prices in the context of real maize prices over the past 14 years.  
The graphs show clearly the extremely high variation in maize prices, with very high prices  
occurring for short , but very damaging, periods after a production shortfall. These have 
sometimes risen above import parity prices, usually associated with government failures in 
managing stocks or imports or in promoting imports by the private sector. Similarly very low prices 
have been associated with government or donor interventions (for example low prices followed the 
starter pack programmes in 1998/99 and particularly 1999/2000, while government and donor food 
aid imports depressed prices in 2003/4 and to a lesser extent in 2004/5).  
 
Figure 5.1 Real maize prices 2004-7 





































ADMARC Sellng  33
 















1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006









































Figure 5.3 Lilongwe monthly retail maize price histogram 1995-2007 














Mean        153.1289
Median    142.8316
Maximum   515.0018
Minimum   41.99161
Std. Dev.    75.01851
Skewness    1.985526





5.3  Ganyu (casual labour) wage rates 
A strong theme in this report is that increased maize production and access to food can reduce 
poor people’s need to hire out labour to earn ganyu income to meet short term cash and food 
needs, and at the same time increase the ability of some households to hire in ganyu labour for 
farm and/or non-farm work. At the same time higher real incomes should lead to increased 
demand for locally produced services. Both demand and supply for ganyu are affected, with a   34
tightening of the market (from reduced supply of labour into the market and increased demand) 
and hence an increase in wages
18.  The combination of falling maize prices and rising ganyu 
wages has the potential to raise real incomes of the poor that usually engage in ganyu 
employment.  
Daily ganyu wage rates were estimated from household survey for 2005/6 and 2006/7 by dividing 
total income from ganyu by the number of ganyu days worked. Median wage rates received rose 
from MK100 per day to MK133 per day across the two years. Households were also asked if they 
had hired ganyu labour for crop production in 2006/7, and the median wage rate reported from 
dividing total payment by days worked was MK150 per day. The median wage rate reported in the 
community questionnaire was also MK150 per day (with some variation between areas  and 
between months with ganyu rates tending to be highest in the North and lowest in the Centre, and 
higher in December and May than in March).  
Evidence on ganyu rates was also gathered in focus group discussions and key informant 
interviews. In some places the payment of ganyu is still done in food – particularly cassava tubers 
or maize, and in these cases it has not been possible to find evidence of whether payment 
increased or decreased. 
In areas with flooding, the price of ganyu tasks has not changed.  For example in Karonga, 
weeding remained at K10 / 10m ridge. In parts of Dedza it was reported that labourers were 
setting prices: 
Apart from having an increase in production input subsidy programme has affected ‘ganyu’ 
activities.  Since people who had access to coupons had enough food they were not 
looking for ‘ganyu’ activities they always look for to buy food.  Since there was a drop in the 
number of people looking for ‘ganyu’, ganyu’ payments became higher.  The low demand 
for ‘ganyu’ has given those doing ‘ganyu’ an opportunity to charge the ‘ganyu’ employers 
on what should be their payment for the work they do.  In times when there is hunger there 
are a lot of people looking for ‘ganyu’ and ‘ganyu’ employers decide what to give people 
who work for them. 
In Chikwawa, the ganyu rate had increased in some areas but not others, due to flooding.  Of most 
interest there was the fact that the weeding rate on the Ilovu sugar estate had increased from 
K200-250 to K250-300 per day. 
In Ntcheu rates had also increased.  Weeding increased from K1,500-2,000 per acre up to K2,500-
3,000 per acre.  Increases in harvesting were less – from K80 up to K100 / day.  However, the 
same arguments were being made that labourers were setting prices: 
People who rely more on employing ganyu to work in their fields have been affected by 
reduced demand for ‘ganyu’.  The reduced demand of ganyu on the other hand has 
affected payments and who set the charges.  People usually do ‘ganyu’ to get food and few 
people are doing ganyu to buy other household needs.  The respondents said ‘ganyu’ 
employees are the ones deciding on how much they should be paid and these charges 
have gone up due to less demand for ‘ganyu’ 
There is also anecdotal evidence of increase ganyu rates from commercial farmers who report 
difficulties in obtaining hired labour and the need to pay higher wage rates. FEWS NET, 2007 
reported that  in November 2007 there was reduced search for employment by ganyu labour and  
that farmers wishing to hire labour report increased scarcity and cost of hired labour. A two to 
three fold increase in nominal wage rates is reported in some areas (from MK1,400/ha to 
MK3,600/ha).  
                                                 
18 It should be noted that the terminology of ‘demand for ganyu’ is sometimes confusing as this can refer to 
the demand for hiring ganyu labour (by buyers of labour) or (colloquially) to the demand for opportunities to 
earn income from ganyu (by suppliers of labour). This report will use ‘demand for ganyu’ to refer to the 
demand to buy labour, except in quotations from respondents using the term in the colloquial sense .   35
5.4 Poverty  incidence 
Falling maize prices, rising ganyu wage rates and increased subsistence production in the 2005/6 
season would all be expected to raise real incomes of the poor, the majority of whom produce 
some food, buy some food and hire out labour. NSO poverty incidence estimates presented in 
Table 5.2 suggests that poverty levels have indeed been declining since 2004
19. Substantial falls 
in poverty incidence are estimated between 2005 and 2006, with the proportion of people who are 
poor declining from 50% in 2005 to 45% in 2006. Similarly, the proportion of people who are ultra-
poor is estimated to have fallen by 4 percentage points from 21% in 2005 to 17% in 2006. These 
falls in poverty and ultrapoverty rates are found across rural areas and across the three regions, 
but are much lower in urban areas.  
 
Table 5.2 Trends in Poverty in Malawi, 2004-8 
Proportion Poor (%)  Proportion Ultra-poor (%)   






















































Source: NSO (2007) Welfare Monitoring Survey 2006 
5.5 Food  security 
The qualitative reports of improved food availability and security during the 2006/7 season 
(following the 2005/6 harvest) are supported to only a limited extent by survey data on household 
reports of food status in the past one month and one year (see table 5.3). Overall 38% and 51% of 
households reported that they had inadequate food consumption over the past 1 month and 12 
months, respectively (as compared with 57% reporting inadequate food consumption over the 
previous 12 months in 2004 (NSO, 2005)). There are variations with respect to zones, with about 
63% in the Lower Shire zone experiencing inadequate food consumption in the past 12 months.    
                                                 
19  Estimates are derived using a model-based prediction of household characteristics in the Welfare 
Monitoring Survey (WMS) conducted in the post harvest periods in 2005 and 2006. It is not clear how far the 
model takes account of seasonal issues in the original estimation of IHS2 poverty rates, and it should be 
noted that the 2004/5 harvest was poor and followed by rapidly rising food prices. 
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Table 5.3 AISP Sample – Status of Household Food Consumption  2006/7 
   Household Food Consumption over past 
1 Month 
Household Food Consumption over past 
12 Months 












All  38 51 10 50 42  8 
Livelihood  Zone        
Chitipa Maize & Millet  44  55  2  41  51  9 
Misuku  Hills  43  57 -  7 86 7 
Northern Karonga   61  33  6  44  39  17 
Central Karonga   58  35  8  54  46  - 
Nkhata Bay Cassava  35  59  6  43  49  8 
Western Rumphi & 
Mzimba  35 60  5  54 46  1 
Mzimba  self-sufficient  52 43  5  44 50  6 
Northern  Lakeshore  40 44 16 51 45  4 
Kasungu Lilongwe Plain  38  48  14  51  36  12 
Rift Valley Escapement  27  59  13  39  47  14 
Southern  Lakeshore  40 45 15 48 40 13 
Border Productive 
Highlands  37 58  6  47 50  3 
Shire  Highlands  39 53  8  47 43 10 
Pirilongwe  Hills  26 70  4  45 53  2 
Lake Chilwa - Phalombe 
Plain  45 45 10 52 43  5 
Middle  Shire  37 51 12 50 44  6 
Lower  Shire  54 35 10 60 30  9 
Thyolo Mulanje Tea 
Estates  20 69 10 59 39  2 
 
Analysis of households’ reports of the month in which their own stocks of maize ran out (following 
the poor 2004/5 harvest and good 2005/6 harvest year) and were expected to run out (following 
the 2006/7 harvest), yielded very little difference between years. It is not clear why this is the case.  
5.6 Welfare 
Table 5.4 presents households’ subjective assessment of their welfare by livelihood zone based 
on the AISP sample. It reports the mean ranking of welfare on the ordinal scale from 1 defined as 
very poor to 6 defined as very rich.  Overall, there has been a small but significant increase in the 
mean ranking of welfare from 1.94 in 2004 to 2.10 in 2007 (an 8% increase) with all livelihood 
zones except the Lower Shire report an improvement. However most households continue to put 
themselves in the second step of the poverty ladder.     37
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Note:  The ordinal scale for subjective welfare evaluation ranges from 1 (very poor) to 6 (very rich). 
 
Households’ reported ‘overall satisfaction with life’ in 2007 was also computed. Results are not 
shown as there was very little change in the average score from scores reported in the IHS2 in 
2004. In the IHS2, 23% of households were satisfied or very satisfied with life compared with 25% 
in the AISP. However the proportion of very unsatisfied households has increased from 25% in 
2004 to 33% in 2007, while the proportion of unsatisfied households has fallen from 39% in 2004 
to 33% in 2007.   
Finally we examine households’ reported experience of shocks in the period leading up to the 
IHS2 survey in 2004 on the one hand and prior to the AISS in May/June 2007. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 
show the proportion of households reporting that they were affected by different shocks in the 
three years prior to interview in 2004 (in table 5.5) and in the three years prior to interview in 2007 
(in table 5.6). Both periods covered had included years of major price shocks, but these did not 
feature as strongly in responses in 2007. In the 2007 survey two extra categories of shock or 
stress were added to the list about which respondents were asked (‘lower crop yields due to poor 
soil fertility’ and ‘reduced ganyu opportunities’). Both of these featured strongly in household 
responses.  It should be noted that table 5.6 records household reports of shocks up May/June 
2007 and therefore does not reflect household perceptions following the high maize prices in early 
2008.    38
 
Table 5.5: Proportion rural households severely affected by different shocks, 2000 to 2004 
Shock  % rural households 
affected 
Large rise in price of food   79.2 
Lower crop yields due to drought or floods   68.8 
Illness or accident of household member   48.1 
Large fall in sale prices for crops   42.5 
Death of other family member of household   42.1 
Livestock died or stolen   37.1 
Crop disease or crop pests   26.3 
Household business failure non-agricultural   22.1 
Theft   20.2 
Birth in the household   12.2 
Dwelling damaged or destroyed   11.2 
Break-up of the household   10.4 
Death of working member of household   9.6 
Loss of salaried employment or non-payment of 
salary   7.8 
End of regular assistance aid or remittances   7.7 
Other   5.6 
Death of household head   5 
Adapted from National Statistical Office, 2005, p136 
 
Table 5.6: Proportion rural households severely affected by different shocks and stresses, 
2005 to 2007 
Shock  % rural households 
affected 
Lower crop yields due to poor soil fertility  33.3% 
Short acute illness/ accident of H member  24.3% 
Lower crop yields due to drought or floods  23.3% 
Large rise in price of food  19.9% 
Livestock died or were stolen  18.6% 
Crop disease of crop pests  13.0% 
Reduced ganyu opportunities  11.3% 
Theft 11.2% 
Increased expenditure demand  7.3% 
Large fall in sales prices for crops  7.2% 
Death of household member  5.5% 
Dwelling damaged, destroyed  5.3% 
Chronic illness, disability  4.9% 
Household business failure, non-agr  4.9% 
Birth in the household  4.0% 
Breakup of the household  3.1% 
Other 2.2% 
Marriage/other social events  1.8% 
End of regular assistance, aid or remittances from 
outside household  1.5% 
Loss of salaried employment or non-payment of salaries  1.4% 
Source: Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Survey, 2007 
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6.  Impacts on the input sector 
This section considers the impact of the subsidy  programme on the input sector. A brief 
description first of the size and structure of the sector and second of the methods used to assess it 
precede analysis of sales, and discussion of displacement effects, business confidence, and 
supplier views on the programme.  
6.1  Size and structure of the input sector   
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show the salient structural characteristics of the fertilizer and seed sectors, 
identifying the key actors involved during the past few years and the vertical and horizontal 
relationships among them. At the procurement level, there are a dozen actors in the fertilizer 
sector and half that many for seed.  At the retail level, many of the same actors are present in both 
the seed and fertilizer diagrams. 
In addition to the business enterprises, there are a number of associations.  The Fertilizer 
Association and the Seed Trade Association are recently created professional organizations for 
each input sector. Each association’s aim is to improve professionalism in the sector and 
represent their members in policy discussions with the GOM. The CNFA/RUMARK and AISAM 
networks of agrodealers are the result of donor-funded projects created to build a more vibrant 
private sector supply system. These networks focus on the retail level, offering business 
management and product training (both organizations), credit guarantees (CNFA only), and 
periodic reports on market conditions (both) for agrodealers selling fertilizer, seed, or agricultural 
chemicals. The NASFAM network  of  farmer  cooperatives supplies inputs to members on a 
strictly commercial basis, but member cooperatives also benefit from donor funding that provides 
training and business management support.   
As shown earlier in table 2.4, government participation in the market—at both procurement and 
distribution levels—has been highly variable from year to year, depending on decisions about input 
support programs. A strength of the government network is its ownership of 56 SFFRFM depots 
(up from 28 in 2005/06) and 666 ADMARC market units throughout the country (ADMARC 
reported 362 permanent depots in 2001), which serve as welcome input distribution or sales points 
for many farmers who are not served adequately by the private sector. 
Figure 6.1 Structure of the Malawi Fertiliser Industry 
Importer Managed
ExTrd shops 19 + 6 AD
FW/AG shops 05/06-103; 06/07-81
Nyiombo shops 06/07-66
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6.2  Methods used in assessing impacts on the input supply sector 
Information used in the analyses of input sector impacts comes from (1) past reports on Malawi’s 
input sector; (2) key informant interviews with almost all fertilizer importers, major seed producers 
and importers, administrators of ADMARC and SFFRFM, government officials, and 
representatives of input supplier organizations; (3) a survey of 271 retail outlets; and (4) analysis 
of household survey data on fertilizer acquisition patterns.   
The sampling method for the retailer study was shaped by the time and resources available. An 
effort was made to select districts where both maize and tobacco were grown. For each region, 
one district represents relatively dense input supply (large number of retailers per area and 
population) and the second less dense coverage (fewer retailers and longer distances for farmers 
to travel). The sampling frame was developed using lists of retail shops available from the 
Logistics Unit (LU) (for the major distributors and government outlets) and lists of agrodealers 
provided by CNFA and AISAM. While this sample does not permit us to generalize the results to 
all districts in the country, it does provide a snapshot of impacts these six important districts.  
Table 6.1 provides some general population and cropping information on the six districts, the 
number of retail outlets per district identified in the initial sampling frame, the number of outlets 
recommended for sampling, the final sample size, and a qualitative indicator of the density of the 
retailer coverage by district. As a general rule of thumb, we over-sampled agrodealers because 
they tend to be a very heterogeneous group
20 and under-sampled ADMARC/SFFRFM outlets 
because they tend to be more homogeneous given their centralized management structure.  
Once in the field, we learned that the retail sector in these six districts was very fluid: a number of 
shops on the agrodealer lists could not be found or were not selling inputs in 2006/07 while many 
                                                 
20  Over-sampling heterogeneous groups helps to get a better picture of general tendencies within the group 
whereas too few observations increases the risk of selecting atypical cases that may result in an inaccurate 
picture of the overall group’s characteristics.   41
new shops were identified.
21 Of the 271 retailers interviewed, 262 were selling maize seed in 
2006/07 and 217 were selling fertilizer; all had sold either maize seed or fertilizer at some time 
during the previous three years. 
 
















area in Maize 
& Tobacco 
North  Mzimba  132  50 / 50  High  524,014 
from 25-50 
in se to 50-
100 in w;  
M: 50-75%  T: 
10-25%  
  Rumphi  44  29 / 41  Low  128,360  50-100   M: 50-75% 
T: 10-25% 
Center  Kasungu  78  50 / 50  Medium  480,659  50-100  
M50-75%     T 
10-25% n.; 5-
10%  s. 
  Lilongwe  140  50 / 50  High  905,889**  200-400   M: 50-75%    
T: 10-25% nw 
South  Blantyre  51  51 /38  High  307,344**   400-800  M:50-75% 
  Machinga  52  52 /42  Low  369,614  





75% in n. 
*Excluding national park areas. **Rural population. 
Source: Compiled from sample data and the Malawi Atlas of Social Statistics (IFPRI, 2002). 
 
Most of our analyses look at the impacts by region and/or type of actor, with a focus on the 
following groups:  
•  Importers with distribution networks (e.g., Farmers World/Agora, RAB
22, Export Trading, 
Nyiombo) 
•  Importers with small or no distribution networks (e.g., Yara, Optichem, Optima, Sealand, 
Simama, Muli Brothers)  
•  Farmer cooperatives (NASFAM affiliates and a few independent cooperatives)  
•  Independent agro-dealers  
•  Government distributors, with occasional import activity (ADMARC/SFFRFM) 
 
The analytical framework presented in Figure 1.1 identified the following factors as potential 
indicators of the subsector’s performance: volumes supplied and sold, profits, cash flow, 
confidence of the actors in the future, investments, innovations, and the development of new 
services. 
We focus on an analysis of trends in sales by different actors over the past three years, with the 
objective of finding out which actors have experienced increasing/decreasing sales and their views 
about the factors driving these changes (subsidy, climate, local programs/projects, changes in 
personal situations, government policies, etc.). Patterns of entry and exit to the sector are also 
assessed. To examine the issue of displacement of commercial sales by subsidized sales we use 
two approaches:  analysis of trends in aggregate fertilizer sales through commercial and 
subsidized channels and analysis of  household survey data on sources of fertilizer (subsidized 
                                                 
21 This raises the question of whether there is a need for some type of registration or licensing system that would 
be able to track information on the number and location of functioning input suppliers. 
22  Strictly speaking, RAB does not import but orders through others such as Yara. Given its extensive 
network of retail outlets it fits better in this category than elsewhere.   42
versus commercial purchases) and category of farmer (based on assets), comparing patterns in 
2002/2003, 2003/04, and 2006/07.  
As collecting quantitative information on profits across several years was not feasible, we used 
information on perceptions about trends in profits from importers/distributors and retailers and 
combined this with information offered about the reasons for these changes to see how far the 
changes are attributed to the subsidy program.  We have also collected information about the 
impact of the subsidy program on costs and cash flow. This information does not speak directly to 
the issue of profit; but it helps us to understand the incentives and disincentives for importers, 
distributors, and retailers to participate should the program continue.  
We assess confidence in the system with information about investments and the entry and exit of 
different actors during the recent past. Actors were also asked to identify the current and potential 
benefits of the program to themselves, to others in the input sector, to farmers, and to Malawian 
citizens in general.  
Open-ended questions about the advisability of continuing the subsidy program and 
recommendations for improving it have contributed insights relevant to all of the key indicators 
mentioned above. 
6.3  Input supply and sales analysis in a context of growing competition 
A key issue for the private sector is whether this year’s subsidy program helped existing actors to 
get back on the path of increasing imports and sales that they had been experiencing before they 
were excluded from the 2005/06 subsidy program. A related issue is understanding trends in 
competition (number of actors in a particular market) as this is often a sign of improving or 
declining health of a sector. These questions need to be addressed separately at the procurement 
and the retail levels because the subsidy program affected these levels differently. 
Table 2.4 represents our best estimate of aggregate national fertilizer sales disaggregated by type 
of supplier (government or private sector) and type of sale (subsidized or commercial) for the 
period 1997/98 through 2006/07. 
The data in the table end on March 31, 2007. As observed in section 2, they show a decline in 
imports of fertilisers to levels below those of 2003/04, due in part to private sector carry over 
stocks associated with non-participation in the 2005/06 subsidy program. Private sector sales 
increased approximately 11% from 2005/06 to 2006/07, but represented only 87% of levels 
attained in 2003/04.  
During follow-up contacts in November 2007, several suppliers noted an uptake in commercial 
purchases of fertilizer after March 2007 as tobacco farmers prepared for the 2007/08 season. 
Apparently, an increase in tobacco auction prices in 2007 has stimulated demand for tobacco 
fertilizer and a willingness on the part of farmers to make cash purchases before the details of the 
2007/08 subsidy program are finalized. This is viewed by some suppliers as the first significant 
uptake in commercial fertilizer sales since 2003/04. This uptake illustrates the important link 
between output market prices, production incentives, farmers’ financial liquidity, and fertilizer 
demand. 
While acknowledging the post-season growth in commercial sales, suppliers argue that their share 
of the primary market in 2006/07 was too small (less than 60% compared with 80 to 90% in earlier 
years). Supplier explanations for the low level of commercial sales include:  
•  delays in getting the subsidy program designed and implemented caused farmers to delay 
commercial purchases that would normally have been made in June, July, and August;  
•  when details of the subsidy became known and farmers learned they would not receive as 
much subsidized fertilizer as anticipated, it was too late to arrange for credit; 
•  the large share of fertilizer purchased by the government for direct sales through ADMARC 
and SFFRFM and delays in signing contracts to permit private sector participation in the 
voucher program reduced incentives to import stocks beyond those needed to meet the 
subsidy distribution;         43
•  farmers used subsidized fertilizer in lieu of rather than in addition to their normal purchases. 
All of these points relate to program implementation and can be addressed through improved 
planning and better donor, government, and private sector coordination, although point 4,  the 
issue of subsidized fertilizer displacing commercial sales, is a potentially serious weakness in the 
entire concept of a fertilizer subsidy program if it is happening on a large scale. We therefore 
postpone discussion of this to section 6.3. 
To examine the impact of the subsidy program at the retail level we use three years of sales data 
(2004/05-2006/07) for a subset of 128 private sector retail outlets (60 distributors and 68 
agrodealers) located in the six districts covered by the retailer survey. Analysis of these data 
suggests that the impacts of the subsidy program on sales volumes were mixed (Table 6.2).
23 As a 
group, the distributor chains had higher sales in 2006/07 than in 2004/05 (70% increase in 
volume). Despite the aggregate increase in sales volume, one-third of distributor outlets had a 
decline in sales from 2004/05 to 2006/07. Among the distributors, the outlets for the smaller 
distributor chains were more likely to have increased sales over earlier levels than the larger 
chains, suggesting that the smaller chains may be increasing their market share. However sales 
volumes of these retailers were also strongly influenced by their participation in the subsidy 
programme in 2006/7.The negative impact of the subsidy on sales in 2005/6 is very evident.  
By contrast, the agrodealers as a group suffered setbacks in 2006/07 with aggregate sales for the 
group declining and 35% of individual shops experiencing a drop in sales
24. Twenty-six percent of 
this group had no fertilizer sales. Of those not selling, problems of credit and supply were cited by 
60% as the reason, while the subsidy program was mentioned by 40%. Of those selling, only 2 
agrodealers participated in the voucher program (indirectly, in collaboration with one of the 
distributors). For all 68 agrodealers reporting sales data, the aggregate sales in 2006/07 
represented only 12% of 2004/05 sales. 
 
Table 6.2. Fertilizer sales trends for a subset of retail shops 2004/05 to 2006/07 
Sales (tons)  Type of Retailer  No. of 
shop
s  04/05 05/06  06-07 
06/07 sales as 










Distributor outlet  60  13,718  7,293  23,273  170  33  90% in Center 
Agrodealers              
     All  68  14,343  8,666  1,788  12*  35  46% Center 
42% South 
    Those  with         
sales in 04/05  32 14,343  8,287  1,087 8  75  46% Center 
42% South 
Those with no 
sales in 04/05  36 0  379  701  --  --  -- 
*Includes those with no sales in 2004/05, making the 2006/07 numbers a larger share of earlier volumes.  
 
Given the number of established agrodealers not selling in 2006/07, there was a surprising 
number of new agrodealers setting up shop. Of the subset reporting fertilizer sales trends,18% 
began selling inputs in 2006 and another 28% began in either 2004 or 2005. Many agrodealers 
who sell fertilizers (70%) cater to farmers wanting to purchase units smaller than the standard 50 
kg bag. This market differentiation contributes strongly to survival as these agrodealers are not in 
                                                 
23 Many agrodealers were not able to provide quantitative data on their sales trends for the previous three 
years, so those covered in this subset of retailers interviewed may be biased towards those with better 
management and record keeping skills. Data for the distributor shops covered come primarily from the head 
offices. 
24 Comments in this paragraph refer to only the 68 agrodealers who provided sales trends data.   44
direct competition with ADMARC and the distributor outlets, which seldom sell small packs. 
Another factor contributing to agrodealer survival is that many of these shops are diversified, 
selling other inputs (53%) and non-inputs (46% sell groceries and 23% sell hardware). Unlike 
ADMARC/SFFRFM, most distributors and cooperatives are also diversified into these other 
products, but inputs represent a larger share of their profits. Agrodealers and cooperatives 
exhibited a statistically significant lower share of profits from inputs (60% and 73%, respectively) 
than did ADMARC/SFFRFM (97%) and distributor outlets (77%).  
There was some regional variation in the prevalence of shops with declining sales. Retailers in the 
Central Region were more likely than others to have declining sales over time while those in the 
North were more likely to have increasing sales. These differences were confirmed by analysis of 
quantitative data for the subsample reporting on sales trends (128 retailers) as well as through 
analysis of qualitative responses (271 retailers) concerning the direction and magnitude of 
changes in sales from year to year between 2004/05 and 2006/07. The higher prevalence of shops 
with declining trends in the Central Region may be due to market saturation. The Kasungu District 
in the Central Region exhibits the highest density of outlets measured in terms of the average 
number of competitors cited by retailers interviewed. The sample average across all districts was 
3.8 competitors, but the Kasungu average was 5.5, with Mzimba close behind at 5.2. Some 
retailers in Kasungu reported as many as 19 competitors selling inputs in their sales area; in 
Mzimba the maximum reported was 12. 
We also examined the level of competition reported for the different types of business structures 
finding a highly significant difference in the average number of competitors reported by 
government outlets (only 1.8) versus agrodealers (5). This finding confirms that 
ADMARC/SFFRFM outlets are more likely to be serving remote locations than others and that the 
emerging agrodealers are tending toward concentration rather than extension into under-served 
locations. Distributor shops and cooperatives were in the middle with an average of 4 and 2.7 
competitors, respectively. Although on average ADMARC/SFFRFM shops have fewer competitors, 
we note that 4 government shops interviewed were located in areas with 6 to 10 competitors and 
42 shops were located in areas with 1-5 competitors. Over time, it may be in the GOM interests to 
begin reducing their presence in markets that have adequate private sector coverage so they can 
concentrate on providing better service to the more remote areas that are not easily served by the 
private sector. 
In terms of the dynamics of competition among retailers, 60% felt that their competition had 
increased in the recent past, 29% saw no change, and 10% saw a decline. Respondents in 
Rumphi were more likely to cite a decline (a problem in a zone that already has relatively low 
coverage) and Blantyre respondents were more likely to cite a lack of change. Agrodealers were 
the ones who contributed most to the changing patterns, representing a large share of the 
establishments moving both in and out of the sector. 
The key difference between the seed and the fertilizer program was the more flexible nature of the 
seed voucher, which permitted a greater variety of retailers to participate and a greater variety of 
seed products to be sold.  Suppliers of hybrid seed began strong promotional campaigns using the 
voucher program as a means of helping farmers to experiment with hybrids. Seed suppliers in 
general were very proactive in supplying both OPV and hybrids to a wide variety of outlets, often 
competing to get stocks into ADMARC and SFFRFM shops where they anticipated heavy traffic 
that would stimulate sales of their products. Agrodealers were not neglected, with many benefiting 
from supplier credit (sometimes covered by a CNFA guarantee).  Producers and distributors of 
hybrids felt that the flexible seed voucher had a very positive impact on their sales and 
represented an improvement over earlier government programs that have tended to favor OPVs.  
Of 178 retailers  responding to qualitative questions about maize seed sales trends, 66% reported 
moderate to large increases in sales over 2005/06 when ADMARC had a monopoly on distribution 
of subsidized quantities of OPV.  By contrast, a much smaller share (20%) reported moderate to 
large declines. Participation in the sales growth was greatest for retailers in the formal distribution 
networks such as RAB, FW/Agora (93% reporting increases) and cooperatives (77% reporting 
such increases). Results for agrodealers were less favourable with 55% reporting increases but 
32% reporting declines. This may be due to the low share (only 27%) of agrodealers interviewed   45
who participated directly in the voucher program (albeit, this percent is significantly higher than the 
5% of agrodealers selling fertilizer in 2006/07 who participated). Of those retailers reporting 
increases in seed sales, 72% attributed this to the subsidy program. Few mentioned access to 
credit as a reason, illustrating perhaps that credit is less of a constraint for agrodealers selling 
seeds than for those selling fertilizers.  
Suppliers interviewed in the seed sector did not raise the issue of vouchers displacing normal 
retail sales. At the retail level, 25% of those able to separate commercial and voucher sales stated 
that voucher sales represented less than 75% of sales while 37% said vouchers accounted for 
100% of sales. If we remove ADMARC/SFFRFM from that last calculation, however, only 19% 
reported 100% sales due to vouchers, suggesting that the commercial outlets did do a varied 
business in both cash and vouchers. Evidence that farmers redeeming seed vouchers bought 
more than the 400 MK bag of seed when redeeming their voucher is relatively weak; 56% of 
retailers said this never happened and an additional 21% said it happened in fewer than 10% of 
cases where a seed voucher was redeemed.  
In sum, most seed sector participants interviewed at the supplier and the retail levels were very 
pleased with the voucher system in terms of its impact on their sales volumes. Vouchers appear to 
have given hybrid sales a particularly good boost. Shares of vouchers submitted for hybrids were 
78% in the North and the Center and 73% in the South. Vouchers processed by the LU show that 
hybrids accounted for 61% of the 4524 total tonnes of subsidized seed sales.  Increased demand 
for hybrids, which are more fertilizer responsive than other maize varieties, could be the trigger 
that gets commercial demand for fertilizer moving in a positive direction again. Such a scenario, 
however, would require policies and investments to keep maize demand and prices at a level that 
provides adequate incentives to intensify production.  The importance of the output price in 
shaping fertilizer demand was noted above in the discussion of post-season tobacco fertilizer 
purchases. 
6.4 Fertilizer  Displacement 
We examine two types of displacement caused by the subsidy. In section 6.6 we consider the 
extent to which the subsidy sales through ADMARC and SFFRFM lead to a reduction 
(displacement) of sales through private sector supplier (supplier displacement). In this section we 
consider the extent to which total subsidy disbursement leads to incremental use of fertiliser and 
seed use. This, together with the way the inputs were distributed, has a major influence on the 
impact of the programme on the input sector and on rural people’s crop production, and hence on 
the welfare of different groups of farmers and consumers.  
There are considerable difficulties in estimating the incremental input use resulting from the 
subsidy, as while the intention of the subsidy is to make inputs available to farmers who would not 
otherwise use them, and thereby to increase productivity, it is very difficult to ensure that all 
subsidised inputs go to such farmers, and, as noted earlier, key informants in the fertiliser industry 
believe that there is substantial ‘displacement’ of commercial fertiliser sales by subsidised sales. 
This directly reduces the production and welfare impacts of the programme as there are no 
incremental production benefits from subsidised fertiliser that is displacing commercial sales (and 
this has implications for wider market and welfare impacts). Income gains for farmers are also 
reduced (to the value of the subsidy which would normally be less than the net gains from 
incremental fertiliser use). It can also have an adverse effect on the fertiliser industry by reducing 
commercial sales and hence the viability of commercial distribution channels (primarily the agro-
dealers) that are not also involved in sales of subsidised fertilisers (in other words it can lead to 
supplier displacement, which we examine separately later in section 6.6). 
Estimation of the proportions of subsidised inputs that are displacing unsubsidised sales on the 
one hand and leading to incremental input use on the other requires an estimation of what 
commercial input sales would have been in the absence of the subsidy. The development of this 
“counter-factual” estimate is hindered by constant changes in the Malawian input system during 
the last few years and inconsistent sources of information on input use and sales. The task is 
complicated further by (a) the potential for the subsidy to cause switches in fertiliser use between 
farmers, crops and fertiliser types (so that, for example, subsidies may lead some farmers to   46
reduce of one type of fertiliser use on a particular crop while other farmers increase their use of 
another type of fertiliser on the same or different crops) and (b) likely effects of price falls 
depressing fertiliser demand (and such reduced demand may appear to be the result of 
displacement by subsidy sales).  
The extent of displacement and incremental input use is investigated by (a) formal examination of 
recent national trends in commercial, subsidised and total sales of inputs; (b) analysis of changes 
in input use by farmers in the household survey; and (c) discussion with stakeholders with different 
perspectives and interests in the industry. Particular attention is given to the question of 
displacement and incremental use of subsidised fertilisers as fertilizers are the major cost item in 
the input subsidy programme and displacement effects are considered by some observers to be 
very significant. 
6.4.1  Estimates of incremental fertiliser sales from national sales data 
Figure 6.3. presents information on subsidized and unsubsidized sales of all fertilisers, with a trend 
line estimated by regressing total sales from 1997/98 to 2004/5 against time. 2005/6 and 2006/7 
were excluded from the regression because in those two years there was both a significant 
subsidy, and a sharp increase in total fertilizer sales. Sales in 2006/7 are 99,000 tonnes above the 
trend line.  
 
Figure 6.3 Total fertilisers acquired by farmers, subsidized and unsubsidised sales 
Source: see Table 2.4  
 
The regression estimation of the trend line suggests that over the period 1997/98 to 2004/5 total 
sales were relatively stable with a slight upward trend. This stability prevailed despite some quite 
large subsidy programmes (for example the starter pack programmes in 1998/99 and 1999/2000), 
suggesting that there was significant displacement.  
The extent and nature of displacement were investigated further by examining the relationship 
between unsubsidized sales and subsidized sales, to test the hypothesis that unsubsidized sales 
are strongly affected by subsidy sales.  In determining the effect of subsidised sales on 
unsubsidised sales it would be desirable to account for the effects of other variables on 
unsubsidised sales. These might include fertiliser prices, crop prices, income per capita, and 
variables representing the density of sale outlets. Unfortunately this is not possible due to (a) lack 
of data for some variables and (b) the very short data series (due to structural change in the mid 
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The analysis was conducted initially for all fertilisers. Unsubsidised sales were regressed against a 
time variable and linear and quadratic functions of subsidised sales, for both 1997/98 to 2006/7 
and 1997/98 to 2004/5 (the latter attempting to investigate the relationship with Starter Pack /TIP 
subsidies but without the larger 2005/6 and 2006/7 subsidies). In each case the primary objective 
was to estimate a base figure for what unsubsidised sales would be without any subsidised sales 
(we call this counterfactual the ‘natural level of commercial sales’), but the general relationship 
between subsidised and unsubsidised sales is also of interest.  
Significant negative coefficients (indicating that subsidies reduce commercial sales) were found 
between subsidized and unsubsidized sales (p=0.02 to 0.04), and significant positive coefficients 
between time and unsubsidized sales (p=0.006 to 0.07). Estimates of displacement % from the 
estimated equation coefficients varied around a mid point of about 50%.  
The different regression models’ estimates of the natural level of commercial sales for 2006/7 are 
consistent at around 215,000 tonnes. Another factor that needs to be taken into account in 
estimating the natural level of commercial sales are the effects of fertiliser price increases and low 
tobacco prices.  For the 2005/6 season there was an approximate 20% rise in fertiliser prices, and 
this can be expected to have led to reduced demand in 2005/6 and 2006/7 for commercial sales, 
with a fall in natural level of commercial sales. There is no empirical information on the size of this 
fall in demand. Demand for fertiliser for maize production could be expected to be relatively 
inelastic. If elasticity of demand is taken to be 0.5 this would mean a 20% rise in price would lead 
to a 10% fall in commercial sales in the absence of any subsidy. Demand for tobacco fertilisers, on 
the other hand, would be expected to be more elastic, and might also have been depressed in 
2006/7 by low tobacco prices in 2005/6. This suggests that it might be appropriate to conduct 
separate analysis of subsidised ‘maize fertilisers’ and ‘tobacco fertilisers’.  
There had been no significant subsidy of ‘tobacco fertilisers’ prior to the 2005/6 subsidy, and 
regression analysis of sales of CAN and D Compound against time from 1997/8 to 2004/5 
indicated only a weak (P=0.15) negative relationship between unsubsidised sales and time. 
Estimates of displacement were therefore calculated using both regression estimates and the 
simple average of sales over the period 1997/8 to 2004/5. The substantial ‘maize fertiliser’ 
subsidies in the past allowed regression analysis of the relationship between unsubsidised sales, 
time and subsidised sales. Weak negative coefficients (indicating that subsidies reduce 
commercial sales) were found between subsidized and unsubsidized sales (p=0.36), and weak 
positive coefficients between time and unsubsidized sales (p=0.52). Analysis of sales over the 
period 1997/8 to 2006/7 yielded slightly better results, with p=0.05 for the positive relationship 
between unsubsidised sales and time and p=0.34 for the negative relationship between 
unsubsidised and subsidised sales. Simple estimates of displacement % from the estimated 
equation coefficients were 45% over the period 1997/8 to 2004/5 and 18% for the period 1997/8 to 
2006/7.    48
 
Table 6.3 Estimates of Displacement and Incremental Fertiliser Sales, 2005/6 and 2006/7 
 
  Subsidy  Natural' commercial sales    Actual  Displaced   
  regression  price  effect  final  commercial  commercial  Incremental 
   estimate  %  estimate  estimate  sales  sales  sales 
2005/6          
All fertilisers  131,803  207,000  10% 20,700  186,300  160,185  26,115  105,688 
 % of subsidised sales      20% 80% 
Maize   108,986  82,780  0%  0  82,780  79,860  2,919  106,067 
 % of subsidised sales       3% 97% 
Tobacco  22,014 53,000 10% 5,300  47,700 25,846  21,854  160 
 % of subsidised sales      99% 1% 
Maize & Tob  131,000  135,780  3.9% 5,300 130,480 105,706  24,773  106,227 
 % of subsidised sales    19% 81% 
2006/7    
All fertilisers  178,582  215,000  10% 21,500  193,500  117,719  75,781  102,801 
 % of subsidised sales       42% 58% 
Maize 152,989  88,000  0%  0  88,000  57,203  30,797  122,192 
 % of subsidised sales       20% 80% 
Tobacco 25,592  53,000  15% 7,950 45,050  22,150  22,900  2,692 
 % of subsidised sales       89% 11% 
Maize & Tob  178,581  141,000  5.6% 7,950 133,050 79,353  53,697  124,884 
 % of subsidised sales    30% 70% 
 
 
Table 6.3 shows estimates of 2005/6 and 2006/7 displaced and incremental sales for different 
categories of fertiliser, using estimates of ‘natural commercial sales’ (the counterfactual 
commercial sales if there were no subsidies, estimated from the regression analysis) and then 
deducting an allowance for reduced demand as a result of fertiliser and tobacco price changes. 
Displacement and incremental use rates are expressed as a % of subsidy. It should be noted that 
the estimated displacements are below those estimated in March 2007, due to (a) upward revision 
of both natural commercial sales and of total fertiliser sales and (b) separate analysis of maize and 
tobacco fertiliser sales, with (implicitly) greater allowance for a price effect leading to a fall in other 
fertiliser sales outside smallholder agriculture. Separate analysis of maize and tobacco fertiliser 
sales is, however, likely to lead to some under-estimation of displacement  since subsidised maize 
(or tobacco) fertilisers can substitute for other fertilisers
25. It appears that displacement has 
increased from 2005/6 to 2006/7.   
6.4.2  Estimates of incremental fertiliser sales from household survey data 
To further investigate the issue of incremental input use resulting from the 2006/07 subsidy 
program, we used national household survey data.  We first computed mean household fertilizer 
acquired from subsidized and unsubsidized sources in 2002/03 and 2003/04, as reported by 
households interviewed in these two seasons in the IHS2, carried out by NSO in 2004.  We then 
computed subsidized and unsubsidized fertilizer use in 2006/07 for these same households, as 
                                                 
25 Analysis of changes in sales of other fertilisers (ie not maize or tobacco fertilisers) suggests that sales in 
2005/6 and 2006/7 fell by a little more than would be expected from the price effects estimated for tobacco 
in table 6.3, which in turn suggests that there may be some but limited displacement across different 
fertiliser types. However estimates are sensitive to the treatment of an apparent outlier of high non-maize / 
non-tobacco fertiliser sales in 2004/5 (if this is ignored then estimated displacement across fertiliser types is 
very low).   49
reported in the Agricultural Inputs Supplementary Survey (AISS) also carried out by NSO, in 2007.  
By examining differences in fertilizer use patterns of the 2,431 households interviewed in both 
these surveys, it is possible to determine the net increase in subsidized, unsubsidized, and total 
fertilizer use between the 2002/03 and 2006/07 surveys (for the 1,101 households interviewed in 
2002/03) and between the 2003/04 and 2006/07 surveys (for the 1,330 households interviewed in 
2003/04).   
In the 2002/03 and 2003/04 seasons, 45.6% and 36.5% of the maize growing households 
surveyed nationwide purchased commercial fertilizer. Mean amounts purchased over the 
nationwide sample were 80.9 kgs of fertilizer per household in 2002/03 and 50.9 kgs per 
household in 2003/04.  These estimates count both users and non-users; application rates among 
users were more than double these nationwide estimates. In these years, the TIPS program 
distributed roughly 35,000 tonnes and 22,000 tonnes of free fertilizer in 2002/03 and 2003/04, 
respectively.  
During the 2006/07 crop season, the percentage of smallholder households purchasing fertilizer 
on commercial terms declined to 15.6%, with mean amounts of 14.8 kgs of fertilizer purchased per 
household.  Overall fertilizer use increased markedly, due to the size of the AISP programme.  The 
proportion of households using fertilizer nationwide rose to 65.7% in 2006/07, most of which was 
acquired through the subsidy program. Mean fertilizer acquired by smallholder households from all 
sources in 2006/07 was 78.8 kgs per household, of which 64.0 kgs per household was through 
AISP.  
As shown in Figures 6.4a and 6.4b, many households received subsidized fertilizer in 2006/07, 
represented by the dots to the right of zero on the horizontal axis.  The large majority of these 
households are below zero on the vertical axis, meaning that their purchases of unsubsidized 
fertilizer declined between the base years and the 2006/07 season.  The negative slope of -0.49 
(comparing 2002/03 with 2006/07) and -0.62 (comparing 2003/04 with 2006/07) indicate that an 
additional ton of fertilizer distributed under the subsidy program appears to have displaced 
commercial purchases by as much as 490 kgs and 620 kgs.  This represents an incremental 
fertilizer use of 51% and 38% of subsidised fertiliser, depending on the year. However these 
estimates do not take account of possible effects of falling tobacco prices and rising fertiliser 
prices, as was done in the analysis summarized in Table 6.3.  Taking account of these effects 
should reduce the estimated displacement and raise estimates of incremental fertilizer use as a 
result of the subsidy.   
To investigate possible effects of fertiliser and tobacco price changes on unsubsidised fertiliser 
purchases, we conducted separate comparisons of changes in IHS2/ AISP fertiliser purchases for 
households who received some subsidised fertiliser and households who received no fertiliser, 
assuming that changes in fertiliser for households who received no subsidy were not due to 
displacement. This then allowed us to separate displacement and price effects for households who 
did receive subsidised fertilisers
26. This analysis led to an estimated displacement rate of 34% 
when comparing 2002/3 IHS2 and 2006/7 AISP purchases, and an estimated displacement rate of 
48% when comparing 2003/4 IHS2 and 2006/7 AISP purchases. This represents an incremental 
fertilizer use of 66% and 52% of subsidised fertiliser, depending on the year. These incremental 
rates are considerably higher than those estimated without taking account of price effects (51% 
and 38%), but are lower than those estimated using national data (averaging 70% across all 
fertilisers). 
It is also possible that the fertilizer purchasing behaviour of households after expecting to receive 
or receiving subsidized fertilizer may differ according to their ability to purchase fertiliser (we would 
                                                 
26 This assumes that for households who did not receive any subsidised fertiliser all changes in fertiliser 
purchases are unconnected with the subsidy. This may not be the case, as some households who did not 
receive the subsidy may have reduced their unsubsidised fertiliser purchases in the expectation that they 
would get subsidised fertiliser, even if they were subsequently disappointed and received none. It is also not 
easy to tease out the difference between subsidised and unsubsidised fertiliser if farmers are sharing 
subsidised fertilisers, reselling them, and purchasing them from others.   50
expect poorer credit constrained unable to afford fertiliser to use the subsidy to buy fertiliser that 
they would otherwise be unable to afford, whereas less poor households who can afford to and 
would buy fertiliser without a subsidy might be expected to use the subsidy to purchase fertiliser 
that they would have purchased anyway).  To investigate this, households were disaggregated 
according to their (IHS-2) initial levels of (a) wealth and (b) landholding size.  We ranked all 
households from high to low according to (a) the value of their assets and (b) their landholding 
size, and then in divided the sample into three equal groups, or “terciles” according to the asset or 
land holding.  Incremental fertilizer use was then computed for each asset tercile and each land 
tercile.  
Findings indicate that incremental fertilizer use resulting from receipt of subsidized fertilizer is 
higher for households in the bottom asset tercile than for households in the top asset tercile.  
Incremental fertilizer use (after allowing for price and other non-displacement effects as described 
above) is estimated as around 75% for the poorest tercile, declining to 60% for households in the 
middle tercile and 42% for households in the top asset tercile.  
 
Figure 6.4a  Changes in subsidized and unsubsidized (commercial) fertilizer acquisition, 
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note;  each point represents a farm household surveyed in both 2002/03 and 2006/07 who acquired fertilizer 
from either commercial or subsidized sources in either year.   51
 
Figure 6.4b  Changes in subsidized and unsubsidized (commercial) fertilizer acquisition, 
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note;  each point represents a farm household surveyed in both 2003/04 and 2006/07 who acquired 
fertilizer from either commercial or subsidized sources in either year. 
6.4.3  Conclusions on incremental fertiliser sales  
The regression analysis of national fertiliser sales and of survey data give us estimates of 
displacement and incremental fertiliser use, of between 30 and 40% displacement and 70 to 60% 
incremental use. Observations of higher displacement among less poor farmers are supported by 
information from key informants. While the extent of displacement is of very great importance to 
the impact of the subsidy programme, there are a number of possible causes of displacement. 
Thus although the survey results suggest that displacement is higher among less poor farmers, it 
is not known how far this is an inherent feature of the subsidy and how far it may have been 
caused by uncertainty regarding the subsidy (and reduced commercial purchases in the hope of 
greater subsidised purchases). Similarly it has been difficult to isolate the effects of low tobacco 
prices depressing purchases of fertiliser for use on tobacco. With regard to the latter it was noted 
earlier that there are reports of increased sales of fertiliser for 2007/8 tobacco production, 
stimulated by the higher tobacco prices received for the 2006/7 crop.  Comparison of estimates of 
2005/6 and 2006/7 displacement rates and the observation that displacement rates are higher 
among less poor households both suggest that increasing volumes of subsidised fertilisers may 
lead to higher displacement rates unless there is careful and effective targeting of subsidised 
fertilisers on farmers who would not otherwise be able to afford fertiliser purchases. However the 
regression analysis did not provide any evidence for increasing displacement with increasing 
volumes of fertiliser subsidies.  
It is shown later that high rates of displacement can be a key factor in reducing the effectiveness 
of the programme in meeting its objectives, and it must therefore be a critical objective in 
programme design and implementation to bring these rates down as far as possible. This may be 
achieved by a variety of measures which are discussed in the final recommendations. The 
analysis in this section, however, suggests that better targeting of fertiliser coupons to households 
who cannot otherwise afford to purchase fertilisers is one important means of lowering 
displacement rates. This issue is discussed later in the report.   52
6.5  Observations on incremental seed sales 
We have not been able to assess seed displacement quantitatively at the national level due to 
inadequate trends data on maize seed sales for all the major distributors. One supplier, however, 
reported a 52% increase in seed sales over 2005/06 levels with only 40% of the firm’s sales 
having been supported by vouchers.  
In addition, qualitative assessments of trends in hybrid sales from some of the major suppliers 
have been very positive, suggesting that in the case of hybrids there has not been a great deal of 
displacement. First of all, 67% of retailers interviewed report that overall sales of OPV and hybrid 
maize seed increased between 2005/06 and 2006/07. More distributor outlets (93%) participated 
in this upward trend than cooperatives (77%) and agrodealers (55%). Second, 73% of seed 
coupons were redeemed for hybrids—an encouraging sign given that historically, hybrid maize has 
generally represented less than 30% of area cultivated (average of 32% from 1995/6-1999/00 per 
the Malawi Atlas of Social Statistics published by IFPRI).  Third, the mean percent of voucher 
sales in total maize seed sales for retailers interviewed was 83% (95% confidence interval of 79-
87%) compared to 92% for fertilizer sales (95% confidence interval of 90-95%), suggesting a 
stronger commercial market for seed than for fertilizer. This could be a function of the more limited 
quantities of seed made available through the voucher (enough for 0.1 to 0.2 ha of land) compared 
to fertilizer (enough for about 0.5 ha of land if a household receives two coupons). Agrodealers 
had a slightly lower share of sales by voucher (77%) than distributors (80%), cooperatives (87%), 
and ADMARC/SFFRFM (88%) (p=.10). There was not a statistically significant difference in share 
of sales by voucher across regions and districts.   
Estimates of new hybrid customers are also high—one firm reported that 300,000 farmers had 
tried their hybrid seed for the first time in 2006/07. By November 2007, farmers were requesting 
these seeds by name for the 2007/08 season, even before the vouchers had been distributed; with 
sales for 2007/08 far exceeding those at the same point in time in 2006/07.  
6.6  Retail supplier displacement 
Whereas fertilizer displacement (the impact of subsidised sales on unsubsidised sales) as 
discussed above has a major impact on the impact of the subsidy on incremental production and 
(as will be discussed later) hence on livelihoods and growth, retail supplier displacement  (the 
impact of the subsidy programme on private sector retail sales) has a major impact on private 
sector profitability and development. The  subsidy programme affects private sector retail sales in 
two ways, first in the impact of subsidy sales on total sales, and second in the impact of subsidy 
sales channels on the private sector share of total retail sales. In 2005/6 there was a big increase 
in subsidy sales over previous years but the private sector was excluded from retail sales. In 
2006/7 some private sector companies were able to participate in retail sales of subsidized 
fertilisers. 
Simple regression of private sector sales on parastatal sales and time over the period 1997/98 to 
2004/5 shows a significant negative relationship between private sector sales and parastatal sales, 
suggesting that parastatal sales in 2005/6 and 2006/7 led to 32% and 26% reductions in private 
sector sales respectively, as compared with what private sector sales would have been in the 
absence of both the subsidy and parastatal sales.  
6.7  Costs, cash-flow, and profits 
The interim evaluation report in March 2007 identified a number of characteristics of the 2006/07 
input subsidy program that contributed to increased costs for suppliers: 
(1) Cancellation and lack of transparency with tenders that resulted in wasted time by suppliers 
and delayed program implementation; 
(2) Late announcement and implementation of the subsidy program that increased procurement 
and transportation costs;  
(3) Need to hire extra sales personnel because input distribution was concentrated in a short 
period of time; 
(4) Complex and time-consuming voucher redemption process (particularly for seed)   53
(5) Increased costs of capital when vouchers were not redeemed before credit became due. 
 
Follow-up contacts with suppliers in November 2007, confirmed that transport costs, the costs of 
processing seed vouchers, and slow payment on vouchers remained key concerns throughout the 
2006/07 program. The transport cost calculations are currently under discussion for the 2007/08 
season and continue to be a problem.  In addition, suppliers are already expressing concern that 
the 2007/08 program is getting underway late and may result in supply shortages. 
The transport cost issue concerns high overall costs due to program induced supply bottlenecks 
as well as lack of transport incentives to serve remote areas.  It is the general view of suppliers 
that the GOM’s failure to get the program in place early leads to transport bottlenecks and heavy 
demands on the trucking system by both GOM and commercial importers/suppliers during a very 
short period of time. Given the larger volumes moved by the government, the GOM is thought to 
be in a position to negotiate the transport price. The perception of the private sector is that the 
GOM is failing to negotiate favourable prices, paying as much as 50% more than the average 
annual prices paid by the industry in general. This leaves the private sector little option but to pay 
the same high prices. While there is general agreement that voucher reimbursement rates for 
2006/07 covered the transport costs, many suppliers feel that they were unnecessarily high, 
raising the overall cost of the subsidy program as well as commercial fertilizer sales.  
A related transport cost issue is the uniform price set for transport reimbursement per district. First 
of all, the uniform price is set using historical data rather than projections. According to suppliers, 
recent fuel price increases (diesel was up about 16% in the recent past) are not being factored in. 
Second, the uniform price for the entire district discourages the commercial sector from developing 
a more extensive distribution network capable of serving the more remote zones. 
Although we have not updated the fertilizer cost build-ups for Malawi done by IFDC with 2003 data, 
one supplier has suggested that supplier profit margins are declining from about 10% 5 years ago 
to approximately 4% at present due to increased procurement and transport costs. Although a 4% 
return is more in line with returns to fertilizer procurement worldwide, it is low for high-risk 
environments with substantial policy instability such as that found in Malawi. If this decline 
continues, it may encourage some actors to switch to other more lucrative activities and reduce 
the competition needed to ensure efficiency in the sector. If, however, input demand continues to 
rise and policies remain stable, suppliers may find that the 4% returns are an adequate incentive 
to continue investment in the sector. 
Three suppliers provided estimates of seed voucher processing costs. One estimate covered only 
labour and stationery costs and was approximately 1 MKW per voucher. The other estimates were 
in the range of 10-12 MK per voucher (approximately 3% of the value of the voucher sale) and 
appear to have included costs in addition to the labour and stationery (perhaps extended financing, 
etc.). A particular challenge concerns seed placed on consignment at ADMARC facilities because 
ADMARC was slow in submitting seed vouchers for processing. Interviews with a few ADMARC 
offices suggested that the major constraint was computer capacity and personnel. One office 
visited had one computer and one agent to enter the data for the entire ADMARC division. When 
asked if he needed more help, the manager replied: No. Normally our agents don’t have enough 
work so it is good that they will have something to keep them busy for a while. This response 
shows evidence of not seeing the bigger picture in terms of problems posed for the private 
sector.
27 Delayed payment has major implications for supplier cash-flow and finance costs. 
Already in January, the typical three-month credit period for some seed suppliers had been 
exceeded. Some vouchers had not been paid a full two months after submission to the Logistics 
Unit. We have received reports of voucher payments for both seed and fertilizer still being made in 
June and July of 2007. The slow payment for seed appears to be the result of complex 
bookkeeping required because of the involvement of multiple donors with different requirements 
                                                 
27  Slow voucher submission by ADMARC for fertilizer is less of a problem than for the private sector 
because most of the fertilizer sold at government outlets was paid for in advance by the government. Seeds, 
however, were all on consignment leaving the supplier covering the financing.   54
for documentation and payment authorization. For fertilizer, the issue appears to be one of liquidity 
given that more vouchers were distributed than initially planned. 
6.8  Confidence in the sector 
Although supplier confidence at the procurement and retail levels was at an all time low in 2005/06, 
there was a rebound of confidence in 2006/07 that continues at the beginning of the 2007/08 
campaign. Most actors are cautiously optimistic about the future.  Improvements in GOM-private 
sector-donor dialogue are expected to reduce policy uncertainty in the future. New actors have 
been entering the sector and existing actors are expanding their networks.  Competition at the 
importer/procurement level is high relative to many other African countries (approximately a dozen 
actors), with evidence that some of the newer actors are increasing their market share and 
expanding their distribution networks.  While the arrival of new entrants makes the “old guard” a bit 
nervous about the potential for substandard products to enter the system and less experienced 
tender winners to default on delivery, the competition should push all in the sector to improve 
performance. There is also evidence of investment in the sector above and beyond the minimum 
required to survive (e.g., development of new products, funding for agronomic trials to develop 
more efficient and profitable fertilizer recommendations).  This investment will remain timid until 
there is a clear medium-term program developed that promises policy stability with a fertilizer 
program that is acceptable to all stakeholders. 
Follow-up contacts with suppliers in November 2007 revealed that several are planning to open 
new outlets in the near future: an expansion of 40 distributor shops was mentioned for both seed 
and fertilizer sales, and one seed firm mentioned having already placed seed in 11 more outlets 
this year than last year. Further development of seed supplier-agrodealer partnerships appears 
likely through continued support from AISAM, which credits the subsidy program for having made 
possible this positive supplier-agrodealer collaboration. To date there does not seem to be any 
concrete plan for linking agrodealers to fertilizer suppliers, but the agrodealer support associations 
(CNFA and AISAM) are looking for mechanisms to permit greater agrodealer participation in the 
fertilizer voucher program than was possible in 2006/07.   
A recent evaluation of 56 CNFA-affiliated shops (Citizens network for Foreign Affairs (CNFA), 
2007)  found that 82% of the shop owners anticipated growth in their business (all inputs 
combined) this coming year through the opening of bigger shops, the possibility of participating in 
the subsidy programme and their efforts to attract new customers. Those who did not anticipate 
growth mentioned the subsidy programme and rising prices of commodities as the reasons as well 
as inadequate financing. About 70% of all respondents expressed fear of dismal business 
performance if they were left out of the subsidy programme for the coming year, but the response 
did not specify if they needed to be included in both the seed and the fertilizer programs or if 
inclusion in the seed program, as in 2006/07, would be adequate.  
Despite the upbeat CNFA assessment, many agrodealers are not doing well. The CNFA survey 
was to have covered 100 randomly selected CNFA members but only 56 of those 100 were found 
to be actively selling inputs. Some agrodealers simply do not have the knowledge and skills 
needed to market inputs effectively and should probably exit the sector.  Others do have the skills, 
but capital is constraining. CNFA is actively working to address these capital constraints through 
their program to guarantee a part of supplier credit offered to agrodealers in their network; the 
expectation is that supplier credits to agrodealers will increase during the coming season, turning 
around the trends shown in table 6.4.   55
 
Table 6.4 CNFA Guaranteed Loan Volumes from Input Suppliers to Independent Agro-
Dealers 
YEAR 
Loan Volume Indicators  2002/3  2003/4 2004/5  2005/6 2006/7 
Number of companies with 
guarantees  4 8 6 3 3
Number of credit guarantees 
approved (input suppliers)  42 50 44 21 24
Value of guarantees ( MK million)  1.01 5.82 5.49  3.03  2.60
Value of sales supported by 
guarantee ( MK million)  2.00 10.35 22.03 5.92 9.86
 
It is also useful to look at the confidence that other actors have in the input supply sector. Clearly 
there was a major breakdown in government confidence in the private sector that began in 
2004/05 and reached its zenith in 2005/06.  Interviews with key informants in the government 
suggest that the private sector has been able to restore some of that confidence with their 
performance in 2006/7. It is clear, however, that there continue to be high ranking civil servants in 
the government who remain very sceptical of the private sector and believe government can do a 
better job. Given political sensitivities, concerns about being able to respond in emergencies, and 
limited private sector reach to remote areas, the Government still has some legitimate reasons for 
promoting public/private partnerships in the input sector rather than turning full responsibility for 
both input procurement and distribution over to the private sector. Given the relatively high level of 
competition in the procurement sector and evidence of good private sector performance in 
procurement when the government places orders on time and maintains a stable policy 
environment, there appears to be little justification for the government to intervene directly in 
international procurement of fertilizer supplies. Although we have been unable to get full data on 
the costs of government fertilizer procurement and distribution (e.g., administrative costs borne by 
the government associated with the use of government personnel and warehouse facilities), there 
is no evidence available suggesting that government is able to import fertilizers in a more timely 
and cost effective manner than the private sector. On the other hand, the private sector’s relatively 
weak performance in distributing to the remote areas that are now served uniquely by ADMARC 
makes it is difficult to envision an entirely private sector distribution system. This reality was 
recognized by most suppliers and retailers interviewed: only a very few said they thought 
ADMARC should be replaced entirely by the private sector. As noted above, ADMARC/SFFRFM 
shops interviewed for the retailer survey had significantly lower numbers of competitors on 
average than other types of retailers, suggesting that they are located in under-served areas. The 
challenge is to develop a vision of what a public/private partnership should look like in 5, 10, and 
15 years and work toward that vision jointly. Are there markets that are becoming saturated and no 
longer need government outlets? Are there markets with such low demand and difficult access that 
the private sector cannot profitably serve them? Continued dialogue on this issue should build 
further confidence among all the actors.  
6.9  Supplier views on key strengths and weaknesses of the subsidy program  
Suppliers and retailers were asked to identify strengths and weaknesses of the 2006/07 voucher 
program.  Box 6.1 lists a selection of the most commonly mentioned strengths and weaknesses, 
drawing primarily on information gathered from importers, some of whom were involved in retailing 
subsidised fertilisers.  56
 
Box 6.1 Supplier views on strengths and weaknesses of the voucher program 
 
Table 6.5. summarizes information obtained from the retailer interviews about the prevalence and 
magnitude of some of the typical problems encountered by them.  The table reveals that all 
problems but one were more prevalent with the fertilizer program than the seed program. The 
magnitude of the problem is reported as the average number of days or times the problem 
occurred, averaging over only those who reported the problem. We tested for statistically 
significant differences in these averages by type of retailer and by region (significant differences 
are described in the notes to the table). 
Despite the implementation weaknesses most actors believe that the general concept of an input 
subsidy administered through the use of vouchers redeemable by both public and private input 
shops is a good one. Very few respondents to the retailer survey (10%) suggested that the 
program be ended or that the government go back to one of the earlier models (TIP, Starter Pack).  
Reasons for not wanting to continue with the voucher program included corruption, a perception 
that few were benefiting, and its having had a negative impact on their sales. Those wanting to 
continue the program offered a wide variety of reasons that are difficult to summarize; the most 
common included: 
•  It assists the poor (27%) 
•  It promotes hybrids (8%) 
•  It assists small farmers (7%) 
•  It reduces hunger and increases yields (6% each) 
•  It increases business (5%) 
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
•  Very efficient Logistics Unit operations 
•  Private sector was empowered 
•  Constructive government, donor, 
private sector dialogue began 
•  Use of government infrastructure to 
complement private sector 
•  Payment for fertilizer vouchers was 
timely, at least at the beginning 
•  Seed program left choice to farmers 
•  Seed program presented marketing 
opportunity to private sector 
•  Poor farmers were helped 
•  Most input suppliers and retailers had 
better sales this year than last year 
•  VERY late design and implementation 
•  Poor tendering process (started early but then 
canceled); second round lacked transparency 
•  Poor voucher design led to fraud and vouchers 
not honored by Logistics Unit 
•  Low redemption value for fertilizer vouchers 
(especially for remote locations) 
•  MK rather than US$ redemption value increases 
supplier risk 
•  Slow voucher processing by ADMARC/SFFRFM 
jeopardizes cash flow for seed sector 
•  Weak institutions for monitoring product quality  
•  Information campaign gave too much attention 
to fertilizer and did not provide clear 
understanding of who should get vouchers 
•  In some cases voucher sales are simply replacing 
commercial sales rather than adding to them.   57
 
Table 6.5 Prevalence and magnitude of voucher implementation problems 
Problem  Retailers affected (%) 
Mean number of days problem encountered by type 
of retailer 
 Seed  Fertilizer  Seed  Fertilizer
a 
     Dis  Gov  Coop  AD  Dis  Gov  Coop  AD 
Entirely out of stocks  31  50  10  32  9  12
b  10 23  22  3 
Out of stocks for a specific 
product requested 
65 72 17  31  31  23
c  11 20  17  6 
Long lines  54  74  20  15  24  15  24  18  31  1 
      Mean number of times problem occurred by type of 
retailer 
     Dis  Gov  Coop  AD  Dis  Gov  Coop  AD 
Wrong copy of coupon  70  78  31  20  51
d  11 23 30  95  53 
Falsified  coupon  15  25  3 16  5  4        




35 20 14  23 25 16  18  1 
Coupon for wrong district  39  44  15  33  32  9  11  8  15  1 
Compiled from survey data for 271 retailers in two districts of each of the three regions; only those participating in 
the voucher program are included. 
Notes: 
(a) Only 3 agrodealers participated in the fertilizer voucher program so statistical comparisons across groups of 
retailers were not attempted. 
(b) Government outlets had a statistically significant higher number of days when seed stocks were completely out 
than all other types of retailers. 
(c)  The Southern Region had a statistically significant lower occurrence of this problem than the North. 
(d)  Cooperatives had a statistically significant higher number of cases with the wrong copy of the coupon being 
presented than did the government and the agrodealers.  The agrodealers had statistically fewer problems 
than the distributors. 
 
There were strong views expressed by retailers about the inadequacy of the coupon distribution 
program and what could be done to improve it. Only 9% suggested that the distribution system 
continue as it was conducted in 2006/07. Fifty-five percent of retailers suggested that different 
actors than were involved in 2006/07 needed to be given the responsibility for coupon distribution 
in the future, but there was no consensus concerning the appropriate actors. Among the various 
suggestions, different actors in the government agricultural services were mentioned most 
frequently (29% of the time); other suggestions ranged from religious leaders to farmers clubs to 
committees or workers formed especially for the voucher program. In addition to the suggestions 
on whom to involve, there were strong opinions on whom to exclude (25% of responses), with 
chiefs or village heads and TAs topping this list. . These findings were supported by respondents 
in the focus group discussions and case study interviews. Others (13%) offered suggestions on 
improving the rules about coupon allocation. Again, there was little consensus, with some 
proposing coupons for all, others wanting coupons only for the poor, others insisting that coupons 
go only to those with the financial resources to use them, and yet others asking for a universal 
subsidy. About 11% offered suggestions on what could be done to reduce fraud, with suggestions 
ranging from distribute vouchers door to door, put names on them, distribute original copies only, 
and pre-register recipients. About 5% of respondents mentioned the need to improve timing, with a 
general consensus that coupons needed to be distributed before the rains.  
In response to a question about what could be done to improve the physical supply of inputs, the 
most common responses were better timing (28%) and better mix of products (13%). Some 
thought the system was ok as is (11%) and 12% offered no suggestion. 
At the procurement level, suppliers supported the voucher program, but continued to stress that 
stability in the broad design and implementation characteristics of the program is much more 
important to their performance than the type of program itself. Stability in the program 
characteristics over several years should reduce the amount of annual planning and consultation 
needed, ensure early announcements of tenders, and enable efficient, low-cost procurement.   58
Common recommendations for addressing the weaknesses in the 2006/7 program offered by 
informants at the procurement and supply level include: 
•  Using the more flexible seed voucher approach for both seed and fertilizer; 
•  Improving voucher distribution so that it is earlier (June/July when cash is available from 
sales of other crops) and the control is in the hands of agricultural staff and Village 
Development Committees;  
•  Reducing ADMARC/SFFRFM share of the market (in a reasoned and predictable manner) 
and using saved resources to improve the quality of their services; 
•  Monitoring product quality (and increasing sanctions for violations) through joint action by 
professional organizations and government; 
•  Expanding the agrodealer network while insisting on registration to maintain quality 
controls; 
•  Sustaining maize prices through programs that will increase price stability (including 
research and incentives for development of maize processing industries). 
7.  Access to and use of coupons and inputs 
The overall impact of the subsidy programme on production, food security and wider income and 
development is dependent not only on the volume of subsidised inputs sold, but also on who has 
access to them and how they are used. This section of the report addresses these issues using 
information from focus group discussions and the household survey.  We begin by considering 
survey estimates of coupon distribution, and then move on to consider access and targeting; the 
timing of coupon distribution and input sales; availability of inputs; and the nature, extent and 
effects of irregularities.  
7.1  Total coupons received 
Total coupon disbursement and inputs sales as reported by the Logisitics Unit were reported 
earlier. We now compare these figures with estimates from the household survey.  
 
Table 7.1 Reported Fertiliser Coupon Receipts by Region 
  Coupons received  per hhold Total Coupons Received (‘000) 
        with NSO/MVAC population est.  with MoA population est. 
  Urea & 
23:20 






CAN & D 
Comp.  Total fert  Urea & 
23:20 




Northern region  1.21  0.08  1.29  307 21 328  468  32  500 
Central region  0.96  0.14  1.10 985  144 1,128  1,197  175  1,372 
Southern Region  0.84  0.04  0.88 1,005  46  1,051 1,384 63 1,448 
National 0.93  0.09  1.01  2,296 211 2,508  3,043  279  3,323 
Lower 95% 
confidence limit  0.86 0.05  0.93  2,119  114 2,284  2,808  151  3,027 
Upper 95% 
confidence limit  0.99 0.12  1.10  2,473  308 2,731  3,277  408  3,619 
Source: AISS, 2007. Excludes coupon allocation in peri-urban areas.   59
 
Table 7.2  Total Household Estimates, Fertiliser Coupon Allocations and Estimated Coupon 
Redemptions by Region (‘000) 
   Rural / farm hholds (‘000)    Coupon receipts 
   NSO/ 














hh as % 
MoAFS 
distribution 
Northern region  255  388  52%  628  52% 80% 
Central region  1,026  1,248  22%  1,675  67% 82% 
Southern Region  1,196 1,646  38%  1,192  88% 121% 
National 2,477  3,282  33%  3,482  72% 95% 
Note: Coupon allocations exclude unaccounted supplementary coupons 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by MoAFS and  MVAC 
 
The left hand side of Table 7.1 shows the coupons received per rural household estimated from 
the AISS. These estimates can then be multiplied by the estimated number of farm families to 
calculate total coupons received by region and nationally. This is shown on the right hand side of 
the table. However a difficulty arises as a result of substantial differences between rural population 
estimates used by the National Statistical Office and MVAC on the one hand and by the Ministry of 
Agriculture on the other.  
The NSO/MVAC estimates of the total number of rural households are based on census 
population estimates and growth projections derived from intercensal growth rates. Ministry of 
Agriculture figures are derived from farmer registrations by agricultural field staff. There are very 
substantial differences between the two figures: the NSO/MVAC estimates just under 2.48 million 
rural families outside peri-urban and urban and protected areas in 2006 while the Ministry of 
Agriculture estimate is just over 3.28 million farm families (see table 7.2). The right hand side of 
table 7.1 therefore shows total regional and national coupon receipts in two sets, one calculated 
with NSO/MVAC population estimates and the other calculated with Ministry of Agriculture 
estimates. These are substantially different. 
Table 7.2 shows the differences  in population estimate by region in together with the total number 
of coupons distributed by the Ministry of Agriculture, shown first in ‘000 coupons and then as a 
percentage of the estimated number of coupons received, as calculated in table 7.1 with the two 
different sets of population figures. If the NSO/MVAC population estimate is correct then this 
suggests a very significant number of fertilizer coupons are not reaching the rural people for whom 
they are intended as the total estimates of coupons received is only 72% of coupons issued and 
redeemed, suggesting that 28% is unaccounted for.  If however the Ministry of Agriculture farm 
family figure is correct then there is still a discrepancy between Ministry of Agriculture estimates of 
coupon redemption and the survey estimate, but this is much reduced – the survey estimate is 
increased to 95% of total coupon redemptions, within the 95% confidence limits of that estimates. 
It is interesting to note, however, that table 7.2 shows substantial regional differences in both 
differences in population estimates for the two sources and in the relationship between Ministry 
sales records of redemptions and survey estimates of coupon redemptions. This issue is 
discussed further in section 12.  
Survey estimates of seed coupon distribution are not shown in table 7.1 as these are extremely 
low as compared with the Ministry allocations and are not consistent with reported purchases of 
subsidized seed. It is not clear why there is this discrepancy with seed coupons as there is 
abundant anecdotal evidence and evidence from suppliers regarding the large volume of seed 
coupons disbursed and redeemed. Survey estimates of subsidized seed sales appear to be more 
reliable, however. The survey estimate of overall subsidised seed sales is a little under 3,400 
tonnes using the NSO population estimate and 4,500 tonnes using Ministry of Agriculture   60
estimates. The latter figure is very close to subsidized seed sales of 4524 tonnes reported by the 
Logistics Unit (see table 4.1).  
7.2 Targeting   
Actual receipt of coupons by different categories of people is the complex result of central 
allocations of ‘base’ and supplementary coupons between regions, districts and EPAs with 
different livelihood mixes (as described earlier), any diversions of coupons that prevent them from 
reaching communities, and then the process of allocation and access within the community, 
determined by formal and informal targeting criteria and processes and people’s situations relative 
to these criteria and processes. We investigate targeting of households to receive coupons and 
access of different types of household by considering first household survey findings regarding the 
distribution of coupons between regions and within communities, and then relate these findings to 
information gained from focus group discussions held in February and June 2007 and from the 
AISP community questionnaire. Information from the household survey is used to investigate 
targeting primarily by comparing household characteristics with receipt of coupons. We begin by 
examining differences in coupon receipt between households with different characteristics, and 
then look at the same issue from a different perspective by examining differences in the 
characteristics of households receiving different amounts of coupons.  
7.2.1  Receipt of coupons  
Table 7.3 shows the number of coupons received per household by region, gender of household 
head and IHS2 poverty status. It is clear from this that sample households in the North are more 
likely to receive ‘maize fertiliser’ coupons and to receive more coupons than households in other 
regions. Distribution of ‘tobacco fertiliser’ coupons on the other hand is more favourable to 
households in the centre. These findings are consistent with MoAFS relative allocations to the 
regions. It is interesting to note although recipient households were intended to receive two 
coupons for ‘maize fertilisers’ (one for basal and one for top dressing), a large proportion of 
households received only one ‘maize fertiliser’ coupon, particularly in the centre and south (more 
than half of recipients).  
Figures in table 7.3 are for households reporting receipt of fertilizer coupons. The percentage of 
households reporting purchase of subsidized fertilizer is lower than the percentage of households 
reporting receipt of coupons (by about 13%). This appears to be due to some farmers reporting 
subsidy purchases as cash purchases, but there are also complications of purchase of split bags 
due to sharing and other arrangements between households. For fertilizers the reported receipt of 
coupons appears to be a more reliable estimate of subsidy receipt than the report of purchase of 
subsidized fertilizer. The data in table 7.3 can be compared with mean and median estimates of 
37% and 25% of households respectively receiving coupons as reported by key informants in the 
community questionnaire for the same EAs. These estimates are considerably lower than the 54% 
of households who reported receiving coupons in the household survey, and raise wider questions 
about the reliability of estimates of coupon receipt where these estimates are (a) obtained from 
key informants and (b) generally lower than those reported either in the household survey or in 
MoAFS reports.    61
 
Table 7.3 Fertiliser Coupon receipts by region, gender of head and IHS2 poverty status 
    Urea and/or 23:20  CAN and/or D Comp. 
Coupons   0  1  2  >2  Mean/ 
recipient 0  1 2 >2 Mean/ 
recipient
North   38%  18%  37%  7%  1.9  93% 6% 1% 14% 1.2 
Centre   45%  28%  21%  5%  1.7  93% 4% 2% 66% 2.1 
South  49%  28%  19%  4%  1.7  97% 3% 0% 0%  1.1 
National   46%  27%  22%  5%  1.7  95% 4% 1% 0%  1.7 
Male headed  43%  27%  24%  6%  1.8  94% 4% 1% 43% 1.7 
Female headed  54%  26%  17%  3%  1.6  97% 3% 0% 12% 1.3 
Non-Poor (IHS2)  46%  27%  21%  6% 1.8  94% 5% 1% 0%  1.8 
Poor (IHS2)  46%  27%  24%  4% 1.7  96% 3% 0% 0%  1.5 
 
Looking at the distribution of coupon receipts, female headed households appear to be less likely 
to receive fertiliser coupons of all types, and to receive less per household. Limited differences are 
observed between households classified as poor and non-poor in the IHS2, but given the large 
number of people near the poverty line and methodological problems regarding seasonality and 
poverty measurement, this may not be a good variable for distinguishing between households with 
different livelihood characteristics. However subsidy recipients were generally more wealthy than 
non recipients (in terms of asset values, see section 7.2.2). Table 7.4 shows Urea & 23:20 coupon 
receipts by households classified using a cluster analysis of IHS2 data in the larger livelihood 
zones. Differences in coupon receipts are striking and suggest that targeting recommendations 
were followed to some extent in that there was a tendency for targeting to reach households which 
are productive full time farmers: ‘wage’ and ‘remittance’ households had higher proportions of 
households not receiving coupons, as did ‘poor female headed’ households; ‘borrower’, ‘dimba 
grower’  and ‘large farm’ households had higher proportions of households receiving coupons, and, 
for ‘borrower’ households, higher numbers of coupons per recipient). We discuss later questions 
about the effectiveness of this targeting pattern in achieving programme objectives.  
 
Table 7.4. Urea & 23:20 coupon receipts by different household types 
Hh type 
Coupons  0 1 2 >2  Mean/ 
recipient  Mean/hh 
Poor female headed  53%  25%  19%  4%  1.7  0.8 
Poor male headed  42%  31%  22%  5%  1.6  1.0 
Poor dimba grower  54% 23% 19% 4%  1.7  0.8 
Remittances  54% 25% 18% 3%  1.6  0.7 
Dimba  grower  38% 27% 30% 5%  1.8  1.1 
Borrower      41% 30% 18% 12% 2.5  1.4 
Large  farm    40% 32% 20% 8%  1.9  1.1 
Wage    50% 28% 18% 4%  1.5  0.8 
Remote    41% 35% 24% 0%  1.4  0.8 
All    45% 28% 21% 5%  1.7  0.9 
 
Source: AISS and IHS2 data. See working paper for definitions of household types
28. 
 
                                                 
28 Names of the different household types are intended to be largely self explanatory. ‘Poor’ households tend to 
have less land per household member and lower per capita expenditure and assets in the IHS2. ‘Remittances’ and 
‘wage’ households are characterised mainly by significant remittance and semi-skilled or skilled labour income 
respectively, while ‘borrowers’ are characterised by significant engerprise borrowing, and with ‘large farms’ more 
land under tobacco. ‘Remote’ households tend to be further from a tar road and/or ADMARC market.     62
7.2.2  Receipt of coupons and household characteristics  
Further insights into targeting were obtained by examining differences in household characteristics 
between households receiving the most subsidized fertilizer (from 100 to 600 kgs), those 
receiving .relatively small amounts of subsidized fertilizer (from 0.5 to 100 kgs) and those who did 
not receive any subsidized fertilizer.  Mean household characteristics for these different groups of 
household are reported in table 7.5 (similar analysis is presented in Annex table A1, but with 
median rather than mean household characteristics). 
 
Table 7.5.  Mean Attributes of Households According to the Quantity of Subsidized Fertilizer 
Received in 2006/07. 
 
Households groups by amount of government subsidized fertilizer 
received  2006/07 
 Mean characteristics 
Households 
receiving the most 
subsidized fertilizer 
(100 to 600 kgs/hh) 
N=562 
Households receiving 
relatively small allocation 
of subsidized fertilizer 











Total household income (Mkw/hh)  30,711 22,374 29,017 27,938
Gross value of harvest (Mkw/hh)  19,391 12,658 15,719 15,859
Value of assets* and livestock 
(Mkw/hh)  49,352 42,452 34,756 39,639
Landholding size (ha)  1.67 1.20 1.14 1.27
Kgs acquired of subsidized 
government fertilizer  122 51 . 37.6
Kgs purchased of unsubsidized 
fertilizer 07  21 22 72 50.0
Subjective assessment of 
household economic standard 
relative to community (+ value 
indicates better-off) 
+.15 -.22 -.35 -.21
Female headed household (%)  18.2% 26.4% 30.0% 26.7%
Days worked on ganyu labor 
2006/07  7 15 10 11
Years of education of hh head  5 4 4 4
Adult equivalents in household  4.58 4.21 4.15 4.26
Can hh read a one page letter in 
English? (% yes)  61.2% 48.7% 47.4% 50.7%
Can hh write a one page letter in 
English? (% yes)  54.0% 41.6% 39.8% 43.3%
Expenditures for last 12 months 
on selected non-food items 
(Mkw/hh) 
4,602 3,863 3,514 3,828
Social safety net cash benefits 
(Mkw/hh)  1,895 1,692 1,360 1,559
Note:  2,585 households include 2,426 households obtaining a maize harvest plus 159 households that harvested no 
maize.   *Assets include mortar/pestle (mtondo), bed, table, chair, radio ('wireless'), sewing machine, kerosene/paraffin 
stove, bicycle, motor vehicle, value of animals owned, beer brewing drum, boat or canoe, fishing net, lantern (paraffin), 
ox-cart, wheelbarrow, hand sprayer, panga, hoe, axe, sickle, ox drawn plough/ridger, other draft equipment, and 
irrigation equipment. 
 
The basic pattern that emerges from Table 7.5 is that the households receiving the most 
subsidized fertilizer are somewhat better off than non-receiving households in terms of their 
landholding size, value of assets, total incomes, and expenditures.  Households receiving the most 
subsidized fertilizer also appear to have slightly higher education levels, and a smaller proportion 
of them are headed by a female.  Some of these indicators (such as income and value of crop 
output) may be influenced by the fact that they received subsidized fertilizer.  However, the mean 
value of household variables like landholding size, assets, and education are unlikely to have been 
affected in the short-run by production levels in the same season, and hence these bivariate   63
findings suggest that the fertilizer subsidies were generally received by households of relatively 
higher economic/livelihood standards.   
To gain a more comprehensive picture of how the fertilizer coupons were allocated, multivariate 
statistical techniques were used to identify more precisely the attributes of receiving households.  
Probit models were estimated for the full national sample and for each region. Detailed findings 
are presented in Annex table A2
29).    The results indicate the following: 
1.   Female-headed households were less likely to receive fertilizer coupons than male-headed 
households.  In the Northern Region, for example, the probability of receiving fertilizer coupons 
declined by 11.1 percentage points (from roughly 45% to 34%) for female-headed households.  
Female-headed households were less likely to receive fertilizer coupons in all regions.  
2.  Household landholding size was positively and significantly related to receipt of fertilizer 
coupons.  For example, a household with 3 hectares in the Northern region was 14 percentage 
points more likely to receive fertilizer than a neighbouring household with one hectare.  A 
household in the Southern region with 3 hectares was 5.4 percentage points more likely to 
receive fertilizer than a household with one hectare.  
3.   Households ranking themselves in the bottom economic tercile relative to their neighbours 
were less likely to receive subsidized fertilizer.  Households ranking themselves in the top 
economic tercile were more likely to receive subsidized fertilizer, but this relationship was 
statistically significant only in the South.  Such households were 23 percentage points more 
likely to receive coupons.  Holding all other values at their means, this indicates that 
households in the top economic group in the South had a 61% probability of receiving 
subsidized fertilizer, compared to a 38% probability for households in the bottom economic 
group.  
4.   Households receiving the most social safety assistance were also more likely to obtain fertilizer 
coupons, although this relationship is highly significant only in the Central Region.  This might 
suggest that other social safety net assistance in this region is also targeted to relatively better-
off smallholder farmers.  
5.  The proximity of households to tarred roads, towns and ADMARC depots is sometimes 
statistically related to whether a household received subsidized fertilizer, but with a few 
exceptions, these effects are small.  For example, a household 50 kms from an ADMARC 
depot in the Southern region is 16 percentage points less likely to receive subsidized fertilizer 
than a household only 10 kms from an ADMARC depot, other factors held constant.  
6.  Whether or not a Member of Parliament resides in the community or recently visited the 
community does appear to affect the probability of households in that community receiving 
fertilizer, but in different ways in the various regions.  In the South, households in communities 
in which an MP resides were 27.5 percentage points more likely to receive fertilizer subsidies 
than households in other communities.  This probability rises by another 9.7 percentage points 
if the MP visited the community in the past 6 months.  By contrast, an MP’s residence in the 
community in Northern region actually reduced the likelihood that households in that 
community would receive fertilizer.  In the Central region, there was no relationship between 
MP representation and households’ receipt of fertilizer subsidies.  
The probit model results in Annex Table A2 only identify the factors associated with whether a 
household received subsidized fertilizer or not.  To examine factors influencing how much a 
household received, we run truncated OLS models on the sub-sample of households receiving 
fertilizer. These model results are reported in Appendix Table A3.  The results indicate the 
following: 
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across the entire sample was rejected, indicating that there were differences across regions in targeting 
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1.  Even though female-headed households in the North are less likely to receive subsidized 
fertilizer than male-headed households, when they do receive it, they tend to get higher 
quantities (22.4  kgs more on average) than male-headed households
30.  Female-headed 
households in the Central region are not only less likely to receive subsidized fertilizer; when 
they do receive it they get on average of 18 kgs less than male-headed households.  There is 
no discernable difference in the south in the amounts received by male-headed and female-
headed households who received fertilizer subsidies.  
2.  Neither household size nor the age of the household head has much influence on the quantity 
of fertilizer received by coupon recipients.  
3.  Landholding size is positively related to the quantity of subsidized fertilizer received in the 
Central and Southern regions, but not in the North.  In the South, a household with 3 hectares 
received, on average, about 18 kgs more than a household with 1 hectare, other factors held 
constant.  
4.   Households considering themselves to be in the top economic tercile were likely to have 
received between 14 to 35 kgs more subsidized fertilizer than households in the middle or 
bottom economic tercile.   
5.   Households in Northern region communities in which a MP has visited in the past six months 
received, on average, 27 kgs more subsidized fertilizer than households in other communities, 
other factors held constant.  Similarly, if a MP resides in the community, households in that 
community received, on average, an additional 17.9 kgs of subsidized fertilizer.  No significant 
relationships were observed between MP residence/visit and the quantity of fertilizer received 
by households in the Central or Southern regions.  
Overall, the modelling results indicate that households with greater landholding sizes and relatively 
better economic standing were more likely to receive subsidized fertilizer in 2006/07 than relatively 
small and worse-off farmers. The results also show a relationship between political representation 
and the allocation of fertilizer coupons at the community level, although there was no clear 
consistent pattern across regions and in the Central region, no such relationship was observed.   
7.2.3  Insights on targeting from qualitative studies 
The household survey findings regarding the distribution of coupons between regions and within 
communities are largely consistent with findings from qualitative studies in February (reported in 
the March 2007 report) and in June and from the community questionnaire conducted alongside 
the household survey. 
The broad conclusions from the February focus group discussions and key informant interviews 
was that targeting criteria were extremely variable, with diametrically opposite criteria used in 
different areas. Some of these expressly include the poor, whereas others would exclude them. 
Similar results were obtained in the community questionnaires. The main intended beneficiaries of 
the programme were identified by the key informants as ‘all farmers’ in 34% of EAs, ‘more 
productive farmers’ in 8% of EAs and ‘the poor’ in 81 of EAs. Qualitative field work also revealed 
that targeting criteria were often incapable of identifying equivalent numbers of beneficiaries to 
match the coupons available, and in some areas people were formed into lines, and those at the 
back were unlucky. There are a number of ways in which different criteria pose particular 
difficulties for poorer farming households in accessing and using coupons.  A number of focus 
group discussions reported that in 2005/6 there had been greater opportunities to be employed on 
safety net programmes to earn cash for subsidised fertiliser.  
There is little or no evidence from the qualitative data that decisions about how many coupons go 
to each village are linked to existing information about poverty levels, vulnerability and production 
systems.  A key concern of respondents – both key informants and beneficiaries – was that the 
decision-making process for coupon allocation at all levels was too political.  In these cases the 
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targeting of fertiliser created a great deal of tension within and between villages.  In Kasungu many 
respondents accused village heads of diverting coupons and sharing them with friends and 
relatives.  There were a number of cases of headmen and village heads being arrested.  
Elsewhere village heads expressed fears of being arrested for making mistakes – some said that 
they had received fewer books or coupons than they were officially meant to receive whilst others 
said that they did not understand the targeting criteria nor how to distribute such a small number of 
coupons to so many people.  The chain of distribution of coupons (described earlier) appeared 
long and complicated and there were examples of diversion at each of the different levels in the 
chain, although it is not possible to assess the overall extent of diversion. 
It was widely argued that greater involvement of local agricultural extension workers in targeting 
would greatly improve the programme.  It was suggested that agricultural extension officers knew: 
•  Which households were the poorest 
•  Which households could utilise new technologies (e.g. hybrid seeds and synthetic fertiliser; 
and 
•  Which fertiliser is appropriate for which households (especially fertiliser preferred for maize 
versus tobacco). 
There were fewer objections to targeting where agricultural extension officers had been influential 
in encouraging farmers to form groups through which to save for fertiliser (see Box 7.1).  In these 
cases, cooperation between group members was having a positive effect on social cohesion in 
villages and there was much less tension surrounding the subsidy programme than elsewhere.  
Men and women appeared to be equal members of savings groups though more in-depth work is 
required to understand if this is really the case.  Groups also appeared to help foster innovation 
and the uptake of technology among the poorest farmers.   
 
Box 7.1 Farmers savings groups in Dedza 
In Dedza, farmers were encouraged to organise themselves into savings groups.  This was a mechanism 
by which they could save and thereby demonstrate their capacity to purchase fertiliser at subsidised 
prices.  It also enabled households without resources to buy fertiliser, even at the subsidised price, to pool 
resources.  For example, whilst households hoped to receive three coupons (for seed, NPK and Urea), 
some did not have enough money to redeem all three bags.  Rather than be cut out of the programme 
completely, fellow club members shared the inputs.  No club members received only one coupon. 
I was considered to be a beneficiary of the subsidy because I was one of the members of clubs found in 
the village.  It was quite automatic that each and everyone who was a member of the club was to benefit 
from the subsidy programme.  When the Village Headman called for a meeting and said that all those that 
are interested to buy fertilizers should be in clubs, I saw this as an important thing.  I have land at the 
dambo and also upland.  Last season, my friends that applied the fertilisers harvested well that myself on 
the same size of land.  I learnt something from this and I thought it was good that I should try.  
Of course, benefits were there.  Firstly, I learnt the new farming methods because all the people in the 
clubs were being advised by the Agriculture Officials.  For the first time, I used the Sasakawa method.  
Secondly, I have never bought fertilizer in my life on subsidized prices because it is quite expensive but 
with the subsidy, I managed to buy.  Thirdly, I have learnt to work in groups which I used to think that I can 
not manage considering that people always have different views to things but however, I managed.   
Lastly, I harvested a lot and the maize that I have, I am sure it will keep me until the next harvest. 
(Case study respondent, Dedza) 
Two key issues emerge from the qualitative data regarding the targeting of beneficiary households. 
1. Combining poverty / vulnerability and productivity indicators for targeting 
The second round of focus group discussions and key informant interviews found that across all 
districts household targeting was broadly similar (More variation was found in the first round of 
focus group discussions – in terms of how targeting was conducted if not in the formal definition of 
criteria).    The most common list of criteria were in line with the central definition of targeting 
criteria, that coupons should be issued to:   66
•  The poorest and most vulnerable households (usually measured by food stocks or by 
social categories – e.g. widows, elderly, orphans, disabled) 
•  Those with access to land (ignoring those who do not own land but who rent land) 
•  Those with access to cash (to pay the K950 to redeem the coupon) 
•  Those with the capacity to adopt / utilise technology 
In all cases the criteria were a combination of poverty and productivity indicators.  However, there 
was very little discussion of the potential contradictions between the two sets of indicators and it is 
also difficult to tell how far these different criteria were followed. It seems that female-headed 
households were less likely than male-headed households to receive a coupon (see discussion of 
household survey findings above), and this implies that some of the targeting criteria (for example 
access to land) skewed the distribution of coupons towards men, whilst targeting criteria that ought 
to have resulted in the targeting of female–headed households (widows, the poorest and most 
vulnerable) do not appear to have been used as much and/or may have been over-ridden by other 
criteria. 
2. Concentration versus Dilution? 
This was a second area in which respondents did not acknowledge a potential contradiction or 
trade-off, but it is an important issue raised in the March 2007 report and which needs to be 
revisited:  should the programme spread but dilute the available coupons by sharing them among 
a broader number of households, or should it concentrate them among a smaller number of 
beneficiaries for greater effect? Follow-up questions then need to ask what ‘greater effect’ should 
be prioritised (for example household or national food security) and where (geographically and 
within communities) would targeted concentration deliver the greatest effect? At the local level 
many beneficiaries commented on the one hand that one coupon (or a coupon shared between 
two or four beneficiaries) was not enough for the land holdings of most households, and that it was 
inappropriate – i.e. that applying only NPK had significantly less impact on yields than applying 
both NPK and Urea.  On the other hand, they also argued that more households should benefit 
from coupons.  
The general perceived trend is that more households received coupons this seasons but that 
beneficiaries received fewer than last year (i.e. the increase in the total number of beneficiary 
households was substantiallly higher than the total number of coupons). An increased number of 
beneficiaries in 2006/7 is supported by data from the household survey (which found that 54% of 
households received coupons in 2006/7 compared with 30% in 2005/6) but there was little 
difference between the two seasons as regards the average number of coupons received per 
recipient  
In some places it was argued that the impact of the subsidy on production / yields was particularly 
good when people received supplementary coupons, suggesting that concentration is appropriate.  
Elsewhere, it was clear that political expediency led to dilution – particularly when those 
responsible for targeting were afraid to exclude anyone.  In this case the impacts on production 
were thought to be less but the programme gained wider popularity. 
In Ntcheu, for example, it was argued that In Kanama Village according to what the local leaders 
(respondents) decided, people did not get two types of fertilizer.  Some recipients could get only 
urea while others got 23:21:0 fertiliser only.  There was no way the maize could produce bumper 
yields with only one type of fertilizer said the respondents.   
However, respondents in Ntcheu also noted that the impacts on food security were greater and 
more progressive if the coupons were diluted - almost everybody knows that inputs subsidy 
programme has helped quite a lot in reducing hunger throughout the entire nation apart from a few 
areas where other factors came into play.   
The implication is that determination of the appropriate balance between concentration and 
dilution may depend on whether the objective of the inputs subsidy programme is household food 
security or increases in productivity.  Whilst there are linkages between the two, they are not 
automatically or necessarily complementary. This issue will be raised again in discussion of   67
Livelihood and Rural Economy impacts and in the Conclusions and Recommendations section of 
the report.  
7.3  Access to inputs 
Access to subsidised inputs required a coupon and cash to purchase the input (except in the case 
of maize seed). It was noted in the March 2007 report that these conditions place particular 
difficulties on access by the poor and by women, and the determination of people to get inputs 
demonstrates the extent of poor peoples’ willingness to invest precious time and money in trying to 
get coupons, and hence demonstrates poor peoples’ demand for fertiliser.  
Households who received coupons found cash in a number of ways. Table 7.6 summarises 
reports by recipients of coupons in the household survey, though problems of fungibility often 
make it difficult  to identify precisely how a cash expenditure is financed. The table shows that 
most households used general savings and ganyu was also important. Investigation of differences 
by region or household characteristics showed some variation in the relative importance of 
different sources, but no striking differences,  
 
Table 7.6 Sources of cash for input purchase (% coupon recipient households) 




Northern region  49%  3% 6% 5% 27%  11% 
Central region  61%  5% 3% 3% 22%  6% 
Southern Region  48%  3% 5% 3% 26%  14% 
National   54%  4% 5% 3% 24%  10% 
Source: AISP 
Focus group discussions were generally consistent with the findings in table 7.5 but yielded extra 
insights. In Mzimba, for example, focus group discussions revealed that in common with other 
districts, many households in Mzimba got cash through ganyu (wage rates had increased on last 
year) and selling livestock, but that remittances from relatives in South Africa were also important 
– this was not mentioned in other districts. Safety nets were not considered a good source of cash.  
There were some small programmes that distributed food (this could free up other household 
cash) but no cash-for-work programme.  In Lilongwe, households got cash by selling crops and 
livestock.  Safety nets were not reliable as sources of income for coupons.  Tobacco production 
was important for many households but in 2005/6 prices were low and selling tobacco was not a 
good way to get cash to redeem coupons.  In Rumphi, it was reported that some households with 
two coupons sold one to get cash to redeem the second or they shared a coupon (and half of the 
fertiliser) with someone who could pay the cash.  For women, income generating activities, 
particularly beer brewing, was used to save cash. 
In general, the previous good harvest meant that many households still had food stocks and this 
had reduced expenditure on food and increased the availability of cash in many households.  For 
households whose food stocks had already run out, the most important way of accessing cash 
was reported as ganyu, though some households depended on transfers or remittances from 
relatives.  However, as discussed elsewhere, good maize supplies from the 2005/6 harvest had 
generally increased demand and reduced supply of ganyu, and raised wages.  Of greatest concern 
was the sale of livestock to purchase fertiliser, though it was not clear whether these sales were 
distress sales that meant a permanent loss of productive assets, or whether households still 
maintain some livestock in spite of these sales. 
7.4  The importance / potential of safety nets 
Coverage of safety net programmes was patchy but in around half of the locations where 
qualitative research took place, safety nets were important.  In most of these cases the 
programmes were public works programmes.  Where payments were in cash, safety nets enabled   68
households to redeem their coupon but where payments were in-kind then there were fewer 
synergies between the two programmes.  Where the payment was food, for example the Malaysia 
Dam Project in Kasungu, households still had to do ganyu to get access to cash.  Safety nets and 
ganyu tended to be incompatible in their timing – it was not possible to do both at the same time.  
Elsewhere safety nets paid beneficiaries in inputs (fertiliser and seed).  In this it was not clear 
whether the two programmes were in direct competition or whether the safety net programmes 
were targeting those who did not receive coupons. 
Timing of safety nets was also critical.  Households complained that safety net programmes 
tended to be ad hoc and unpredictable which made it difficult for them to plan or rely on safety net 
income to utilise their coupons.  In Lilongwe (rural), beneficiaries had to choose between working 
on the MASAF cash-for-work programme doing road construction or working to prepare their own 
land.   
The main lesson regarding safety nets is that their impact depends on their design. Thus, 
•  Safety nets that are ad hoc or unpredictable in their coverage have limited effects on 
access to or utilisation of coupons. 
•  Safety nets providing cash can enable access to and utilisation of coupons better than 
those providing in-kind payments. 
•  Safety nets that involve public works can divert labour from farmers’ own agricultural 
activities and undermine the effectiveness of coupons. 
On the whole, it appeared to be accepted that there was no point targeting coupons to households 
that could not find K950 in cash.  However, there was no discussion of what alternative means of 
support might be available or appropriate for those households with no access to cash.  A critical 
policy choice emerges here with regard to the linkages between safety nets and the inputs subsidy 
programme:   
•  Can and should safety nets be designed and timed to support the fertiliser subsidy 
programme, by being timed not to conflict with farm labour requirements and by providing 
cash at the time that households are receiving / redeeming coupons?   
Or: 
•  Should safety nets be designed and timed to compete with the inputs subsidy programme  
(by requiring work at the same time as households are preparing land, applying subsidised 
fertiliser, and by providing in-kind inputs that do not facilitate coupon use) in order to 





7.5  Access to Suppliers 
There was consistent evidence from focus group discussions of difficulties in accessing suppliers, 
with long queues, stock-outs and the need to pay ‘tips’ to market staff to get fertiliser. These are 
discussed further below. We note here, however, that the household survey data provide lower 
estimates of time and expenditure in incurred in buying inputs. Table 7.7 presents summary data 
on reported distances to buy inputs, time spent buying inputs, and costs for transport and 
miscellaneous expenses. This does not show major differences between regions, but examination 
of results from different livelihood zones and districts shows more variation.  Similar results were 
obtained from key informants with the community questionnaire. The greater distances to markets 
and larger differences in distances to ADMARC and private selling points tend to be in less 
populous areas and are thus masked in aggregation at national and regional levels. Community 
questionnaire reports that around 35% of EAs sampled nationally relied on only one outlet for   69
redeeming fertiliser coupons  (57% in the north, 50% in the south and only 11% in the centre), with 
around 90% of main outlets being parastatals (across all regions). The greater density of private 
outlets redeeming coupons in the central regions is evident in 43% of EAs in the centre reporting 
private outlets as the second main outlet for redeeming coupons (as compared with 21% in the 
North and South).  
 
Table 7.7 Reported distances to buy inputs, time spent buying inputs, and costs for 
transport and miscellaneous expenses. 










selling point (km) 
    mean median  mean median  mean median  mean median 
Northern  region  9 7  293  150 8 5  9 5 
Central  region  15  7 271  100  7  5 7  5 
Southern  Region  12  7 208  150  6  5 7  5 
National   13  7 247  150  7  5 7  5 
 Source: AISS, 2007 
 
The key informant interviews and focus group discussions suggest that in many places there does 
appear to have been a supply response in terms of a reported increase in suppliers of subsidised 
fertiliser and seed in 2006/7 as compared with 2005/6, but this was geographically patchy.  New 
(private sector) supplies remained concentrated in bomas or larger commercial centres and 
remoter locations continued to depend on ADMARC.  Larger commercial centres benefited from 
increased competition
31.  In remoter locations, ADMARC centres often ran out of stock and were 
slow to replenish when demand was greatest. Transport difficulties, both upstream and 
downstream of supplier outlets, continue to reduce the penetration of suppliers into rural areas.  
Upstream, heavy rains in Rumphi and poor roads prevented fertiliser getting through to suppliers 
once the rains had started – and probably contributed to the low levels of stocks in remote 
ADMARC centres.  Downstream, in almost all districts there was congestion at selling points.  Men 
queued for up to a week to redeem their coupons, and women’s role in redeeming / controlling 
coupons was limited because it was too dangerous for them to sleep in the open outside suppliers 
premises. ADMARC remained important for women redeeming coupons as they did not have to 
travel so far.  
In 2006/7 the coupons specified which type of fertiliser they could be redeemed against.  However, 
depots often did not have the type of fertiliser specified on their coupon, or farmers were not 
allocated the coupon they preferred.  As a result they sometimes applied D Compound to maize 
rather than the preferred 23:20. These problems led to arguments that coupons specific to 
particular types of fertiliser disrupted household planning and reinforced supply problems for suppliers, 
and that more versatile coupons redeemable against a range of input types would overcome some of 
the input access/ supply problems faced by farmers and suppliers. 
The findings regarding access to suppliers and to specific types of fertiliser and how far these are 
strengths or weaknesses of the programme again raise questions about the objectives of the 
programme – in particular whether the programme seeks to address household level food security, 
particularly among the poorest and most vulnerable groups, or whether it seeks to drive 
productivity increases and greater market integration in smallholder agricultural production. 
                                                 
31 Both these observations support findings from the study of input suppliers as reported earlier in section 6. 
However community questionnaire responses show no evidence of perceived increases in fertiliser 
suppliers in the last 3 years(except perhaps in the central region), and very weak evidence for an increase in 
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7.6 Timing 
Timing of farmers’ purchase and use of seeds and fertilisers is a critical determinant of other 
aspects of programme implementation and of its production, livelihood and food security impacts. 
Seeds and basal dressing fertilizers (NPK and Compound D) should be in the possession of 
farmers by the start of the rains, to allow early planting. Two processes have to be completed for 
farmers to obtain subsidized inputs: coupons have to be distributed to them, and inputs have to be 
distributed to local markets. The March 2007 report discussed in detail the timing of major events 
leading up to and during the implementation of the programme, and concluded that there were 
delays in both these processes, and both were responsible for problems with late sales 
(particularly of NPK in the Southern region) and queues and stock outs in markets. Delays in 
almost all aspects of the programme were a major concern expressed by many key informants 
and in focus group discussions groups in February. Table 7.8 shows reported timings of receipt of 
coupons. Similar results were obtained from key informants with the community questionnaire. 
 
Table 7.8 Timing of receipt of coupons by recipients (% coupons) 










Northern region    4% 36% 45% 13%  2% 
Central region    12% 49% 31% 7%  1% 
Southern Region    16% 54% 24% 5%  1% 
National   13% 49% 30% 7%  1% 
Cumulative (national)    13% 62% 92% 99%  100% 
  Source:  AISS,  2007 
7.7  Availability of inputs 
The situation in 2006/7 was much better in most places than in 2005/6 as regards availability of 
inputs in markets, as a result of involvement of private sector distributors in fertiliser sales and a 
larger number of seed sellers. However there were still problems in some areas as regards stock 
outs and lack of inputs for cash purchase. Discussion groups and key informants reported these 
difficulties mainly with ADMARC markets and in areas where there were not private sellers. In 
some areas stock in markets did not match demand from households with coupons, so that 
households had to travel to more distant markets or coupons were exchanged for a different 
fertiliser. Household survey data do not show any consistent or substantial differences across 
different suppliers as regards the extent to which farmers were not able to get the inputs they 
wanted, with 90% of coupons obtaining the inputs that farmers wanted.
32  Community 
questionnaire reports suggest that about 75% of ADMARC and private suppliers and 100% if 
SFFRFM outlets suffered from frequent major queues, but that  queues were less of a problem for 
ADMARC markets in the north. Stockouts varied by region, supplier and type of input, and were 
generally more of a problem in the south, particularly with SFFRFM, and were less of a problem 
with seed than with fertiliser. 
7.8 Irregularities   
A number of irregularities in the 2006/07 input subsidy programme were reported in the media, 
mainly with regard to fertilizer rather than seed coupons. These irregularities occurred at different 
levels in the distribution chain and it was concluded in the March 2007 report that although 
irregularities certainly happened, and constant vigilance and firm action is needed to limit this, they 
did not prevent the bulk of the input subsidy getting to different households in rural areas. Survey 
estimates of household access to fertilisers reported earlier support this view. Nevertheless there 
                                                 
32 This is supported by data in Table 6.5 which shows no statistical difference among types of outlets in 
terms of stock outages or inadequate supplies of a particular fertiliser.  On the other hand, ADMARC had a 
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continues to be concern about such irregularities, and in particular key informants and focus 
groups raised concerns about targeting ands access to coupons (discussed above) and the need 
to pay ‘tips’ for access to coupons or to redeem fertilisers.  
With regard to payments made to receive coupons, survey data show that overall 5% of coupons 
were reported to have been accessed with some payments (2% in the north, 7% in the centre and 
4% in the south). The major specified recipients of these payments (38%) were traders (roughly 
equal numbers of payments were made to unspecified others, more in the north where no 
payments were reported to traders). About 20% of payments were made to traditional or village 
leaders and VDC members. There were few instances of payments to agricultural extension staff.  
Median and mean payments for a coupon were MK600 and MK1,000 respectively. Median 
payments to traders were MK850 with a mean of MK1,050. Reported payments were highest in 
the centre (median MK1,000),considerably lower in the south (median payments MK500 per 
coupon) and very low in the North (median MK5 per coupon, mean 150MK). Community 
questionnaire data did not show any regional pattern but suggested median prices of around 
MK1000 where coupons were being traded. 
In the household survey very few cases were reported of selling of coupons by respondents (0.3% 
of coupons received).This is not surprising given the sensitivity of the issue, and the survey is 
likely to underestimate this. However 8% of households receiving one coupon and 14% of all 
households receiving any coupons reported total fertiliser use less than the amount of subsidised 
fertiliser use. While some of these cases may result from errors in recall and recording of fertiliser 
use, it is likely that a significant number represent sales or gifts of coupons to others
33.  Key 
respondents reported higher levels of reselling of fertiliser in the community questionnaire, with 
10% of EAs reporting it happening commonly, 13% reporting it as occurring rarely, and 77% 
indicating that it never happened. Reported occurrence of reselling was higher in the central 
region (particularly within the Kasungu-Lilongwe Livelihood zone) with just under 60% of central 
region EAs  reporting that it never occurred (only 46% in the Kasungu Lilongwe Plain) and 19% of 
EAs reporting that it was common (25% in the Kasungu Lilongwe Plain).  
The long queues to buy fertiliser at many markets encouraged the payment of tips to enable 
people to get to the front of the queues in a number of locations. Qualitative studies indicated that 
whilst people knew the price that they were to pay for fertiliser (K950), they reported that they 
sometimes paid more – either to the VDC in order to receive a coupon, or at the supplier when 
redeeming their coupon.  There was no evidence that private suppliers were more or less likely to 
take bribes than ADMARC.  In general, the quality of supplies was perceived to be better at 
ADMARC – with one private supplier in particular accused of adding stones and dirt to fertiliser – 
but the level and speed of service was considered better in private suppliers than in ADMARC.  
This raises questions about how to regulate for quality and standards under a combination of 
private and parastatal suppliers. 
Most respondents in the household survey did not have to pay any ‘tips’ to market staff to redeem 
their inputs, but a tip was paid for redemption of about 20% of fertiliser coupons, and there was 
substantial variation in the extent of this between different suppliers. The percentage of coupons 
requiring tips and mean redemption price were lower at ADMARC/SFFRFM than at all other 
distributors, as shown in table 7.9, but this masks considerable variation between different 
distributors, with some having slightly lower reported incidence of tipping than ADMARC/SFFRFM 
34. Community questionnaire data suggest that payment of tips was less common in ADMARC 
than SFFRFM, and less common in the North than the South and Centre.  
                                                 
33 As noted earlier in section 7.2, qualitative study informants in Rumphi reported that some households sold 
a coupon or a share of a coupon to get cash for coupon redemption.  
34  However it should be noted that with much larger quantities of fertilizer were distributed through 
ADMARC/SFFRFM than through other suppliers, the aggregated impact of 18% of coupons redeemed by 
ADMARC/SFFRFM is probably much greater in terms of money than the 27% redeemed at other 
distributors. 
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Table 7.9 Payment of tips to purchase subsidised fertilisers, by supplier 





/ bag (MK) 
      
ADMARC/SFFRFM 18%  950  983 
Others 27%  950  1,223 
All 20%  950  1,029 
  Source:  AISS,  2007 
 
7.9 Technical  advice 
Proper use of subsidised seed and fertiliser is an important determinant of the impact of the AISP. Table 
7.10 compares reported receipt of advice by AISS respondents with reported receipt of advice by IHS2 
respondents in 2004.The percentage of respondents reporting receipt of advice in the 2006/7 season is 
higher than in the IHS2 survey in 2004, but a lower proportion of the advice was perceived as useful, with 
the result that the percentage of farmers reporting receipt of useful advice is similar across the two surveys.   
 
Table 7.10 Reported receipt of advice from Field Assistants (FAs) 
  
% hh received 
advice  % hh by usefulness of advice 
% all 
farmers 
Advice from FA    No  Yes  Useless/ 
not useful 
Average Useful  Useful   
            
IHS2  new seed varieties  91% 9% 8% 5% 87%  8%
 fertilisers    90% 10% 11% 6% 83% 8%
AISS  new seed varieties  77% 23% 38% 13% 49%  11%
 fertilisers    78% 22% 38% 12% 50%  11%
Source: IHS2 2004 and AISS 2007 data 
 
8.  Economic cost benefit analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
Economic cost benefit analysis is concerned with estimation of the value of incremental benefits 
and costs of the programme to the national economy. The method is grounded in static analysis of 
consumer and producer benefits resulting from changes in costs of production, quantities 
produced and consumed, prices, and hence gains to producers and consumers. The analysis is 
static, however, and largely ignores dynamic growth impacts, either positive or negative, and 
poverty reduction and social protection effects. Economic cost benefit analysis of the subsidy 
programme is also very challenging, as there are considerable methodological difficulties (mainly 
in assessing what benefits there are from such a programme and how they might be formally 
assessed), and considerable data difficulties (estimates are required of incremental costs to 
government and farmers, of incremental production, and of prices and values of incremental 
production, estimation of the latter being particularly problematic, as discussed in annex B). These 
difficulties interact as different methodological approaches make particular demands for data, 
while data and analytical resources limit the methodologies that can be used.  
The result is that it is not possible to avoid considerable uncertainty regarding the economic 
benefit: cost ratio in the evaluation of the 2006/7 programme. The purpose of the evaluation is not, 
however, to provide definitive and precise analysis of the benefits and costs of the 2006/7 
programme, but to set out the likely benefits and costs of the programme if it were to be 
implemented in the future in order to (a) inform decisions about whether or not the programme 
should be implemented in the future, and (b) identify critical design and implementation issues that   73
will affect the efficiency and effectiveness of any future programmes that are implemented. 
Primary value of economic cost benefit analysis in these circumstances is therefore in 
investigating the sensitivity of programme efficiency to external and management variables We 
therefore set out a range of cost:benefit ratio estimates for a range of different conditions and 
assumptions, identifying the main variables effects in determining the net benefits, effectiveness 
and efficiency of the programme.  
We also report on analyses for two separate time periods. The first focuses on an ex post analysis 
of the 2006/7 programme. It is recognised, however, that this is not particularly useful for policy 
decisions about future programmes, which have to take account of the possibility of different 
market conditions. We therefore conduct a second, ex ante, analysis which considers what returns 
such a programme might have if implemented in the future, with estimates of input and output 
prices in the next 5 years or so.  
Full information on the data, assumptions and methods used in the cost benefit analysis is 
provided in Annex B. As noted above, particular difficulties are faced in determining appropriate 
prices for valuing incremental maize production, and we therefore conduct both the ex post and ex 
ante analyses using two different estimates of price levels, to show the range of returns associated 
with these prices and the sensitivity of results to maize prices. Issues in determining maize prices 
are discussed in annex B. 
8.2  Benefit Cost Ratios, ex post analysis of 2006/7 season 
Table 8.1 sets out the benefit cost ratios calculated for the 2006/7 programme with the estimates 
of benefits and costs outlined above and in Annex B.    74
 
Table 8.1 Ex Post Benefit: Cost ratios for 2006/7 AISP 
  
 
A number of points of interest should be noted regarding this table.  
There is considerable variation in benefit : cost ratios, the lowest being 0.76 and the highest 1.36. 
Although these depend upon the price used to value the maize, there is greater variation as a 
result of differences in assumptions made about incremental production, and indeed these 
differences in assumptions lead to variation from 0.76 to 1.25 if incremental maize production is 
valued at $147.5 per tonne and to variation in B:C ratios from 0.83 to 1.36 if incremental maize 
production is valued at $160 per tonne . The benefit : cost ratio is therefore highly sensitive to the 
quality of management: effective management of the programme with early delivery of fertilisers, 
seeds and coupons and with effective use of inputs by farmers is essential if the programme is to 
yield a positive return
35. Since effective application of fertiliser can raise returns to fertiliser 
considerably above 18 kg grain per kg of N, this suggests that effective extension services also 
have an important role to play in raising returns to the programme.  
Annex B provides rationale for the choice of retail maize prices for the two scenarios presented 
above. The chosen prices of $147.5 and $160 per ton under the scenario of a good production 
season imply a significant increase in maize prices over historical average prices.  The mean and 
median Lilongwe monthly retail maize prices between January 1994 and December 2007 have 






were $83.0, $103.7, $142.8, $169.1, and $245.2, respectively, over this 1994 to 2007 period. The 
2007 harvest, by contrast, was considered an exceptionally good rainfall year with a record level of 
maize production, implying that prices at the low end of the price distribution should be used for a 
good production year if historical prices are the best guide to current conditions.  However, there 
                                                 
35 These calculations assume efficiency losses of 15% of the value of displaced fertilisers. This loss would 
be higher, however, if farmers usually purchase and apply fertilisers earlier than they are able to if the 
subsidy causes them to delay application and thus get a lower response to the fertiliser. In such 
circumstances higher rates of displacement would lead to lower benefit : cost ratios than indicated where 12 
kg grain per kg nitrogen is achieved by subsidised fertiliser. 
Benefit: cost ratios, maize price =  $ 160.0 /tonne
Displacement -----> 50% 40% 30%
Grain:N ratio------> 12 15 18 12 15 18 12 15 18
S e e d 7 0 . 9 0 . 8 31 . 0 01 . 1 70 . 8 41 . 0 21 . 2 00 . 8 51 . 0 31 . 2 1
y i e l d 1 1 8 . 2 0 . 9 21 . 0 91 . 2 70 . 9 21 . 1 01 . 2 80 . 9 21 . 1 01 . 2 9
1 6 3 . 4 1 . 0 11 . 1 81 . 3 61 . 0 01 . 1 81 . 3 60 . 9 91 . 1 71 . 3 6
Mean B:C ratio 0.92 1.09 1.26 0.92 1.10 1.28 0.92 1.10 1.29
Fiscal efficiencies -0.07 0.08 0.23 -0.08 0.10 0.28 -0.09 0.12 0.33
0.08 0.10 0.12
Benefit: cost ratios, maize price =  $ 147.5 /tonne
Displacement -----> 50% 40% 30%
Grain:N ratio------> 12 15 18 12 15 18 12 15 18
S e e d 7 0 . 9 0 . 7 60 . 9 21 . 0 80 . 7 70 . 9 41 . 1 00 . 7 80 . 9 51 . 1 2
y i e l d 1 1 8 . 2 0 . 8 51 . 0 11 . 1 70 . 8 51 . 0 11 . 1 80 . 8 51 . 0 21 . 1 9
1 6 3 . 4 0 . 9 31 . 0 91 . 2 50 . 9 21 . 0 91 . 2 50 . 9 11 . 0 81 . 2 5
Mean B:C ratio 0.85 1.01 1.17 0.85 1.01 1.18 0.85 1.02 1.19
Fiscal efficiencies -0.13 0.01 0.14 -0.15 0.01 0.18 -0.18 0.02 0.21
0.01 0.01 0.02  75
were producer and consumer subsidies lowering maize prices in a number of years during the 
1994-2006 period, and there are also indications of structural increase in maize prices in recent 
years, such that historical averages may provide a somewhat inaccurate guide to current and 
future with and without subsidy prices.  Based on the rationale provided in Annex B, prices of 
$147.5 and $160 were used as alternative estimates of average with and without subsidy prices in 
a good rainfall year in the current supply/demand conditions in 2007/08.  
Based on these findings of benefit-cost ratios ranging from 0.76 to 1.36, high, indeed very high, 
returns can be achieved with good programme management and with higher incremental 
production, just as very poor returns can be achieved with poor program management and low 
incremental production.  Finally, fiscal efficiencies vary widely both with the effectiveness of use of 
incremental inputs and also with displacement rates. Although the benefit : cost ratio does not 
change much with higher rates of displacement, fiscal efficiencies do vary considerably. These are 
calculated as net economic or social benefit from the programme (ie benefits less costs) divided by 
the total fiscal cost of the programme (including donor expenditures). This provides a measure of 
the gain to the country per unit of government funds utilised. As expected, highest fiscal efficiency 
is found with low displacement and high grain ratios and gains from improved seed. It should be 
noted that the lack of sensitivity of benefit: cost ratios to changing displacement rates is the result 
of the effectiveness of the seed subsidy in promoting incremental production and limited estimates 
and hence analysis of displacement in seed purchases. Other programme benefits arising through 
maize price and wage rate impacts are also sensitive to displacement effects (these are not 
accounted for in the economic benefit cost analysis but discussed in section 9). 
8.3  Benefit Cost Ratios, ex ante analysis  
Table 8.2 below sets out the benefit cost ratios calculated for the ex ante analysis, with benefits 
and costs estimated as outlined earlier. These are presented with three different assumptions 
about implementation: good implementation (with low displacement and high grain to nitrogen 
responses); moderate implementation (with intermediate displacement and grain to nitrogen 
responses); and poor implementation (with high displacement and low grain to nitrogen 
responses). Three different maize price scenarios are used, with, for each, assumptions about 
prices associated with different types of season (good, medium, bad, very bad) , and then an 
average or expected benefit cost ratio calculated for each price scenario, taking account of the 
probability of different types of season.    76
 
Table 8.2 Ex ante  Benefit: Cost ratios for  AISP 
 
Note:  Grain to nitrogen ratios reduced in ‘bad’ and ‘very bad’ seasons by 25% and 
50% respectively. Fertiliser prices 30% above 2006/7 prices 
 
These calculations show that benefit: cost ratios vary dramatically with maize prices. As discussed 
earlier and in annex B there are considerable difficulties in determining appropriate prices for 
valuing both ex post and ex ante maize prices. It will also be noted later in section 9 that while high 
maize prices lead to high economic returns, they are not good for social protection, livelihood 
benefits and growth benefits from the programme. This highlights weaknesses with over reliance 
on economic cost benefit analysis in evaluating or appraising a programme such as this.  
Economic returns also vary with fertiliser prices. A 30% increase in fertiliser prices above 2006/7 
levels have been used in this analysis. However current international prices of some fertilisers 
(notably DAP) are already far above forecast prices (see annex B). Although this is not the case 
Low price scenario Implementation Good Medium Poor
Probabilty Displacement 30% 40% 50%
Weather Good Grain:N ratio 18 15 12
Price 110 B/C ratio 0.79 0.64 0.48
Weather Medium Grain:N ratio 18 15 12
Price 140 B/C ratio 1.01 0.82 0.61
Weather Bad Grain:N ratio 13.5 11.25 9
Price 250 B/C ratio 1.35 1.01 0.82
Weather Very bad Grain:N ratio 9 7.5 6
Price 400 B/C ratio 1.44 1.16 0.88





Middle price scenario Implementation Good Medium Poor
Probabilty Displacement 30% 40% 50%
Weather Good Grain:N ratio 18 15 12
Price 160 B/C ratio 1.15 0.93 0.70
Weather Medium Grain:N ratio 18 15 12
Price 190 B/C ratio 1.36 1.11 0.83
Weather Bad Grain:N ratio 13.5 11.25 9
Price 250 B/C ratio 1.35 1.01 0.82
Weather Very bad Grain:N ratio 9 7.5 6
Price 400 B/C ratio 1.44 1.16 0.88





High price scenario Implementation Good Medium Poor
Probabilty Displacement 30% 40% 50%
Weather Good Grain:N ratio 18 15 12
Price 190 B/C ratio 1.36 1.11 0.83
Weather Medium Grain:N ratio 18 15 12
Price 240 B/C ratio 1.72 1.40 1.05
Weather Bad Grain:N ratio 13.5 11.25 9
Price 300 B/C ratio 1.62 1.21 0.99
Weather Very bad Grain:N ratio 9 7.5 6
Price 400 B/C ratio 1.44 1.16 0.88





for urea, continued increases in international prices of programme fertiliser imports above the 30% 
increases used in the analysis will make the economic and fiscal costs of the programme even 
higher, and these can only be justified if the programme delivers very high economic benefits. 
Thus a 60% increase in fertiliser prices would lead to an approximate 13% fall in the benefit cost 
ratio (ie with high prices and good management from 1.59 to 1.38 and with low prices and poor 
management from 0.65 to 0.56). This analysis shows that the economic and fiscal costs of the 
programme will become increasingly burdensome with high fertiliser prices, and it is therefore 
extremely important that any future programme  is implemented as efficiently as possible. 
8.4  Economic cost benefit analysis: conclusions   
There are numerous difficult methodological and data issues in the estimation of both the ex post 
and ex ante economic benefit : cost ratios. A range of best estimates have been presented to 
demonstrate the sensitivity of the economic returns and fiscal efficiency of the programme to 
design and management (principally as they affect the grain to N ratio and displacement), maize 
prices and input prices. It is not possible to control weather conditions and regional or international 
prices, but as international input prices and risks of climatic variability rise it would be very 
important to implement any future programme as effectively as possible. It would also be important 
to consider how choice of appropriate scale and design (in terms of targeting and pricing) affects 
costs.  
It must be emphasised that while the precise estimates presented here are sensitive to 
judgements made to address data and methodological difficulties, the broad results are robust, as 
regards the sensitivity of returns to different variables and likely orders of magnitude of returns 
under different, specified conditions. It must also be recognised that economic returns are not the 
only criteria to be used in judging if the  AISP is worthwhile, as there are particular limitations in the 
way that it does not address more dynamic ways that investments may stimulate farm and non-
farm growth and social protection in rural economies. However low economic returns indicate that 
such benefits are being obtained at a high cost, and it is important to be sure that costs are kept 
as low as possible and that these wider  benefits justify their costs. The next section describes the 
results of modelling of livelihoods and the informal rural economy to illustrate how the input 
subsidy may promote growth in ways not taken into account in the economic cost benefit analysis.  
9.  Livelihood and rural economy impacts  
This section of the report considers the effects of the subsidy programme on rural livelihoods and 
the rural economy. We consider two different types of impact: direct impacts are those 
experienced by recipients of the subsidy as a direct result of their receipt of subsidised inputs; 
indirect impacts are those that result from changes in society and the economy as a result of direct 
impacts on large numbers of people affecting their assets and behaviour and hence the behaviour 
of markets (principally maize and labour markets) and the resources available to the community. 
We consider direct and indirect impacts in turn.  
9.1  Direct subsidy impacts on rural households 
No attempt is made to use the household survey data to estimate direct impacts of receiving 
subsidised inputs since, as noted earlier, the yield and production data collected in the survey do 
not appear to be reliable enough for use in this way. We consider, however, information from focus 
group discussions and key informant interviews and from previous sections of the report on 
different types of households’ access to subsidised inputs, and of reported effects of receiving 
subsidies We also estimate the direct effects of receipt of subsidised inputs using a set of 
household livelihood models described in Dorward, A., 2007.   
In the focus group discussions and key informant interviews there are arguments in all districts, 
even those that experienced flooding, that food production has increased as a result of the coupon 
distribution.  In areas with good rains the impact on food production has been greatest but even 
those areas that experienced floods or a dry spell at the time of tasselling have some   78
improvements in production.  The increase in food production is reported to have had a number of 
positive effects on household welfare: 
•  Food security indicators – namely number of meals consumed each day, number of 
malnutrition cases and the time which food stocks are lasting – are all reported to have 
improved. 
•  Income and access to cash has increased as more households have produced a surplus 
to sell. 
“mbuyomu chakudya chimatha September kapena October kenako nkumadya gaga, pano 
chimatha kupezana gaga uja kumapitsira nkhumba. Kupemphananso chakudya kwangotsala  
kwa amodziamodzi”. 
(in the past food was running out in September or October and then people had to eat bran, 
now the food meets with that of another harvest, the bran is now given to pigs. Begging each 
other food has just has remained with a few people) (Case study, Ntcheu). 
Other reported direct impacts of the programme include: 
•  Increased access to cash is resulting in other types of investments.  Households now have 
money to buy school uniform from the sales they make or indirectly from cash that would 
otherwise have been spent on fertiliser.  There are also investments in productive assets in 
the immediate term - some of us bought pigs and chickens right now they are reproducing 
and multiplying because of the same maize we sold…this is an improvement because in 
future we can sell some of these pigs and handle more easily household problems”  
“ana sakujomba chisawawa ku school poti chakudya chilipo pomwe kale amajomba kupita 
kukathandiza makolo ganyu kapena kutsala pakhomo makolo atapita ku ganyu” 
(children are no longer staying away from school anyhow because of availability of food in 
their homes unlike in the past when they had to stay away from school to assist their 
parents in ganyu or stay at home while the parents have gone to do ganyu). 
•  Increased utilisation of technologies – including fertiliser and hybrid seeds.  Households 
are increasingly exposed to examples of how technology can work and are taking it up with 
increasingly enthusiasm.  In some districts they are also adopting other changes in their 
cropping systems, including Sasakawa techniques. Even in Chikwawa, where flooding 
washed away many crops and where consumption of fertiliser is low because many people 
work on already fertile soil, there is recognition that fertiliser can be positive for production.  
People who have never used fertiliser before are reported to be planning to use it next 
season to increase yields. 
•  Less tangible, though very important, is the change in attitudes of people towards their land.  
Feelings of hopelessness have been replaced with confidence and enthusiasm about 
households’ own capacity to be more productive and increase their income earning 
potential in agriculture.  Intra-household disputes are fewer.  More widely there is anecdotal 
evidence of increased social capital – people are now able to do the ‘right thing’ at social 
events such as weddings and funerals.  They can invite their neighbours and feed them. 
“maphokoso mmbanja atha poti anthu pano chakudya akukhala nacho, mmbuyomu 
pakhomo chakudya chikangotha amuna amakhala mmavuto poti unali udindo wao  
kukafuna chakudya ndiye ngati sapita kuganyu sikulongolola kwake azikaziwo” 
(Quarrels in families have now stopped since people now have food. In the past, once the 
food was over men were in problems because it was their duty to find food for the family so 
if they did not go to ganyu the women were shouting at them) 
There are also some less positive signs.  The most important of these is that the call for more 
coupons so that all rural households can receive them is interpreted by many as a sign that the 
subsidy may increase the dependency of households on subsidy support.  For example, one 
respondent commented that Negatively, the subsidy has increased the dependency syndrome and   79
as such, that is why people are refusing to target and everyone just wants to benefit.  It is clear 
that the programme has benefited from two good rainy seasons in many districts.  The importance 
of maximising the benefits of these good years and using them to make households more resilient 
to problems and less reliant on programmes in subsequent years is recognised by some 
respondents (Box 9.1). 
 
Box 9.1 Diversification and risk management in Ntcheu 
Benefits from the coupon system depend on good implementation – particularly the 
delivery of the programme by government and suppliers – but also on the responses 
of households.  In Ntcheu participants in the programme complained that problems 
with implementation – especially timing, targeting and poor information about how 
many coupons each household would get hampered their planning for the 
forthcoming season.  Households that immediately invested in other productive 
assets – particularly livestock – were better able to cope when the subsidy 
programme did not deliver what they had expected.  Those that continued to focus 
on maize were less prepared to respond. 
Authorities have disturbed the programme this season by causing coupon shortages 
because of selling. “we could have been somewhere now but look…we will be going 
back to ganyu seeking this coming season,” they complained. 
Participants said that the programme could have had long terms effects had it been 
not for this disturbance caused by coupon sellers who have caused shortages 
…“there could have been long term effects if this season was like last season…but 
now we are like starting again…we just hope the government will come up with ways 
of combating this selling of coupons and that it should increase the number of 
allocation to each village,” they said. 
However one of the women said that those people who bought items like livestock 
would be able to enjoy the effects of the programme in the long-term because she 
said if the livestock multiply as they are doing right now, then in future these people 
will be able to just sell some and buy inputs just like the a-bit well to do and the well 
to do are doing now. 
 
There are of course difficulties in quantifying the scale of the direct impacts reported above, as (a) 
it is difficult to judge the extent of the impacts described on different households and the number of 
households affected in these ways, and (b) it is difficult to separate out the effects of the subsidy 
from the effects of good weather. Models of rural households’ livelihoods were constructed and 
used to provide an alternative method of investigating impacts in which these difficulties could be 
to some extent overcome.  
The development and features of the model used to investigate direct (and later indirect) impacts 
of the subsidy programme are described in Dorward, A., 2007. Cluster analysis of IHS2 data was 
used to define seven or eight different household types for each of the larger livelihood zones 
defined by Malawi National Vulnerability Assessment Committee, 2005.  Household livelihood 
models were then developed for the two largest zones (in terms of population) the Kasungu 
Lilongwe Plain and the Shire Highlands zones. Between them these two zones include just over 
40% of rural households in Malawi and they represent examples of less and more densely 
populated areas in the centre and south of the country. A common structure was used to construct 
models of seasonal constraints and activities for seven household types in each zone.  Receipt of 
coupons was then simulated for each household type.  
Although the models describe key features of and differences between household types and zones, 
they cannot capture the complexity and diversity of rural livelihoods, and are from necessity 
constructed using at times inadequate data. Simulation results discussed below should therefore   80
be taken as illustrative of the nature of subsidy impacts and of the way that they interact with and 
are affected by the various characteristics of different households and rural areas.  
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 summarise key household characteristics, baseline model conditions and 
simulated results for the changes that result from access to different subsidy packages for the 
different households in the two zones (packages are made up one or two bags of fertilizer 
containing 17.5 kg N with a 70% subsidy and 2 kg hybrid seed free)
36.  More detailed results of 
these simulations are provided in Dorward, A., 2007. 
There are three possible uses of the subsidy by subsidy recipients:  reselling of coupons or of 
subsidized inputs, incremental use of the inputs in production, or use of the inputs with 
displacement of otherwise unsubsidised purchases. These lead to two main types of direct benefit 
for recipients: immediate income transfers from reselling or displacement, or incremental 
production at harvest if the inputs are used on farm
37.  
The model estimates substantial resale among poorer households (to the left of the tables), while 
less-poor households who are already using fertilizer tend to substitute unsubsidised purchases 
with subsidized purchases. As discussed earlier the household survey did not report substantial 
reselling of fertilizer, but 14% of households reported fertilizer use lower than receipt of coupons 
and examination of reported fertilizer purchases suggests complex patterns of exchange and 
sharing of subsidized inputs. Qualitative field work suggested that selling of coupons or fertilizer 
was one way of raising cash for coupon redemption.. It may also be that the discount on reselling 
fertilizer in the model was too small, that there are strong pressures which discourage reselling, or 
some combination of these explanations for the discrepancy between model and survey results. 
Receipt of coupons by less poor households appears to lead to a combination of incremental 
fertilizer use and displacement, the balance between these varying between household types. 
Incremental fertilizer use is slightly increased and reselling and displacement are reduced when 
seed is also subsidized alongside fertilizer.  
Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show both substantial differences between the two areas
38 and substantial 
increases in estimated net incomes of some recipient households, even with significant reselling or 
displacement. Proportionate increase in income are particularly significant for poorer households 
in the Shire Highlands simulations where, even at discounted prices, the income from reselling 
fertiliser can ease seasonal cash and food constraints and allow poor households to reduce the 
time spent hiring out ganyu labour to others and to increase the time spent working on their own 
farms. These gains are also immediate and do not depend upon their ability to work. Benefits from 
incremental fertiliser use are, however, deferred to the end of the season and are dependent upon 
the household’s access to labour and land. There are also generally positive and in some cases 
substantial increases in maize production result from the subsidy, varying across households. 
Impacts on tobacco cultivation vary between households.  
                                                 
36 No distinctions were modelled between different fertiliser types. Some minor changes in intercropping of 
beans and maize and in groundnut cultivation are not shown in the tables and explain apparent 
discrepancies between changes in maize production and maize areas.  
37 The purchases of resold inputs are considered in later simulations and may lead to displacement and 
transfer benefits or incremental use and incremental production benefits among purchasers. 
38  Poorer household types in the Kasungu-Lilongwe Plain have slightly higher dependency ratios than 
poorer household types in the Shire Highlands, and IHS2 prices used had slightly lower maize prices and 
higher fertiliser prices in the Kasungu-Lilongwe Plain, depressing returns from fertiliser use on maize.   81
 
Table 9.1 Summary household characteristics, baseline model conditions and simulated 
subsidy impacts: Kasungu Lilongwe Plain (2004 prices) 











grower  Borrower   Large 
farm  Wage 
           Household characteristics (IHS2)   
Rainfed land ha/member (median)  0.14 0.16  0.27  0.23 0.26 0.34  0.15 
Dimba land ha/member (median)  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.04  0.02 0.00  0.00 
% Female headed     100%  0%  49%  12%  9%  8%  4% 
Dependency ratio (mean)  1.4  1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 
Per capita expenditure  (median) 14,292  16,624  22,218  19,247 21,302 26,405  22,854 
Persons/hh (mean) 4.9  5.5 3.1 5.3 5.6 4.6 5.1 
Poverty incidence  (mean)  60%  48%  29%  38%  23%  15%  29% 
             Baseline       
Local maize area  Ha  0.79 0.93  0.78  0.95 1.10 0.93  0.53 
Hybrid maize area  Ha  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.09 0.24 0.19  0.27 
Tobacco area  Ha  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.29 0.51 0.44  0.13 
Maize production  Kg  480 563  473  745 1,286  1,468  831 
Net income  MK  41,797 51,548  38,892  66,854 85,960 72,383  93,048 
Fertiliser use  kg N  0 0  0  3 17  33  10 
            Direct impacts of receipt of subsidy (changes)    
One bag fertiliser               
Local maize area  Ha  -0.01 -0.02  -0.02 +0.01 -0.00  0.00 +0.01 
Hybrid maize area  Ha  0.00 0.00 +0.03  +0.13 +0.00  0.00 -0.05 
Tobacco area  Ha  +0.01 +0.02  -0.00  -0.14 0.00 0.00  +0.06 
Maize production  Kg  -4 -11 +44  +349  +6  0 +46 
Net income  MK  +302 +441  +247  +76 +1,941  +1,604  +1,844 
Net income %     +1% +1%  +1%  +0%  +2%  +2% +2% 
Fertiliser use  kg N  +17.5 +17.5  +17.5  +14.4  +0.5  0.0  +7.9 
  Resale      +17.5  +17.5 +15.7  +2.1  0.0  0.0  0.0 
  Other 
displacement  kg N  0% 0% 10%  70% 3%  0% 45% 
One bag fertiliser & 2 kg seed             
Local maize area  Ha  -0.02 -0.03  -0.08  -0.01 -0.00 0.00 -0.03 
Hybrid maize area  Ha  +0.02 +0.03  +0.08  +0.13 +0.00  0.00 -0.05 
Tobacco area  Ha  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.12 0.00 0.00  +0.10 
Maize production  Kg  +28 +59 +139  +337  +7  0  +25 
Net income  MK  +575 +765  +457  +613 +2,241  +1,904  +2,424 
Net income %     +1% +1%  +1%  +1%  +3%  +3% +3% 
Fertiliser use  kg N  +17.5 +17.5  +17.5  +14.4  +0.5  0.0  +7.9 
  Resale     +16.4  +15.2  +11.9  +2.1 0.0  0.0 0.0 
  Other 
displacement  kg N  7% 13% 32% 70%  3%  0% 45% 
Two bags fertiliser & 2 kg seed            
Local maize area  Ha  -0.03 -0.05  -0.08  -0.01 +0.18 0.00 +0.05 
Hybrid maize area  Ha  +0.03 +0.05  +0.08  +0.13 +0.00  0.00 -0.05 
Tobacco area  Ha  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.12 -0.18 0.00 +0.02 
Maize production  Kg  +51 +83 +139  +336  +387 +34 +233 
Net income  MK  +932 +1,154  +787  +792  +1,053 +3,282  +1,507 
Net income %     +2% +2%  +2%  +1%  +1%  +5% +2% 
Fertiliser use  kg N  +35.0 +35.0  +35.0  +31.9 +18.0  +1.8 +25.4 
  resale     +33.0  +31.7  +29.4  +19.6  +2.9  0.0  +8.5 
  other displacement  kg N  6% 9% 16%  35%  43% 5% 48%   82
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            Household characteristics (IHS2)    
Rainfed land ha/member (median)  0.14  0.15 0.20 0.27 0.43 0.12 0.14 
Dimba land ha/member (median)  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 
% Female headed     100%  0%  62%  18%  18%  4%  21% 
Dependency ratio (mean)  1.3  0.9 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.8 1.1 
Per capita expenditure  (median)  11,326  12,060 18,529 20,016 29,871 16,869 12,342 
Persons/hh (mean)  4.2  4.9 3 4.3 3 5.1  5.4 
Poverty incidence  (mean)  76%  70% 39% 40% 15% 46% 73% 
             Baseline      
Local maize area  ha  0.76  0.79 0.89 0.94 1.33 0.54 0.95 
Hybrid maize area  ha  0.00  0.06 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.22 0.00 
Tobacco area  ha  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.23 0.15 0.00 0.00 
Maize production  kg  466 617  793  1,194  1,413  913  576 
Net income  MK  40,643  50,936 43,002 67,622 63,079 80,014 54,673 
Fertiliser use  kg N  0 4  8  21  23  19  0 
            Direct impacts of receipt of subsidy (changes)    
One bag fertiliser              
Local maize area  ha  -0.04  -0.06  -0.02 -0.03  +0.01  -0.03 -0.04 
Hybrid maize area  ha  +0.08  +0.11 +0.02 +0.00  0.00  +0.00 +0.10 
Tobacco area  ha  0.00  0.00  0.00 -0.01  -0.01  +0.05  0.00 
Maize production  kg  +160  +217  +34  +14  +34  +24  +197 
Net  income  MK  +436  +770  +737 +1,227 +841 +1,051 +430 
Net income %     +1%  +2%  +2%  +2%  +1%  +1%  +1% 
Fertiliser use  kg N  +17.3 +13.4  +10.0 +1.5 +1.4 +1.9  +17.5 
  resale      +11.8  +5.9  +8.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  +10.8 
  other displacement  kg N  31%  43%  8%  9%  8%  11%  38% 
One bag fertiliser & 2 kg seed            
Local maize area  ha  -0.05  -0.07  -0.04 -0.04  +0.01  -0.05 -0.06 
Hybrid maize area  ha  +0.10  +0.13 +0.02 +0.00  0.00  +0.00 +0.11 
Tobacco area  ha  0.00  0.00  +0.02 -0.01 -0.01 +0.08 0.00 
Maize production  kg  +190  +247  +32  +18  +54  +28  +227 
Net income  MK  +1,010  +1,334  +1,161 +1,611 +1,104 +1,458 +1,007 
Net income %     +2%  +3%  +3%  +2%  +2%  +2%  +2% 
Fertiliser use  kg N  +17.3 +13.4  +10.0 +2.0 +2.3 +2.8  +17.5 
  resale      +10.6  +4.7  +8.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  +9.6 
  other displacement  kg N  38%  50%  11%  11%  13%  16%  45% 
Two bags fertiliser & 2 kg seed          
Local maize area  ha  -0.06  -0.08  -0.06 -0.05 -0.06  +0.00  -0.08 
Hybrid maize area  Ha  +0.11  +0.13 +0.02 +0.00 +0.08 +0.01 +0.13 
Tobacco area  Ha  0.00  0.00  +0.04 -0.01 -0.01 +0.03 0.00 
Maize  production  Kg  +206  +259  +37  +186 +280 +317 +254 
Net income  MK  +1,378  +1,665  +1,499 +2,022 +2,226 +1,469 +1,488 
Net income %     +3%  +3%  +3%  +3%  +4%  +2%  +3% 
Fertiliser use  kg N  +34.8 +30.9  +27.5 +13.7 +11.9 +16.4 +35.0 
  resale      +27.5  +21.7 +24.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  +26.0 
  other displacement  kg N  21%  26%  8%  39%  34%  47%  26% 
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9.2  Indirect subsidy impacts on rural households 
The discussion in the previous section suggests that there are substantial direct benefits from the 
subsidy for recipient households, and the nature of those benefits varies according to the nature of 
the subsidy and the characteristics of households. Previous discussion of conditions in the 2006/7 
season also, however, suggested wider changes affecting all households as a result of the good 
weather and contribution of the 2005/6 subsidy to a good maize harvest in 2005/6. These changes 
centred around maize price impacts and ganyu supply and demand  and wage rates. The interplay 
between the input subsidy programme, ganyu, maize prices and how these affect household 
livelihoods and well-being, and the wider rural economy came out strongly in the qualitative data 
focus group discussions and key informant interviews.  
The general story told in these fora was that a combination of subsidised access to fertiliser and 
good rains in almost all locations in season 2005/06 resulted in an exceptionally good harvest.  All 
households groups (see the household group descriptions in Section 2: Information about Data) 
harvested crops.  The richest two groups of households had food stocks that lasted through to the 
2006/07 harvest.  They also sold surpluses.  Many households in the ‘poor’ group had stocks that 
almost reached harvest, at which time they took ganyu.  The poorest households – those who 
usually consume their maize green – i.e. before it has ripened - had stocks that lasted through the 
rainy season. As a result, many households were selling maize and much fewer were entering the 
market to buy.  This led to a significant fall in the price of maize.  At the same time, households 
with food stocks, especially those in category 3, became less dependent on ganyu to provide 
either food, or cash to buy food.  The seasonal problem of oversupply of labourers then switched 
to an undersupply and some households that usually sell labour (again in category 3) began to buy 
in labour.  As a result, those that entered into the ganyu market were able to command better 
wage rates than has been the case for many years.  Labourers have become wage-setters rather 
than wage-takers – though men have been more successful at setting prices than women. A 
further benefit is that less theft of crops is reported, because maize prices are lower and there is 
ganyu available at a good price from those households who want it. 
Although the survey data do not show substantial changes in periods of time for which households 
report or expect their maize stocks to last, there is clear evidence of higher ganyu rates and of 
lower maize prices as compared with previous seasons (and lower maize prices led to further 
increases in real wage rates for ganyu). The discussion of possible incremental production as a 
result of the subsidy also suggests that it has played a role in lowering maize prices. It is difficult , 
however, to separate the effects of the subsidy from the effects of the good rains in 2005/6 and 
2006/7.  
The household models discussed above were therefore used to investigate further the 
relationships between the subsidy, maize prices, ganyu rates and income and welfare benefits. 
This was achieved by calculating aggregate baseline labour and maize market demand and supply 
from all households in each zone (allowing for the total numbers of each type of household in each 
zone), and then for different subsidy scenarios (a) simulating subsidy impacts on each household 
type and on aggregate labour and maize market demand and supply  and then (b) modifying 
maize and labour prices and rerunning step (a), either with predetermined maize and labour prices 
or with maize and labour prices which allowed the maize and labour markets to be roughly in 
equilibrium in line with assumptions about relatively thin markets and inelastic maize and labour 
demand outside each zone. Again further information on the methodology and results can be 
found in Dorward, A., 2007.     
9.3  Simulation of indirect impacts of a universal subsidy 
We consider first a simple situation where all households in each zone have access to subsidized 
fertilizer providing 17.5kgN together with 2kg of hybrid maize seed – a universal subsidy which 
avoids targeting problems. As discussed earlier, simulation of the direct impacts of this shows 
immediate transfer benefits from reselling and displacement and deferred benefits from 
incremental fertilizer use.   84
Immediate transfer benefits lead to tightening of the labour market in the season of implementation, 
with a contraction in labour supply by poorer households (who need to hire out less ganyu to earn 
food, as a result of income from reselling fertilizer
39) and a much smaller expansion of hired labour 
demand by less-poor households (who have more resources available to hire labour as a result of 
cash saved by subsidy displacement of unsubsidized seed and fertilizer purchases). This 
tightening of the labour market should lead to an increase in real wages, estimated at around a 5 
to 11% increase in the first year of subsidy implementation (see the column headed ‘year 1 
subsidy’ in table 9.3, which shows separate results for the Kasungu Lilongwe Plains and the Shire 
Highlands). 
 
Table 9.3 Simulation of subsidy impacts on the Informal Rural Economy 
  
Increased wages lead to immediate real income and hence welfare and consumption gains to 
poorer households, both recipients and non-recipients. Increased on farm labour use by the poor 
(as a result of reduced need to hire out labour) also mean that gains from direct transfers to poor 
people and higher wages should lead to incremental production and welfare gains at and after 
harvest, even without any incremental input use (though these gains will be offset to some extent 
in the wider economy by losses of low cost labour to the less poor). Less poor people who hire in 
labour may also incur a loss in net real income if they have to pay higher wages when hiring labour 
in and for purchasing local goods and services whose prices are determined largely by unskilled 
wage costs.  
Simulated income gains as a result of transfer benefits and incremental production benefits to 
recipients and of wage changes in the year of subsidy are shown in the ‘year 1 subsidy’ column in 
table 9.3 in real terms (allowing for cost of living changes as a result of wage and maize price 
changes). The universal subsidy is seen to give higher percentage income increases to poorer 
households (defined as ‘target hh’ in table 9.3) even before allowance for falls in maize prices. 
Comparison of % income changes for poorer households in year 1 in table 9.3 with % income 
changes as a result of direct impacts of receipt of the same subsidy shows that indirect impacts 
are important, again even without allowance for falls in maize prices.  
Major impacts of a subsidy are, however, also expected in the season following its implementation, 
as a result of households having increased stocks of grain produced with the subsidy. To simulate 
this, the model was run with household pre-seasonal grain stocks increased, assuming that 50% 
of the incremental net income from the subsidy is retained in these stocks. Two alternative 
                                                 
39 The wider production effects of any incremental input use from resold inputs are not simulated.  
Year 1 Year 2 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2 Year 2
Subs No Sub Subs Subs No Sub Subs
Total subsidised Seed (MT) 1482.5 0 1482.5 754.468 0 754.5
Subsidised Fertiliser (MT N) 12971 0 12971 6601.59 0 6602
Wage change (% from base) 5% 20% 20% 11% 30% 30%
Maize price change (% ) 0% -26% -26% 0% -27% -27%
Real net income change
Target hh 5% 15% 16% 9% 16% 15%
All hh 2% 1% 2% 4% 3% 4%
Total cost / hhold (MK) 2,015 0 2,015 1,770 0 1,814
Total cost / target hhold(MK) 6,717 0 6,717 3,161 0 3,240
Total benefit / hhold (MK) 506 310 670 2,160 1,791 1,984
Benefit / target hhold (MK) 1,193 3,648 3,928 3,435 6,088 5,929
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scenarios were simulated, without and with a subsidy in the second year. Again the results for both 
simulations in both zones are presented in table 9.3.   
Increased grain stocks carried over from the previous year have two effects: decreased need for 
pre-harvest purchases of grain by households with insufficient stored grain and, as a result of this, 
decreased hiring out of ganyu to earn cash and food by poorer households and (slightly) increased 
financing to hire in farm labour by less-poor households. The effects of the loosening of the grain 
market are a fall in maize prices and a rise in wages, as discussed earlier for the 2006/7 season
40. 
Interactions between wages and maize markets make it difficult to simulate the precise balance 
between maize price and wage changes, but their effects on net incomes are similar: poorer 
households benefit from both higher wages and lower maize prices, while less-poor households 
may gain or lose from these changes, depending on the extent to which they hire labour in and out 
and buy and sell maize at different times. Column ‘year 2 no subsidy’ in table 9.3 shows simulated 
wage increases of 20% and 30% in the Kasungu Lilongwe Plains (KAS) and Shire Highlands (SHI) 
zones and maize price falls of just over 25% (these are smaller than differences observed in the 
2006/7 season, following the 2005/6 subsidy, but it is impossible to differentiate here between 
weather and subsidy effects on prices, it should also be noted that field reports of wage and price 
changes are not changes from equivalent and well defined baselines). These processes at work in 
a year following a subsidy are strengthened by the implementation of a subsidy, as this further 
eases seasonal cash constraints and tightens the labour market, as described above for year 1.  
The effects of wage and maize price changes in these scenarios are to increase average real net 
incomes, with particular benefits to the poor (indeed they may in the short term appear to be 
damaging for less-poor households). This is shown by comparison of estimated increases in real 
net income for poorer and all households in table 9.3, and by comparison of these estimated 
increases with the estimated direct increases from an equivalent subsidy as set out earlier in 
tables 9.1 and 9.2. It is also worth noting that estimated wages increases are higher in the Shire 
Highlands zone than in the Kasungu zone, as a greater proportion of households benefit from the 
reduced need to look for ganyu and so the subsidy has a greater effect on the labour market (56% 
of all households fall into the poor female headed, poor male headed and poor dimba categories in 
the Shire Highlands zone, whereas 30% of all households fall into the poor female headed, poor 
male headed categories in the Kasungu zone). Similarly although poorer households in the 
Kasungu zone have a higher estimated % gain in real income, the greater proportion of poorer 
households in the Shire Highlands zone leads to a higher average increase in real income in that 
zone. 
The increased income benefits from the subsidy can be compared with the estimated costs of 
inputs supplied under the subsidy. Two comparisons are offered in table 9.3, one averaging costs 
and benefits across all households, and the other looking only at the benefits to poor (“target”) 
households, and dividing total subsidy costs by the number of target households to give the costs 
per target household. Costs incurred in one year then need to be compared with benefits that 
accrue over that season and subsequent seasons (and will be contingent on policies that do not 
push maize prices up and wages down, a pertinent issue given maize price rises experienced 
during the 2007/8 pre-harvest season). Comparison of costs and benefits in table 9.3 shows 
benefits to be substantially greater than costs in the Shire Highlands zone, and slightly less than 
costs in the Kasungu Lilongwe Plain. As these model results should be considered as illustrative 
rather than prescriptive, too much weight should not be given to precise comparisons of costs and 
benefits. However it is appropriate to take note of (a) the substantial difference between costs and 
                                                 
40 There are difficulties in modelling changes in maize prices across and within seasons, partly due to the 
structure of the model and partly due to difficulties in distinguishing between and allowing divergence 
between ex ante price expectations driving farmer decisions and ex post price outcomes resulting from 
those decisions. Changes in both maize prices and wages between years are simulated as a proportionate 
fall or rise that is constant across the whole year, but post-harvest maize prices will sometimes behave 
differently from pre-harvest and are also more likely to diverge from price expectations. However it is not 
thought that this will  have particularly significant effects on the results presented here as regards overall 
benefits over two years.   86
benefits in the Shire Highlands zone and (b) the differences in cost-benefit relationship between 
the two zones. Under (a) we should note the potential of indirect market effects to allow the 
programme to make very substantial contributions to dynamic benefits to poor people’s livelihoods  
and to economic growth in poor rural areas, provided that markets are allowed to let increases in 
production lead to reduced maize prices and increased wages.  Under (b) we should note that 
both basic differences in input and output prices (as noted earlier) and differences in land pressure 
and livelihood structures between areas will lead to differences in the ability to which the subsidy 
programme contributes effectively to increased real incomes and improved livelihood opportunities 
for the poor.  
This analysis draws out the importance of understanding different direct effects of subsidy access 
on different households and the different indirect effects of these as they affect labour and maize 
markets. These effects are illustrated in figure 9.1, which shows the rather complex set of direct 
and indirect impacts and their relationships over time as described above. Further subsidy impacts 
shown in the figure are that increased real incomes should lead to greater farm and non-farm 
investment (in human and social capital as well as in financial, natural  and physical capital for 
particular enterprises), and that growing real incomes in rural areas should lead to increased  
demand for locally produced goods and services, including non staple foods. Impacts on demand 
for and investment in input services will depend heavily on the way that subsidies are 
implemented. 
 
Figure 9.1 Tracing out direct and indirect subsidy impacts over time 
 
Key:     Positive  effect 
    Negative  effect 
 
Simulations were also conducted for preliminary investigation of the effects of targeting subsidies 
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9.4  Simulation of indirect impacts of a targeted subsidy 
Targeting of subsidies was investigated by running simulations where a larger subsidy package 
was provided only to poorer households
41. The subsidy package consisted of 2kg seed and 35 kg 
of nitrogen, equivalent to two 50 kg bags of fertilizer, and ‘poorer’ households were defined as 
those labelled as ‘poorer’ in the cluster categorization (poor female headed, poor male headed 
and poor dimba). There is immediately a difference between the two zones, as 56% of households 
qualify for the subsidy in the Shire Highlands zone as compared with 30% in the Kasungu zone
42.  
In both zones the simulations suggests substantial reselling of fertilizer by poorer households and 
purchasing of resold fertiliser by less poor, untargeted households. Income from reselling fertilizer 
is used not only to finance seasonal consumption but also extra purchase of hybrid seed by some 
households. Poor households benefits from the targeted subsidy are roughly equivalent to gains 
from the smaller comprehensive subsidy (as larger direct gains are more than offset by smaller 
indirect gains through falling maize prices and rising wages) but the balance between these and 
costs per target household differ between the two livelihood zones: in the Shire Highlands zone a 
comprehensive programme is more cost effective as target households make up a substantial 
proportion of the population and savings from targeted subsidies are smaller, but in the Kasungu 
Lilongwe Plain they make up a smaller proportion of households and hence  savings from targeted 
subsidies are very substantial and more than offset lower benefits from smaller labour and maize 
market impacts. Less poor households who do not receive the subsidy lose out marginally from 
the increased ganyu rates wages, and in selling any surplus grain, but their dynamic, longer term 
gains from growth in the economy should be positive.  
9.5  Simulation of indirect impacts of increased buyer confidence in maize markets  
An issue that was raised in the March 2007 Interim Evaluation report was the importance of 
stabilization of maize prices if the programme is to deliver longer term benefits of increased 
productivity  and rural incomes leading to diversification out of maize production. In this section we 
describe simulation of the effect of increased consumer confidence in maize markets.  Simulations 
were run for the without subsidy base year and for the second year of a universal subsidy (i.e. 
simulating the effects of increased confidence in maize buying in the absence of any subsidy and 
in the presence of a universal subsidy). Increased confidence in buying from the maize market 
leads to a fall in maize production (due to lower subsistence production) and increased reliance on 
purchases. The subsequent tightening of the maize market leads to increases in maize prices. At 
the same time there are relatively small cropping switches by some household types from maize to 
groundnuts and tobacco, and these cause some tightening of the labour market. These changes 
occur in both without and with subsidy scenarios. However there are important interactions with 
the effects of the subsidy.  
As discussed earlier, the subsidy tends to tighten labour markets and raise wages in the year of 
implementation and then additionally depress maize prices in subsequent seasons. Where 
increased confidence in maize markets is accompanied by a subsidy, then both these changes 
tighten labour markets and raise nominal wages (benefiting poorer households). However if 
market confidence increases in the absence  of increased maize production from the subsidy, then 
the increase in nominal wages is counteracted by the increase in maize prices. As a result the 
poor suffer real income losses although there are real income gains for less poor households 
across both the Kasungu and Shire Highland zones. In this situation although all households, 
                                                 
41  Varied patterns of coupon distribution between different household types in the 2006/7 programme 
prevented simulation of a pattern of targeting matching actual distribution of coupons, and it was considered 
more useful to compare the universal distribution of a smaller (one 50kg bag) subsidy (as occurred in many 
places) and targeting on the poor.  
42 Note that this compares with IHS2 estimates of 56% poverty incidence in the Border zone and 36% in the 
livelihood zone. Although model estimates of net incomes for the poorer groups are similar across the two 
zones, IHS2 estimates of median expenditure for poorer households are higher in the Kasungu zone than in 
the Border zone.    88
including the poor, gain from increased market confidence (as a result of direct benefits of reduced 
investment in lower productivity maize), for the poor this is counteracted by the effects of higher 
maize prices affecting their income and cash flow.  
However, in simulations where increased confidence in maize markets is accompanied by a 
subsidy, then the increased maize productivity from the subsidy counteracts the fall in maize 
production induced by increased buying confidence in maize markets, reducing maize price 
increases as compared to the baseline. These are then smaller than the increases in nominal 
wages, and as a result real net incomes from the poor rise more than they do under the subsidy 
without increased buyer confidence in maize markets.  
These simulation results are highly significant to maize price and subsidy policies in Malawi and 
need further investigation.  Evaluation of these results must also recognise that maize price 
stabilization policies are normally considered to benefit the poor in two ways: first by protecting 
them against the very adverse consequence of large price rises in bad years, and second by 
allowing the poor to diversify out of low productive staple food production in normal years. The 
results presented here do not question the first of these benefits, but do suggest that for reasons 
outlined above the second of these benefits may not accrue to the poor, and could actually 
damage their livelihoods.   
Conversely, however, synergies between the subsidy programme and maize price stabilization are 
suggested. The results presented here provide support for the argument that the long term 
developmental benefits of the subsidy programme would depend, among other things, on greater 
price stability allowing a long term shift out of maize production by the poor. More work is needed 
to investigate the results presented here, but they suggest that the longer term benefits to the poor 
from price stabilization policies in allowing shifts out of maize production also depend upon 
policies that increase maize productivity.  
9.6  Indirect livelihood and rural economy impacts: conclusions 
Although the use of livelihood and informal rural economy models in the discussion above should 
be taken as providing illustrative insights from simulation of the impacts of different subsidy policy 
scenarios on rural livelihoods, there are strong complementarities between simulation results, the 
narrative of the qualitative findings, and more quantitative evidence on maize prices and ganyu 
wages. Accepting the limitations of each of these information sources, a number of useful 
conclusions may nevertheless be drawn: 
1.  Where a range of households are able to access the subsidy packages there are clear 
direct benefits to recipients which arise from two different features of the subsidy – it acts 
as a cash transfer programme where subsidized inputs are resold or where they displace 
cash or credit purchases, and it also stimulates increased use of inputs. These features are 
largely alternatives in that (a) cash transfer benefits do not normally arise with increased 
input use (although inputs resold by one household may have a displacement or 
incremental production effect on input use by the buyer) and (b) cash transfers through 
displacement are not generally pro-poor. Direct benefits from the cash transfer features of 
the subsidy are experienced in the year of subsidy (and can give continued benefits in 
subsequent years if they increase the wealth of the household) whereas direct benefits 
from increased input use are not experienced until harvest at the end of the season, but 
increased input use gives benefits in the subsequent year through increased grain stocks 
(and again can give continued benefits in subsequent years if they increase the wealth of 
the household).  
2.  As a large scale programme, the agricultural input subsidy delivers both direct benefits to 
recipients and indirect benefits and costs to all households in a rural economy, through its 
impact on maize and labor markets. The nature, scale and distribution of benefits and costs 
vary with the size of the subsidy package provided to each household, and the number and 
targeting of recipient households. Indirect benefits and costs are very important: they may 
significantly add to or detract from direct benefits to recipients, and affect the welfare, 
positively or negatively, of non recipients. Poorer households, in general, benefit from   89
tightening of the labour market and higher wages, and from lower maize prices. Some but 
not all less-poor households tend to lose in the short term from paying higher wages for 
ganyu and gaining lower prices for surplus maize sales (they should make larger gains in 
the long run from dynamic growth effects but these have not been examined). Immediate 
tightening of labour markets arises from the cash transfer feature of the programme, 
whereas the indirect impacts from increased input use are felt in maize prices and wages 
after harvest and in the following year.  
3.  Simulation results support empirical observations that there is the potential for significant 
displacement with the subsidy programme and that this is greatest where better off 
households access subsidized fertilizer. The simulation further suggests that displacement 
may increase over time as people’s ability to afford inputs increase. However the 
discussion in this section has not considered indirect impacts on the input supply sector: as 
discussed in section 6 there is the potential for both ‘crowding in’ and ‘crowding out’ of 
private sector suppliers by the programme, depending upon its design and implementation.   
4.  Targeting of subsidies to poorer households can involve some combination of both 
geographical targeting between areas and livelihood targeting within areas. These pose 
different political, social, and administrative challenges and costs and benefits which have 
not been discussed. Relative costs and benefits of targeted versus smaller per unit 
comprehensive subsidies depend upon the distribution of target households within different 
areas, relative prices, and costs and effectiveness of targeting.  
5.  Simulations suggest important positive interactions between the effects of the subsidy and 
of measures that promote longer term buyer confidence in maize markets, but also suggest 
that in Malawi benefits to the poor from maize price stabilization policy effects may be 
largely limited to direct gains in years of high prices unless such policies are accompanied 
by complementary policies raising the direct incomes of the poor and/or maize productivity 
and profitability. 
6.  We have not attempted to conduct a formal benefit:cost analysis of the different scenarios 
presented here.  There has also been no comparison of the cost effectiveness and 
efficiency of the subsidy as compared with other policies (for example cash transfers) that 
may provide some similar benefits. However it should be noted that (a) there is likely be 
both complementarity and competition between alternative policies. While they may 
compete for resources, targeted cash transfers for example may be more efficient in 
delivering immediate transfers to the poor. However although such transfers may generate 
labour market externalities that are beneficial to the poor (by stimulating wage increases), 
input subsidies should also generate maize market externalities where they lead to 
incremental fertilizer use and increased maize production. The relationships between and 
relative merits of cash transfer and input subsidy programmes also vary between 
households with different access to land, labor and capital, and between areas with 
different  agro-ecological and socio-economic characteristics. They will also change over 
time if, as would be hoped, farm and non-farm incomes rise and there is structural change 
in the rural economy.  
7.  The analysis reported here has highlighted the importance of the beneficial subsidy 
impacts as a result of higher maize production lowering maize prices. The 2007/8 
production season has, however, been marked by sharp maize price increases in early 
2008, and these price increases will have seriously undermined many of the poverty 
reducing, food security and growth benefits of the 2006/7 programme. The causes of these  
price increases are disputed, but it is clear that a major contributory factor was the export 
of grain to Zimbabwe. Since this was arranged with  the understanding that there was a 
very large maize surplus in Malawi, the reasons for the over-estimate of grain stocks must 
be seen as a critical causative factor, and must be addressed.   
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10.  Gender and intra-household issues 
Women play a key role in agricultural production and rural livelihoods, and women-headed 
households are disproportionately represented among the poorest rural households.  For these 
reasons alone it is important to ask specific questions about the impact of AISP on women – in 
households headed by both men and women.  The main areas of concern relate to  
•  women’s access to coupons: the extent to which they are targeted within AISP and their 
experiences of redeeming coupons; 
•  gendered impacts of AISP: the extent to which women and men benefit differently from 
AISP and the extent to which AISP contributes to the transformation of gender relations.   
10.1  Women’s access to coupons 
Evidence presented elsewhere in this report but summarised in Table 10.1 shows that women-
headed households are  
•  less likely to receive fertiliser coupons than households headed by men.   
•  In the Central Region  are likely to receive fewer coupons than households headed by men 
if they do receive coupons  
A number of different factors, most of which are linked to targeting, can explain the 
disproportionate allocation of coupons to households headed by men.  In many districts, targeting 
of coupons was done based on land holdings.  Whilst there is a link between land holding size and 
poverty in Malawi, there is no significant difference between male and female-headed households 
in terms of land holding size.  However, within small landholding sizes, poverty is higher in female-
headed households.  (Malawi Government and World Bank, 2006 p. 43).  Other targeting criteria 
used that affect women’s access to coupons included that which targeted people with the capacity 
to adopt / utilise technology.  Again, it is clear from the IHS data that women are more likely to 
grow crops for home consumption, are less likely to use fertiliser and less likely to obtain extension 
services. 
Women have less access to cash than men and found it more difficult to raise the K950 payment 
in order to redeem their coupon for fertiliser.  Women got access to cash through ganyu and 
through income-generating activities such as beer brewing.  In some districts, for example Dedza, 
savings clubs were important for getting access to cash though there were no distinguishable 
gender differences in membership of the clubs. 
In general women had different views from men on the most important targeting criteria.  They 
focused on supporting the very poorest households whilst men tended to prioritise those with 
greater capacity to increase productivity.  Linking this to the survey findings shows that women’s 
views are overridden in the implementation of the programme.   91
 










% of hholds receiving the most subsidised fertiliser 
(100 to 600 kgs/hh)  18.2 71.8 100 
% of hholds receiving small amounts of subsidised 
fertiliser (100 to 600 kgs/hh)  26.4 73.6 100 
% of hholds receiving no subsidised fertiliser   30.0  70  100 
% all holds  26.7  73.3  100 
% of households receiving no coupons  54  43  46 
% of households receiving 1 coupon  26  27  27 
% of households receiving 2 coupons  17  24  22 
% of households receiving >2 coupons  3  6  5 
All households   100  100  199 
Mean number of coupons received per recipient 
household  1.6 1.8 1.7 
 
 
More practical concerns may have also influenced targeting.  Redemption of the coupons was 
more difficult for women because their reproductive responsibilities limited the time that they could 
spend away from their homes queuing for fertiliser.  This may have affected targeting decisions the 
following year.  In 2006, men queued for up to a week to redeem their coupons.  Even women with 
some control over coupons were less likely to redeem coupons themselves and often lost control 
of coupons to their husbands or relatives because it was too dangerous for them to sleep in the 
open outside suppliers premises. For this reason ADMARC remained important for women 
redeeming coupons if they did not have to travel so far to reach an ADMARC market.  
10.2  Gendered impacts of AISP 
In both female- and male-headed households, women tended to report differently to men on the 
impacts of AISP.  Whilst men focus on the sizes of surplus and on output prices, women described 
how they are better able to afford education costs in the years when AISP had been operating.  
Women also reported that they were able to command higher wage rates for ganyu than in 
previous years, though men have been more successful at becoming price-setters than women. 
Within households and communities there is some limited evidence that the increased well-being 
in 2005-06 and 2006-07 seasons is improving community and intra-household relations.  Where 
agricultural extension officers had encouraged people to form fertiliser savings groups, on the 
whole they had done so in a manner that sought to include women in groups.  In these cases, 
cooperation between group members was positively affecting social cohesion in villages.  At the 
same time, the existence of groups fostered innovation and the uptake of technology – including 
by women. 
A less tangible, but equally important, effect has been the change in attitudes of people towards 
their land and own capacity to support themselves.  Household members have increased 
confidence and enthusiasm regarding their earning potential in agriculture and their capacity to 
feed their families.  Households are able to behave in more socially acceptable ways in the 
community – for example inviting neighbours to weddings and funerals and feeding them.  The 
gender impacts of this are manifested in reports of fewer disputes within households. 
 “maphokoso mmbanja atha poti anthu pano chakudya akukhala nacho, mmbuyomu 
pakhomo chakudya chikangotha amuna amakhala mmavuto poti unali udindo wao  
kukafuna chakudya ndiye ngati sapita kuganyu sikulongolola kwake azikaziwo”   92
(Quarrels in families have now stopped since people now have food. In the past, once the 
food was over men were in problems because it was their duty to find food for the family so 
if they did not go to ganyu the women were shouting at them) 
Whilst increased wellbeing has reduced disputes over resources within households, it is less clear 
how far AISP is having lasting effects on women’s (perceived) roles within households.  It appears 
that some women do want to engage in market-oriented agricultural activity rather than focusing 
solely on the domestic provision of food.  This is demonstrated by the high demand for fertiliser 
among women, despite the significant demands on women’s time (and safety) that procuring 
fertiliser under AISP requires.  At the same time, many women expressed a desire to get fertiliser 
most suitable for application to maize and not fertiliser suitable for tobacco.  For many women, 
production of food for household consumption remains a priority over cash cropping for the market. 
There are some examples of women using the profits or benefits from AISP to make further 
investments in productive assets.  Some women have bought livestock and their explanations of 
these choices reflect a clear strategy to ensure that the immediate benefits of AISP are translated 
into longer-term ones. 
However, as noted above, the benefits of AISP appear to have been greater for men than women.  
Men are benefiting from greater increases in the rates for ganyu.  In Chikwawa, it was men who 
planted rice rather than maize when the first maize crop was washed away by flooding.  The 
extent to which AISP is generating real transformations in gender relations appears rather limited. 
11. Macroeconomic  impacts 
The AISP is largely financed by the Government of Malawi. In 2005/06 fiscal year, government 
spent MK6.9 billion in the subsidy, which was 45 per cent above the budgeted level. In 2006/07 
and 2007/08 fiscal budget, the subsidy accounted for 45 percent and 51 per cent of the MoAFS, 
respectively. In terms of the overall budget, the subsidy constituted 5.2 percent and 6.2 per cent of 
the national budget in 2006/07 and 2007/08, respectively. The significance of the subsidy in the 
budget may have implications on macroeconomic developments. Some of the implications include 
the potential of the subsidy in crowding out allocations to the other sectors in favour of the 
agricultural sector, particularly allocations to the social sectors and for infrastructure development. 
In addition, within the MoAFS, there may be a bias in the allocation of the budget towards the 
subsidy at the expense of other vital services such as research and development and extension 
services. There is also potential that the expenditure over-runs on the subsidy may contribute to 
deficit spending with consequences on price stability. The analysis of the macroeconomic impacts 
of the subsidy programme will focus on sectoral allocation of resources to the agricultural sector, 
the allocation of the MoAFS budget to various services, and the overall impact of government 
spending behaviour. 
The immediate impact of the subsidy is its impact on the share of the agricultural sector in the 
national budget (Table 11.1). The implementation of the subsidy has raised spending on 
agriculture from an average of US$3.2 between 2000 and 2005 to about US$11.1 in 2006 and 
2007. In the 1990s, the share of the agricultural sector in the total budget had declined to below 10 
per cent, the level recommended by AU/NEPAD (2003) in order to achieve pro-poor growth in 
agriculture. It is clear that the subsidy has helped Malawi to surpass the 10 per cent level to an 
average of 12.1 per cent in the years of the subsidy. 
 
Table 11.1 Agriculture Sector Government Spending Trends, 1970 – 2007  
Indicator  1970-79  1980-84  1985-89  1995-99  2000-05  2006-07 
Agriculture Share in Budget (%) 
Agriculture Budget ($m) 
   Recurrent Budget ($m) 
   Development Budget ($m) 































Source: Computed based on NSO data 
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There is no evidence to suggest that the social sectors have been adversely affected by the 
increasing share of agriculture in the total budget. The shares of infrastructure, education and 
health sectors in the budget have not been adversely affected by increase in the allocation to the 
agriculture sector. For instance, in the 2007/08 budget, both health and education each accounts 
for 14 per cent of the budget, representing an increase of about 6 per cent over the 2006/07 
budget. There has generally been a shift of budgetary resources to the agriculture, health, 
education and infrastructure development since 2004. 
The increased resource allocation to the agricultural sector and the cost overruns resulting from 
the subsidy has not lead to general macroeconomic instability. During the period over which the 
AISP has been implemented the price level has stabilised and government spending has been 
controlled with manageable budget deficits.  In 2005/06 fiscal year, the budget deficit was 1.5 per 
cent of gross domestic product, and slightly rose to 1.8 per cent in the 2007/08 budget, compared 
to 2.6 per cent in 2005/06 fiscal year. Figure 10.1 shows the trends in government revenues and 
expenditure from January 2005 to November 2007. Both revenues and expenditure show some 
increasing trend, however, the deficit is also increasing with time. The low deficit spending and 
reduced borrowing of the government from the Central bank, has resulted in the sharp decline in 
inflation from a peak of 17.1 per cent in February 2006 to 14.9 per cent in July 2006 and falling 
further to 7.9 per cent in May 2007. Since maize prices account for a larger weight in the 
consumer price index, undoubtedly lower maize prices resulting from a bumper harvest in 2005/06 
and 2006/07 seasons have also contributed to price stability. 
In terms of allocation of the MoAFS budget to various activities, there is evidence that the subsidy 
has had some impacts on the delivery of other services by the MoAFS. Key informant interviews at 
district level, revealed that although the MoAFS provided operational funds for the implementation 
of the subsidy, the resources were often inadequate. As a result there was a substantial shift of 
resources from other recurrent expenditure budget lines towards subsidy implementation activities. 
Apart from resources, the implementation of the subsidy becomes the core activities by the 
MoAFS at district level, often at the expense of other activities.  
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Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Financial and Economic Review (Vol. 39, No. 2, 2007) 
 
Examination of allocation of Ministry of Agriculture recurrent expenditure to different services 
shows declining budget shares for research and extension since the subsidy was introduced.   94
However Figure 11.2 shows that while expenditure on the subsidy has grown dramatically in the 
last two years (reflected in expenditure on food security 
43), research and extension expenditures 
have also grown, though too a much lesser extent, and perhaps not enough to offset the diversion 
of resources to subsidy implementation activities, as described above. Research and extension 
expenditures are nevertheless very low. This cannot be attributed to the subsidy, it is rather the 
result of budget cuts in previous years when, following structural adjustment programmes, the 
budgetary allocations to research and development and extension services were cut back with 
wider cuts to the Ministry of Agriculture budget, leading to declines in recruitment and training of 
agricultural extension officers and reduced funding and activities of both agricultural training 
institutions and agricultural research institutions. In this context it is not clear how far the subsidy 
programme is crowding out expenditure on research and extension as this depends upon how 
much government would be committed to increasing expenditure on these activities in the absence 
of the subsidy programme.  Some measure of Government commitment to extension activities 
may, however, be judged from the specific mention of the rebuilding of extension services in the 
2006/7 and 2007/8 budget statements by the Minister of Finance.  
 
Figure 11.2 Real Agricultural Sector Expenditure (Recurrent and Development) at 2000 
prices 




                                                 
43 The high expenditure on ‘administration and support services’ in 2002/03 and 2003/04 is attributed to 
misclassification of programmes such as starter pack and targeted input programme. These should 
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Research services Land research conservation
Irrigation Nutrition & Food Security
Other Services  95
12.  Conclusions and recommendations 
At the heart of the ToR for this evaluation are two questions: 
•  Is the AISP a good use of government resources (and implicitly should government 
continue to invest in it)? 
•  How could the AISP be made a better use of government resources?  
Both these questions require that the performance of the AISP be measured against government 
objectives in investing in it, and the two questions are of course related: even if it were judged that 
the 2006/7 AISP was not a good use of resources, continued investment in the AISP might be 
justified if its performance could be improved in future or if different conditions in future were 
expected to lead to it generating higher benefits.   
The final section of the report pulls together the findings from the evaluation in four main sub-
sections which we consider in turn  
•  The performance of the 2006/7 Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme against its objectives 
and likely performance of future programmes  
•  Critical issues affecting AISP performance  
•  Design and implementation principles for improving performance  
•  Specific recommendations for improving performance 
 
12.1  Performance of the 2006/7 Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme  
The programme’s stated objectives centred around improvement of land and labour productivity, 
increased production of both food and cash crops by smallholder farmers, and reduction in 
people’s vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and poverty. Other generally recognized 
programme objectives were the development of private sector capacity and engagement in input 
marketing, and the promotion of wider pro-poor growth and economic development.  
Improved land and labour productivity and increased smallholder production of food and cash 
crops are all closely related. Attempts to directly measure changes in smallholder yields did not 
provide reliable estimates of changes in yields or production. Very large maize production 
increases reported in the 2006/7 National Crop Estimates do not seem credible when compared 
with the already large increases in production reported for 2005/6 (which was also a year of good 
rainfall with a large input subsidy), and also do not seem to be consistent with patterns of maize 
price increases observed from September 2007 onwards. Retail maize price levels between July-
December 2007 already exceed historical mean prices over the past 14 years.  Increases in 
production are therefore likely to be much lower than those reported in the 2006/7crop estimates. 
The export of over 300,000 tonnes of maize to Zimbabwe has also contributed to higher than 
average maize prices in 2007/08.  Nevertheless, the evolution of maize prices during the 2007/8 
season (allowing for sales of over 300,000 tonnes and lower reported imports from Mozambique 
as compared with previous years), livelihood modeling and estimates of increased grain 
production from incremental fertiliser use suggest a significant increase in maize production as a 
result of the subsidy, probably of the order of around 700,000 tonnes.  
Based on this estimate, economic cost benefit analysis and livelihood and rural economy modeling 
suggest that smallholder maize productivity, and indeed smallholder productivity as a whole, has 
increased as a result of the subsidy. However production and productivity increases vary with and 
are sensitive to (a) the extent to which subsidized fertilizer sales displaced commercial sales and 
(b) ) the timeliness of delivery of the subsidized fertilizer and the effectiveness of its application.  
Sales of improved maize seed also have an important effect on productivity. Economic cost benefit 
analysis is also sensitive to maize prices – and is lower under conditions where regional maize 
prices are low. Although only one measure of performance, economic cost benefit analysis does 
provide important information about programme efficiency and effectiveness. This suggests that 
the programme will not contribute to achievement of its objectives, and indeed will have wider   96
negative impacts, if it is not implemented in a way that keeps down displacement and increases 
the productivity of subsidised inputs. These challenges will become even more important in the 
future, with reduced benefit-cost ratios expected from large increases in world input prices and 
probably less dramatic increases in local maize prices in the region in the future except in years 
when the region as a whole is food deficit.  
It has not been possible to investigate incremental application of fertilizers to particular crops, but 
the pattern of changes in household fertilizer use between years suggests that displacement of 
unsubsidized fertiliser sales by subsidized sales are likely to be higher for cash crops than for 
maize, and the AISP is likely to have led to limited direct increases in cash crop production.   
Well distributed rainfall made 2006/7 a generally good year for maize and other rainfed crop 
production, and this, with low maize prices following a good 2005/6 season, will have reduced 
vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and poverty even in the absence of the 2006/7 AISP. 
However multiple sources of evidence, particularly from the qualitative interviews and livelihood 
and rural economy modeling, suggest that where the implementation of the subsidy programme 
increases maize production then this leads to both higher wages and to lower maize prices, and 
hence to increased real incomes and food security and reduced vulnerability for poorer 
households. If the AISP leads to changes in labour markets and to increases in national maize 
production large enough to push wages up and maize prices down, then poor households 
experience these benefits whether they benefited directly as subsidy recipients or not. However  
income and food security gains, and reduced vulnerability and poverty, are greater for direct 
recipients of the subsidy. Benefits are also sensitive to maize market stability and the absence of 
policies or shocks that raise maize prices – a particularly pertinent issue in the context of high 
domestic maize prices in the first quarter of 2008. 
With regard to development of private sector capacity and engagement in fertilizer marketing, it 
seems clear that the 2006/7 AISP offered substantially improved opportunities for the six large 
private firms and their distributor affiliates to participate in fertilizer distribution. These accounted 
for 28% of subsidised fertilizer sales. The private sector also imported 70% of the subsidized 
fertilizer distributed by ADMARC and SFFRFM.  However, there are significant concerns that (a) 
tendering procedures and late orders led to increased costs in importing fertilizers, (b) terms for 
private sector participation in fertiliser retail sales were agreed only as fertiliser distribution was 
getting underway, leading to delays in sales in some areas, and (c) the program was not able to 
involve the large number of independent agro-dealers in the sales of subsidized fertilisers. There 
are also significant concerns that the subsidy has depressed unsubsidized fertiliser sales, and 
retailers who were not able to sell subsidized fertilizers reported very low sales.  This is a 
particular problem for the small agro-dealers and a matter of some concern since these agro-
dealers may otherwise have a critical role to play in the development of input markets in more 
remote areas (although they are not currently reaching such areas).  
With regard to development of private sector capacity and engagement in maize seed marketing, 
the AISP offered substantially improved opportunities for a wide range of seed wholesalers and 
retailers. Private dealers report that the seed subsidy had a particularly beneficial effect in 
stimulating overall seed sales.    
Historical experience in other countries, theory and the livelihood and rural economy modeling 
suggest that the promotion by the AISP of higher wages and lower maize prices also promotes 
wider pro-poor growth and economic development. This, however, will take time and requires a 
significant period of increased maize productivity and of low and stable maize prices, to allow 
matching growth of both demand and supply in domestic non-farm and non-staple farm markets. 
This in turn requires consistent and stable policies that encourage greater stability of maize prices 
and promote both maize and non-maize productivity and markets.  
Although we observe that the 2006/7 AISP does appear to have contributed towards achievement 
of most of its objectives, we also note that no targets were set for these objectives and that the 
effectiveness of the AISP in promoting these objectives is highly sensitive to three particular 
variables: crop response to fertilizer, valuation of incremental maize output, and displacement of 
unsubsidized sales by subsidised sales. At least two of these variables are sensitive to program   97
design and implementation and therefore under at least partial control of government.. Actions 
needed to improve crop responses to fertilizer are, conceptually at least, relatively straight forward, 
and involve, for example, timely receipt of fertilizers by farmers, proper application, and use of 
improved seeds. Actions needed to reduce displacement are, however, more complex.  
Critical and related issues here are targeting and control of programme scale and costs. Survey 
results clearly show higher rates of displacement with less poor households and higher rates of 
incremental fertilizer use when subsidized fertilizer is received by poorer households. We are not 
aware of any evidence to indicate that poor farmers are less efficient in their use of fertilizer than 
relatively non-poor farmers.  In fact, because poor land-constrained households tend to have 
greater labour-to-land ratios, there are reasons to believe that such households could, with proper 
extension messages and seeds, achieve greater response rates to fertilizer than larger farmers. It 
is also widely reported in different parts of the world that smaller farms are more efficient users of 
land and capital than larger farms and the Malawi Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment (Malawi 
Government and World Bank, 2006, p 180ff) presents evidence that this is also the case with 
maize production in Malawi. We discuss below how better targeting towards poorer farmers may 
be achieved, but note here that this is critical for achievement of all the programme objectives 
discussed above: it should promote greater achievement of increased production and productivity, 
and greater efficiency of use of government and national resources. It should also lead to greater 
reductions in vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and poverty, and greater impacts on wider 
growth, through both direct effects (since more poor and vulnerable households would gain directly 
from receipt and use of subsidised inputs) and through indirect effects (as a result of greater 
programme impacts on wages and maize prices). Reduced displacement of unsubsidised sales 
will also reduce the negative effects of the programme on development of private sector capacity 
and engagement in input marketing.  
The need to limit the scale and cost of the programme is related to but goes beyond targeting: 
effective targeting should be part of a strategy to limit the scale and cost of the programme. An 
almost universal feature of subsidy programmes around the world is their tendency to grow in 
scope, scale and cost, as stakeholders exert political pressure to increase their access to private 
benefits. These processes are clearly affecting the AISP, and it is very important that they are 
resisted. Economic theory and historical experience with subsidies in general and specific analysis 
of the AISP all suggest that most effective use of scarce government resources is achieved 
through strictly controlling subsidy costs and reducing, not increasing, its scale and scope over 
time.  
Overall the analysis of evidence available in evaluating the AISP both (a) recognizes the 
programme’s potential to contribute positively to both its stated objectives and to wider 
government objectives for pro-poor growth, and (b) considers that the 2006/7 contributed to the 
achievement of those objectives. The estimated benefit cost ratios ranged from 0.76 to 1.36. 
These estimates demonstrate that with good management the program can yield favorable 
economic returns. It is beyond the scope of the study to have considered the rate of return to the 
AISP subsidy programme in relation to other alternative public investments and hence it is not in a 
position to assess whether the objectives of the programme could have been better achieved with 
an alternative mix of public investments in measures promoting growth and social protection. Any 
use of the results for such comparisons should also take into account some of the more difficult to 
measure benefits of the AISP such as providing immediate social protection and stimulation of 
farm and non-farm growth – benefits that are not directly accounted for in results reported above. 
There are, however, many ways in which the effectiveness of the programme could be improved, 
and there are substantial dangers that without explicit action to improve its effectiveness and 
control its costs the programme could become inefficient and ineffective, and an unsustainable 
drain on resources, pulling down rather than promoting growth, food security and poverty reduction.   
 
12.2  Critical issues affecting AISP performance 
Our review of the 2006/7 AISP highlights five main critical issues affecting AISP performance: 
definition of programme objectives, targeting, policy coordination, development of the private   98
sector, and information requirements. Figure 12.1 illustrates how these are related: clear definition 
of  programme objectives is  a pre-requisite for improved targeting, policy coordination and 
development of the private sector, while improvement in each of these areas of policy requires 
information.  We discuss each of these issues in turn.  
 
Figure 12.1 Critical issues for AISP performance 
 
 
12.2.1 AISP  objectives 
It was argued in the March 2007 report that an effective subsidy programme could support long 
term pro-poor growth and development with diversification out of low productivity agriculture, if it 
increased land and labour productivity, increased ganyu wages, and promoted stable and 
relatively low prices, although it also noted that a difficult balance needs to be struck between the 
needs of poor net buyers for low maize prices and the needs of net maize sellers for prices high 
enough to stimulate investment in surplus maize production. Evidence presented in this report 
from market price data, qualitative field work, the household survey, and rural livelihood and 
informal rural economy simulations supports this argument. It is therefore important that clear 
objectives be set at the highest level for the way that the AISP is expected to contribute to long 
term economic growth and development. These objectives should then be used to guide the 
development of short and medium term objectives related to productivity growth, poverty reduction, 
food security and development of private sector input networks. These short and medium term 
objectives should in turn guide decisions about the design and implementation of the programme 
and its interactions with other policies.  
A consistent framework of objectives can help to resolve apparent conflicting objectives, such as 
that between household food security and national food self sufficiency as described above. A 
number of points can be made regarding this particular issue.  
Once broad objectives are agreed it is important that appropriate achievement targets are set for 
these in long term subsidy programme planning and in short and medium term plans. These 
should be integrated with planning of other complementary programmes and should specify, for 
example, targets for subsidized and unsubsidized imports and sales by both private retailers and 
parastatals and for increasing maize yields, incremental maize and other crop production, maize 
prices (and maize price stability), ganyu wages, growth in horticultural and livestock production, 
and growth in non-farm incomes. Targets should also set limits for the scale and cost of the 
subsidy programme and provide a means for transparent and consistent communication among 
the various stakeholders in the programme.  
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12.2.2 Displacement 
National and household level estimates presented and discussed in section 6.4 suggest that 
between 30 and 40% of subsidized fertiliser purchases displace commercial purchases. 
Examination of national fertilizer sales also suggests that displacement is higher with ‘tobacco 
fertilizers’ than with ‘maize fertilizers’. High displacement rates seriously undermine the efficiency 
of the programme and its effectiveness in delivering developmental benefits. This occurs because 
high displacement lowers the impact of government investments on incremental crop production 
and hence on food production, incremental incomes, maize prices, wage rates, and input market 
development - indeed on achievement of all programme objectives. Many of these impacts of high 
displacement are not captured by economic benefit cost analysis.  
Lowering displacement rates must be a major objective in the implementation of any future 
programme but will not be easy. A number of recommendations made in the report should help to 
reduce displacement, most notably measures to promote timely and transparent implementation 
and targeting of a greater proportion of subsidised inputs to poorer households. Both these issues 
are addressed below.  
12.2.3 Targeting  
The targeting of subsidized inputs to different groups or types of people is a critical and sensitive 
issue, and some form of implicit or explicit targeting is inevitable unless a universal and equitable 
subsidy is implemented. It is helpful to distinguish two principle levels of targeting – geographical 
targeting (between regions, districts and different geographically defined communities) and intra-
community targeting (between different categories of people or households within communities). 
Geographical differences between areas and communities will often be correlated with socio-
economic and cultural differences between these areas and communities. The distribution of 
subsidized inputs between different categories of people then depends upon the interaction of 
formal criteria determining geographical targeting and intra-community targeting together with 
‘informal’ de facto criteria and mechanisms which are actually implemented. 
The formal criteria that were supposed to be used in determining geographical and intra-
community targeting were described briefly in section 4.3.1. The March 2007 report paid particular 
attention to regional and district patterns of distribution and showed that the basal allocation of 
coupons proportional to estimated maize and tobacco areas led to substantially higher allocations 
per household in the northern and central regions as compared with the southern regions, with 
substantial variation between districts within regions. Regional and district differences were often 
then reinforced in the allocation and distribution of a second round of supplementary coupons, for 
which formal allocation criteria  were much less clear. Communication about criteria to be used for 
coupon allocations between different areas and villages within districts were less clear, particularly 
for the supplementary coupons and appeared to vary between districts. Similarly formal criteria for 
coupon allocations between households within villages were loosely defined and not consistently 
and clearly communicated, as discussed in sections 4.3.1 and 7.2. Targeting criteria in programme 
design in 2006/7 rightly intended to identify recipients who would not otherwise have purchased 
fertilizers, but also stressed the need for households to have access to cash for coupon 
redemption with land and labour for fertilizer use, and capacity to adopt / utilise technology. These 
criteria were often at odds with other criteria identifying recipients as poor and vulnerable 
households. Lack of clarity and transparency meant that informal allocation criteria reflecting the 
interests (sometimes legitimate and sometimes illegitimate) of powerful stakeholders therefore 
became increasingly important at lower levels of allocation and distribution.  
Evidence from the household survey in section 7 of this report shows that (a) actual fertilizer 
coupon receipts did follow the broad regional and district patterns  of allocation reported by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and (b) significant quantities of subsidised fertiliser went to less poor 
households, many of whom purchased greater amounts of fertiliser in previous seasons. Greater 
displacement of commercial purchases and hence less incremental fertiliser use occurred when 
less poor households received subsidized fertilizer. It is possible that this may have been partly 
the result of lower tobacco prices in 2005/6, of uncertainty about access to subsidized fertilisers, 
and of lack of unsubsidised fertiliser stocks at ADMARC /SFFRFM markets. Nevertheless it  100
suggests that there may well be higher incremental productivity gains from targeting more fertilizer 
towards poorer households.  
As a result, and as discussed earlier, ensuring that more poor people get subsidised inputs for 
maize production should have positive benefits in promoting reduced displacement, greater 
productivity and growth impacts, and greater impacts on reducing  food insecurity, hunger and 
poverty. This can be achieved in four ways:  
a.  by making district allocations proportional to farming population in maize growing areas;  
b.  by specifically targeting maize growing areas where there are more poorer, food insecure 
people (using, for example, MVAC information) with lower per household allocations in 
other areas;  
c.  by making the programme a universal one, but with lower quantities of subsidized inputs 
per households; and  
d.  by specifically targeting poorer, more vulnerable households within communities.   
(a) and (b) represent different geographical approaches to targeting while (c) and (d)  represent 
different intra-community approaches to targeting. (a) and (c) both try to correct discrimination 
against poorer households in the 2006/7 programme, whereas (b) and (d) go further in seeking to 
actively discriminate in favour of poorer households. Successful implementation of (b) and (d) 
should be more effective in directing subsidized inputs to poorer people who, it is argued from 
evidence in this report, should use it more productively and to greater effect in reducing food 
insecurity. There are, however, potentially significant political difficulties with both (b) and (d), and 
significant practical difficulties with (d) (although comparison of the AISS and IHS2 data suggests 
that the TIP programmes in 2003/4 and 2004/5 were reasonably successful in targeting starter 
packs to poorer households, despite difficulties with and reports of the problems caused by 
targeting of TIPs in previous years (Levy and Barahona, 2001, Chinsinga et al., 2002, and Levy 
and Barahona, 2002).   
(a) and (c) were both recommended in the March 2007 report, and (a) is being implemented in the 
2007/8 season, while there are concerns about the need for 25kg bags of NPK and urea if 
subsidized quantities per households are halved and about ‘dilution’ of the benefits with smaller 
subsidized  quantities per households (as discussed earlier in section 7.2). If targeting a proportion 
of households is to continue, however, much greater care needs to be given to deciding and 
communicating the objectives of targeting, the types and characteristics of households to be 
targeted, and the criteria (and methods and people) to be involved in targeting. These may need to 
vary between different areas to reflect their particular livelihood and rural economy 
characteristics
44.  
There may also be a targeting dimension in the allocation of the subsidy between food crop inputs 
(not only ‘maize fertilisers’ and seed but also legume seed, for example) and cash crops, in that 
poorer households are less likely to be investing in cash crops and more likely to be food crop 
cultivators unable to afford the purchase of unsubsidised inputs. Displacement may also be lower 
with food crop inputs, and indirect benefits from lower food prices higher. However cash crops are 
also important in offering opportunities for diversification and can be high demanders of labour 
offering benefits to the poor through tightening of labour markets. 
If it is not politically or practically feasible to develop a targeting system that effectively reaches 
poorer households then comprehensive coverage of all smallholder farmers with a smaller subsidy 
per household (to keep down the total budgeted cost) could be a better alternative than ineffective 
targeting and high displacement, though as discussed earlier the relative costs and benefits 
of .these alternatives will vary across different areas.  
There are a number of potential advantages to a comprehensive system: 
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•  To some extent it is merely accepting what has already been happening in many villages.  
•  It provides a transparent system of allocation which is easily understood and can easily be 
explained and justified to the public. It also extends benefits to a much larger proportion of 
the smallholder farmers. The system can also be applied consistently at all allocation levels 
from region to district, EPA and village. 
•  It does away with difficulties in targeting within villages, which was inconsistent and 
sometimes not transparent, and led to opportunities for and sometimes suspicion of 
misappropriation of coupons by those involved in their distribution. 
•  It could reduce pressures for supplementary coupon issues and therefore support better 
budgetary control. 
•  Coupon allocation according to number of households should also increase direct and 
indirect benefits where there is food insecurity, and reduce grain transport and marketing 
costs. 
To address some potential difficulties arising with this system and to take full advantage of the 
benefits listed above, four further modifications were proposed in the March 2007 report: 
o  the subsidy should be extended to include all smallholder farmers, not just maize 
growers, but without additional allocations to cash crop growers; 
o  farmers should have more choice of inputs and fertiliser bag sizes to buy at 
subsidised prices; 
o  coupons should be given a nominal face value approximately equal to the subsidy 
they represent; and 
o  when redeemed by input sellers the fixed face value should be augmented by a 
district/EPA specific ‘location premium’ which can be used to provide an incentive to 
input sellers to operate in more remote areas. 
Further details of this system may be found in the March 2007 report.   
12.2.4  Agricultural sector and programme information needs  
There are some fundamental information gaps that prevent proper planning, management, 
monitoring and evaluation of the subsidy programme.  
A fundamental problem arises with differences between the National Statistical Office and the 
Ministry of Agriculture as regards the number of farm families. Whereas the Ministry of Agriculture 
based its subsidy planning and crop estimates on a total of just under 3.4 million farm families in 
the 2006/7 season
45, estimates derived from National Statistical Office population projections give 
a total of 2.47 million rural households
46. As noted in section 7.1 this leads to very different 
estimates of total subsidised input use under the programme, and/or of the proportion of 
households receiving subsidised inputs and/or of quantities of subsidised inputs received by each 
recipient household. These discrepancies were discussed to a limited extent but not resolved in 
evaluations of the Starter Pack programme. A ‘ground truthing’ study explicitly investigating this 
issue came up with results that were supportive of the Ministry of Agriculture figures, although with 
some regional differences ( Wingfield Digby, 2000). Levy and Barahona, 2002 suggest that the 
number of  household varies between years, as households may merge ‘merge to share scarce 
resources in bad year’ and then may separate again after a good harvest (Levy and Barahona, 
2002, p16). Another, and perhaps associated, source of difference may be related to the 
difference between households and dwelling units. National Statistical Office, 2000 reports an 
average of 1.3 dwelling units per households in the 1998 census, It is very important that the 
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Ministry of Agriculture and the National Statistical Office resolve this discrepancy and together 
determine and agree on an accurate figure. 
A second topic where better information is very important concerns incremental yield benefits from 
the application of fertilisers to local, hybrid  and OPV maize on farmers’ fields. It was intended to 
gather this information from the household survey conducted in 2007 but as noted earlier the area 
and harvest data were not sufficiently reliable to generate the necessary information. While there 
appear to have been particular problems with this module in the survey, analysis of the IHS2 data 
shows that there are major difficulties in using farmer estimates of production and of crop areas to 
investigate such relationships. Discussion of the national crop estimates of maize production for 
2006/7 also cast doubts on the reliability of basic information about crop areas, yields and 
production. Although it is hoped that the 2006/7census on agriculture and livestock will provide 
important information on these issues, the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Statistics Office 
need to consider how to obtain regular and reliable  information on smallholder agricultural 
production, including cultivated areas under different crops, yields, input use, sales, storage and 
storage losses. Rural wages are critical to the livelihoods of the poor but very little information is 
available on access to informal employment and temporal and geographical variation in wage 
rates.   
Better information is also needed on market behaviour, particularly staple markets. It was argued 
earlier that the maize price rises in early 2008 have seriously undermined many of the benefits of 
the 2006/7 AISP and that these price rises could be attributed in large part to information failures 
in assessing and predicting national maize stocks. In addition to better production data, as 
discussed above, information is therefore needed on storage losses, consumption of different 
staples, stocks, imports, and regional trade flows. District and livelihood zone information on 
poverty and vulnerability levels, assets and food security should also be used in coupon 
allocations, while information on parastatal input marketing costs, particularly overhead costs, is 
essential for determining the relative  efficiency of parastatal and private sector delivery of 
subsidised inputs.  
12.2.5  Engagement of the private sector 
A major feature of the 2006/7 AISP was greater involvement of the private sector, although more 
broadly for seed distribution than for fertilizer distribution.  Engagement between Government, 
donors and the private sector in the development of new systems was difficult at times, and 
agreements were often reached late, but private sector confidence was much greater after the 
2006/7 season than after the 2005/6 season. The success of the seed distribution system is 
particularly noteworthy. There are, however, continued major concerns that need to be addressed. 
As discussed in section 6, uncertainty about the subsidy programme depresses incentives for both 
fertilizer suppliers and farmers to invest in fertilizer procurement. With regard to retail sales of 
subsidized fertilizers, only six relatively large players were involved. While this was an important 
step forward from 2005/6, large numbers of small agro-dealers have been excluded. Since growth 
in the activities of these agrodealers may offer the best opportunities for increasing fertilizer 
supplies into more remote areas, it is important that the AISP should seek ways of promoting 
rather than inhibiting their development. On a wider front, both government and the private sector 
need to work together with serious intent to develop and commit themselves to mechanisms for 
overcoming the particular constraints that otherwise inhibit the development of private sector 
services in more remote areas. This requires commitment from all stakeholders to the 
development of a mutually beneficial ‘transition strategy’ that would quickly move to less 
government involvement in input markets that are already well served by the private sector and a 
more gradual transition from government to private sector outlets in remote areas, recognizing that 
in these remote areas there is still an important role for government to play. Specific 
recommendations for improving private sector involvement are made later in section 12.4. Core to 
these are the need for greater consistency and transparency on the part of government, and for 
systems that promote the integrity of private and public sector engagement in the supply chain.  103
12.2.6  Coordination with social protection policies and programmes  
Another issue we highlight in this report is the importance of coordination of the AISP with 
complementary social protection policies and programmes.   
There are a number of interactions between the input subsidy programme and social protection 
measures. The indirect effects of the programme in raising wages and depressing maize prices 
should have very positive social protection benefits, and if low stable prices can be maintained 
with reductions in inter and intra-seasonal prices (a major question given the high maize prices in 
early 2008), then this will reduce the need for and cost of social protection measures. Direct 
effects of the programme in delivering social protection to poor and vulnerable households are 
undermined if these households are unable to access coupons either because they are excluded 
due to lack of land or labour, or because they cannot raise the cash to redeem coupons. Where 
such households do get coupons then they either gain immediate transfer benefits from selling the 
coupon or deferred benefits from using subsidized coupons on their own land. However qualitative 
field work and survey results show that female headed households and those with less assets are 
less likely to get coupons than others, and that if coupons are sold they generally fetch prices 
some way below their real value – so that the subsidy programme may not be effective in 
delivering direct immediate transfers to the poor, as the value of the transfer may be too small to 
meet household needs. However there may be pro-poor positive externalities from input subsidies 
where they lead to incremental food production.  
As reported in section 7.4, social protection measures (such as public works schemes) seem to 
have been less effective in 2006/7 than in 2005/6 in assisting vulnerable households to access 
and use coupons. Although safety net programmes were important in around half of the locations 
where qualitative research took place, there were common problems limiting the contribution that 
they could make in improving households’ access to coupons. If safety net programmes are to 
assist vulnerable households in accessing coupons and subsidised inputs then they need to be 
predictable and reliable, to provide cash, and they must not demand labour in ways that compete 
with farm labour demands.   
Some clear policy conclusions and questions emerge from this.  
•  Fundamentally the linkages between the inputs subsidy voucher programme and safety 
nets need to be given much greater attention and specific coordination mechanisms need 
to be established at different levels, with coordination in the central design of the subsidy 
and safety net programmes and coordination in local coupon allocation, distribution and 
redemption mechanisms.  
•  If the subsidy programme is to continue as a widespread regular annual programme then 
this should both reduce the need for social protection interventions and change the nature 
of social protection support that is needed. Social protection instruments should then be 
designed to increase vulnerable peoples’ ability to participate in the subsidy programme 
and gain direct as well as indirect benefits from it, and/or support those vulnerable people 
who, from lack of labour or land, are unable to gain direct benefits from the programme. 
They should also look to promote and ‘crowd in’ rather than replace and ‘crowd out’ 
traditional community responsibilities for social protection, as local communities should 
become more able to support the more needy among them. 
•  Where safety net programmes are intended to increase vulnerable peoples’ ability to 
participate in the subsidy programme then they must be designed and timed so that they 
do not make labour demands that conflict with farm labour requirements and that they 
either provide cash at the time that households are receiving / redeeming coupons or they 
create ‘entitlements’ to coupons and coupon redemption (as, for example, with 
membership of fertiliser savings clubs reported in box 7.1).   
•  Where safety net programmes are intended to support those vulnerable people who are 
unable to gain direct benefits from the subsidy programme, then it may not matter so much 
if participation competes with agricultural labour demands, indeed such competition might 
be an effective form of self targeting.  104
It also needs to be recognised that as long as the subsidy programme is not operative in some 
areas, or is operative on only a very small scale, then the indirect subsidy benefits (of higher wage 
opportunities and lower food prices) will be much more limited and there will be no or very limited 
opportunities for direct benefits from participation in the subsidy programme.  
12.2.7  Coordination with other policies and programmes  
In the March 2007 report it was stressed that government needs to invest in ensure greater maize 
price stability and to invest in agricultural research, extension and finance (to support increased 
productivity in current crops and agricultural diversification
47), sound macro-economic 
management, infrastructural development, policies promoting wider private sector development 
across the country and social protection. A particular issue arises with synergies and conflicts 
between the AISP and other investment programmes.  
There is substantial evidence from around the world that investments in agricultural research and 
development and roads can yield high returns and are important pre-conditions for agricultural 
development in poor economies. There is less agreement and evidence about the relationship 
between these investments and returns to input subsidies. We are aware of only one study that 
examines these issues together and pays explicit attention to the way that returns to investment 
change over time (Fan et al., 2007). This study, of India from the 1960’s to 1990’s to 2000, 
confirms wider findings by Alston et al., 2000 that returns to agricultural research and development 
are (a) high and (b) tend to increase with development and/or are higher in more developed 
economies. It also reports lower but still good returns in agricultural GDP growth and in poverty 
reduction from investments in fertilizer subsidies in the 1960’s and 1970s, but these declined 
markedly in the 1980’s and 1990s, when returns to agricultural research and development were 
increasing. Very high returns in the 1960s and 1970s were achieved from investments in roads 
and education.  
While there are difficulties in separating out the precise differences in effects of complementary 
investments in this analysis, the clear conclusion about India’s experience of agricultural growth 
and poverty reduction is that these different investments are complementary. There is no reason to 
believe that this conclusion does not also apply to smallholder agricultural growth and rural poverty 
reduction in Malawi today. The benefits of the subsidy programme depend upon previous research, 
in Malawi and elsewhere, on fertilisers and improved seeds.  It is suggested elsewhere in the 
report that the performance of the AISP could be improved by better use of existing research 
findings on fertilizer responses in different areas of Malawi, by better integration of organic and 
inorganic soil fertility management, and by extension services that promote this. If the AISP is 
successful in helping to stimulate growth as outlined in this and the March 2007 report, then 
effective client oriented research and extension have important potential roles in promoting 
profitable diversification into other crops and livestock. Similarly better road infrastructure is 
needed for rural people to access markets, as producers and consumers, both now and in the 
future.   
Section 11 of the report suggested that although the AISP has not led to a decline in funding 
allocated to research and extension, it has reduced the effectiveness of research and extension 
activities, and expenditure on research and extension is a small proportion (8%) of expenditure on 
the subsidy. This is very low and it is important that more resources are put into effective research 
and extension. Section 11 does not provide information on investments in road infrastructure, but 
again it is important that expenditure on this is increased, and this has implications for the scale 
and scope of the AISP, and the need to make sure that resources devoted to the AISP are used 
as efficiently as possible.    
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It has been argued that effective long term development benefits from the AISP will involve 
increased maize productivity, low maize prices and higher wages stimulating local demand for 
non-staple higher value foods (livestock and horticultural products) and non farm goods and 
services. Low stable prices are essential for this process, and while the AISP may reduce maize 
prices in most of good and normal rainfall, there may still be significant price rises in years of poor 
rainfall. Investments in the AISP therefore need to be accompanied by measures to stabilize the 
price of maize.  
12.2.8 Future  challenges 
The discussion of changes in international and regional maize and fertiliser prices, consideration 
of the management and implementation challenges facing the programme, and experience with 
subsidies around the world suggest that if the programme continues then the challenges it faces 
will in many ways intensify.  
The 2006/7 programme experienced cost overruns due to both under-estimates of unit costs and 
considerable over-budget distribution of coupons and subsidised fertiliser. Cost overrun problems 
will be exacerbated in future by expected major increases in costs from higher fertilizer prices This 
will challenge the affordability of the programme for government and, unless regional maize prices 
rise to an equivalent extent, erode net economic benefits (the ‘profitability’ of the programme for 
the country). Climate change is also likely to increase variability in rainfall and seasons with too 
much or too little rain.  
Continued implementation of the programme presents both opportunities and challenges. On the 
one hand programme managers should learn from experience, allowing development of more 
efficient means of implementing the programme. This requires incentives and stimuli that 
encourage and reward efficiency and innovation, and will be best served by a progressive 
transition moving to less government involvement in input markets that are already well served by 
the private sector and a more gradual transition from government to private sector outlets in 
remote areas, as described above. Successful implementation of the programme will demand the 
management of other transitions, as livelihoods and the rural economy evolve and horticultural, 
livestock and non-farm services become increasingly important, and the programme is then 
phased out or changed to have a more explicit social protection function.  
However as subsidies are implemented over longer periods there is also a tendency for the ‘dark 
side’ of subsidies to grow: fraudsters work out how to cheat the system, displacement is likely to 
increase if farmers’ incomes are growing, and political pressures for the continuation and 
extension of the programme also tend to rise. Specific measures need to be taken to address 
these problems, including for example annual changes in coupon printing systems and designs,  
constant watchfulness and action against fraud (with clear communication of new or changed 
systems to input distributors and farmers), and clear independence of programme management 
from political influence.  
These challenges reinforce the need for increased agronomic and management efficiency and for 
improved management systems. They therefore reinforce recommendations made elsewhere in 
the report to achieve efficiency gains and good governance. In particular fixed value coupons can 
help to control costs as well as promote flexibility, farmer choice, competition and private sector 
development. Similarly complementary investments in research and extension for better fertiliser 
application methods and soil conservation and organic matter management can improve fertiliser 
response rates and, with investments in transport infrastructure, lower costs facilitate horticultural, 
livestock and non-farm diversification. 
12.2.9  Type of fertiliser subsidy 
Broad debates in Malawi about different types of fertiliser subsidy have centred around a choice 
between general price subsidies and rationed subsidies with limited quantities to be accessed by 
specific beneficiaries and, where there is targeting, whether this should be achieved through 
coupons distributed by local government or through farm clubs.   106
A Ministry of Agriculture document setting out the concept of the 2006/7 coupon scheme clearly 
presented a very strong set of arguments in favour of a rationed scheme: significant general 
fertiliser price subsidies will be very costly, with major cost control problems as lower prices which 
fuel both domestic demand and cross border leakage. A coupon system, on the other hand, can 
be used to limit the cost of the programme (by limiting the number of coupons) and can also be 
used for targeting of the subsidy to households with particular characteristics and can help to limit 
cross border leakage. As is evident from discussion of displacement problems with AISP, a 
coupon system does not eliminate or necessarily reduce displacement, but it offers options for 
doing this in ways that are not possible with more general price subsidies. A comprehensive but 
rationed system (where all households get a rationed quantity of fertiliser) should be a more 
efficient use of government and of national resources than a universal price subsidy, in terms of 
incremental production and poverty and food insecurity benefits.  Appropriate and effective 
targeting offers opportunities for further efficiency gains but as reiterated throughout this report, 
the extent to which potential gains from a rationed and targeted system depends heavily upon 
effective implementation. 
With regard to the debate about the relative benefits of the current coupon system and use of farm 
clubs in delivering rationed and targeted subsidies, there are important questions about their 
relative effectiveness in targeting and about the practicality of the two approaches. Farm clubs 
were the major conduit for delivery of targeted and rationed fertiliser subsidies until the early 
1990’s. However the strong network of farm clubs has subsequently largely disintegrated. Those 
that have continued tend to provide services mainly oriented to cash crop production, particularly 
tobacco. The current network of farm clubs therefore does not have the broad membership base 
needed for the delivery of the subsidy programme. Attempts to rapidly scale up clubs will be very 
demanding of extension staff and are not likely to lead to effective subsidy distribution : even when 
they were established the previous farm clubs were very heavily supported by an extension 
service that had more staff and resources than the extension service has now.   
The limited spread of farm clubs and likely difficulties in their establishment and operation mean 
that their use as the primary institution for subsidy distribution is likely to pose many more 
difficulties than the current system, as regards lack of access for poorer households (although 
there are exceptions, farm club membership has tended to exclude poorer households), and 
higher rates of diversion and displacement. This is not to say that farm clubs should not have a 
positive role in the disbursement of a targeted voucher subsidy (Box 7.1 suggests that there can 
be strong complementarities between farm clubs and better use of subsidised inputs, and indeed 
the AISP could be a stimulus for the establishment and strengthening of farmer clubs in some 
areas).  
Finally, if a targeted and rationed subsidy system is to be implemented, the use of coupons 
provides important potential benefits over direct physical distribution of inputs to beneficiaries. 
There are benefits from the way that it allows the easier separation of subsidy targeting and 
registration from delivery, but the greatest benefits are from the way that it can allow the 
development of systems where subsidised inputs can be delivered by different suppliers, and 
where farmers can exercise choice regarding which inputs to acquire from which supplier. Where 
systems can be developed to allow this choice they provide a triple benefit, (a) allowing farmers to 
choose inputs that are mos appropriate to their needs, (b) promoting competition among suppliers, 
and hence lower input costs for farmers and/or government, and (c) subsidising the spread and 
expansion of supplier networks.  
12.3  Subsidy programme principles 
It is important to agree on broad principles for the programme which can be the basis for searching 
for and developing specific options for effective system design and implementation. The following 
principles are proposed: 
1.  Given Malawi’s complex food security challenge the input subsidy programme should seek 
to reduce national and household food insecurity, reduce poverty and vulnerability, 
promote economic growth and diversification in the ways outlined earlier, and stimulate 
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2.  It is essential that the programme be implemented efficiently and effectively to ensure that 
the country gets the maximum benefit from this investment, and at as low a cost as 
possible. 
3.  The input subsidy programme is one of a set of policy instruments and programmes 
concerned with food security, agricultural and economic development, and social protection 
that needs to be designed and implemented in a coordinated way to promote food security 
and avoid excessive swings in food production and prices over time. 
4.  The programme should be targeted only at smallholder farmers, preferably those in the 
bottom half in terms of their livelihood incomes. 
5.  The programme should be designed and implemented with a view to the reduction and 
eventual withdrawal of the subsidy as its objectives are progressively achieved.  This 
requires a joint vision of, and objectives for, agricultural input sector development that will 
promote public, private and civil society partnerships founded on mutual trust and 
accountability. 
6.  In pursuit of low cost, sustainable, effective and efficient achievement of its primary 
objectives, the programme should promote the development of a strong, competitive, and 
efficient private sector in fertiliser and other agricultural input supply. This will free up 
government capital and other resources (particularly skilled staff) for other critical uses that 
complement and enhance private sector effectiveness (e.g., road infrastructure, agricultural 
research).  Effective quality control monitoring is also essential to maintain the integrity of 
the input supply sector to the benefit of all stakeholders. 
7.  The programme should be designed and implemented to minimise displacement of 
commercial input sales in order to (a) maximise the incremental benefits and efficiency of 
the programme and (b) reduce negative impacts of the programme on the commercial 
input sector, whose expansion can generate employment and free up government budgets 
for other important investments. 
8.  In remote areas where volumes are small and access costs high, it is difficult for the private 
sector to serve farmers without some form of subsidy from government, and effective 
partnerships between the government and the private sector will be needed. In this there 
are specific roles for state owned enterprises that complement rather than replace private 
sector activities.  
9.  Predictability, transparency and timely decision making and communication are critical for 
the programme to deliver benefits to smallholder farmers, leverage new investment by 
private sector agents (farmers, input suppliers and produce buyers), and lower costs in 
government purchase and delivery of goods and services. 
10. It is important that some flexibility is built into the programme over time to respond to 
weather-induced fluctuations in food supply, as well as changes in farmer input demand 
that support crop diversification. A three year rolling programme, integrated into the 
government’s medium term expenditure framework, could promote the necessary balance 
of predictability and flexibility. 
11. Strict budgetary control is critical for programme sustainability and benefits, to avoid 
disrupting complementary planned investments in agricultural and other sector support 
programmes, and to facilitate macro-economic stability.  
Bearing these principles in mind, the following sections (drawn largely from the March 2007 report) 
suggest:  
1.  Ways in which the implementation of the subsidy programme as currently designed could 
be improved;  
2.  Potential innovations in programme design to increase effectiveness and reduce costs; 
3.  Further recommendations for innovations which could be tested in pilot programmes.  108
12.4  Improvements within the current system 
12.4.1  General system operation and management 
1.  Programme review and design must begin early and follow a calendar agreed with 
representatives of key stakeholders, including Government, private sector, civil society 
and donor partners.  Adherence to an effective calendar will be greatly facilitated in the 
context of a 3-4 year agricultural input subsidy program framework.  To ensure that 
subsidized fertilizer is incremental to commercial sales to the maximum extent possible, 
coupon distribution would ideally take place in April at the same time as farmers begin 
to receive income from tobacco sales.   
2.  An agricultural input programme committee should provide a forum for representation 
and coordination of all key players in the planning and execution of the program.  The 
committee should be small enough to be efficient, and comprised of representatives 
from the private sector (minimum 3), Government (ADMARC/SFFRFM, Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of Trade), donors, farmers, civil society and one or two 
independent members of standing in the industry.  The committee should be chaired by 
the Permanent Secretary of the  Ministry of Agriculture and should meet regularly to 
ensure timely development and implementation of the programme. 
3.  Increased and earlier communication about the programme should accompany greater 
transparency and accountability to and involvement of stakeholders throughout the 
programme, for example in coupon allocation and distribution, in monitoring and 
coordination of  input sales, and in the prevention of fraud. 
12.4.2  Coupon allocation and distribution 
1.  All activities in the process of coupon allocation and  distribution must be started much 
earlier – district allocations, EPA allocations, ordering of coupon printing, communication 
about the subsidy programme, despatch of coupons to districts, despatch of funding to 
districts, distribution to villages and distribution within villages. This is necessary if fertiliser 
purchases are to occur in October, but there are potential benefits in aiming for and 
achieving much earlier subsidy sales.   
2.  Coupon allocations at all levels (to districts, EPAs and villages) should be determined by, 
and be proportionate to, the numbers of smallholder farmers rather than crop cultivated 
area. This method of coupon allocation should increase production benefits in areas where 
there is more food insecurity, provide direct benefits of increased food production to more 
poor (but  productive) households, reduce grain transport and marketing costs to the areas 
with most food insecure people, and lead to minor reductions in fertiliser transport costs
48.  
In addition this would be a more transparent system of allocation, more easily explained to, 
understood by and justifiable to the public. It would also be more consistent with common 
practice of allocating coupons to villages in proportion to their population, and would better 
match the geographic distribution of potential beneficiaries.  
3.  Clearer beneficiary targeting criteria need to be developed and communicated through the 
local government system. These should be consistent both with the programme objectives 
and with local understandings of differences between people’s livelihoods and entitlements. 
This is extremely difficult, and it may well be better to target smallholder farmers as a whole 
in a comprehensive smallholder agriculture input subsidy programme. 
49 
4.  Social protection programmes that enable poorer households to earn cash, similar to those 
implemented in 2005/6, would expand the proportion of the productive poor who qualify to 
                                                 
48 With the volumes and prices of budgeted fertiliser quantities in 2006/7 this would have been of the order 
of 1% or MK 0.5 million.  
49 Other reasons for implementing a comprehensive system alongside wider system changes are presented 
in section 12.2.3 but if these wider system changes are not considered appropriate there may nevertheless 
be a strong case for introducing comprehensive targeting within the current system.  109
obtain and use subsidized fertilizer and reduce the (as yet unquantified) incidence of 
coupon sales due to cash constraints. 
5.  There are strong arguments for conducting pre-registration to identify coupon recipients 
before coupon distribution, with public listing of beneficiaries and of the coupons they are 
to receive. This would increase transparency and accountability in the process of coupon 
allocation, and assist beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries in planning their cash allocations 
and purchases of unsubsidised fertiliser. There are also strong potential synergies with 
social protection interventions to enable poorer households to earn cash for fertiliser 
purchase, as early pre-registration for coupon beneficiaries could be linked to registration 
for public works programmes. 
6.  There should be further investigation of and lesson learning from the successful 
development of local mechanisms and examples of good practice in increasing 
transparency and accountability in coupon distribution (see point 8 below). The Ministry 
should seek to learn about and from different systems developed in different districts.  
Examples of such innovations encountered included farmer savings groups or clubs with 
specific emphasis on promoting encouraging farmers to save up for the cost of coupon 
redemption in Dedza (see box 7.1) and village level organisation of bulk fertiliser transport in 
Mzimba (section 4.3.1). 
7.  Critical attention needs to be paid to coupon design and security features. Attempts at 
fraud are likely to become more sophisticated as the programme continues, and greater 
attention should be paid to preventing fraud.  
8.  The influence and involvement of Traditional Authorities in coupon distribution at local level 
should be eliminated where this is still significant. The involvement of VDC sub-committees, 
assisted by Ministry agricultural staff, could facilitate a more transparent and equitable 
allocation when combined with clear mechanisms for tracking and publicising of all coupon 
issues to districts, EPAs and villages.   
9.  There should be early, widespread and clear communication by radio and public meetings 
about the coupon allocation and distribution system, and about people’s reasonable 
expectations under the programme. 
10. A public relations strategy should be developed for managing information to the press. This 
should ensure that the strengths and achievements of the coupon allocation and 
distribution programme are publicised before and alongside the inevitable news stories 
about abuse of the system. 
11. There must be formal controls on the issue of supplementary coupons. They should 
preferably be eliminated or, if it is desirable to maintain some flexibility, then they should be 
costed in the initial budget and held back from the initial allocation, with strict adherence to 
the budgeted quantities.  No additional coupons should be printed after the approved 
programme quantity has been fulfilled. 
12.4.3  Input procurement & distribution 
1.  To enable timely decision making and procurement by both private sector and public 
entities Government needs to announce early in the calendar year the indicative 
quantity of fertilizer to be covered by the subsidy program in the following year, and to 
indicate the share of that total that government intends to procure and distribute 
through its own outlets. In the interests of national food security and of efficient 
implementation of a major national programme the parliamentary budget approval 
process should recognize and accommodate this requirement for early announcement. 
2.  Following the Government announcement above, private sector importers and 
distributors should  make their own arrangements for fertilizer procure for retail 
distribution to coupon beneficiaries, and should also continue to submit tenders in 
response to the procurement needs of SFFRFM.  110
3.  The share of subsidized fertilizer imported and distributed by the private sector should 
expand over time, with a commensurate reduction in the shares directly imported by 
SFFRFM, and distributed by ADMARC and SFFRFM and concentration of their 
(declining) activities in markets located in more remote areas.  Resources liberated by 
this reduction should enable ADMARC and SFFRFM to strengthen service provision in 
remaining locations through adequate staff numbers and training, and reliable stocking 
of complementary agricultural inputs for maize seed and fertilizer (e.g., crop storage 
chemicals).   The ability of ADMARC to improve service even with a smaller network 
will be contingent on government making approved budget allocations available on time. 
4.  The rate of expansion in the share of subsidized fertilizer and seed distributed by the 
private sector should depend in part on credible commitments to expand retail 
coverage in poorly served areas of the country.  This commitment can be met through 
new or re-activated distributor outlets, but even more cost effectively through expansion 
and integration of independent agro-dealers located away from major trading centers 
into the commercial input supply chain and through voucher reimbursement policies 
that adequately account for the increased costs of serving remote areas. 
5.  A separate and rapid review of government’s tendering process is needed to ensure 
clarity in the criteria for tender selection, adoption of appropriate international industry 
standards for tender validity and conditions, and clear mechanisms for establishing and 
handling potential or actual non-fulfilment.  Criteria for tender selection must address 
the need to balance cost considerations with performance capacity and track records 
while stimulating competition in the market in a transparent way. There should be a 
transparent separation of government and SFFRFM tendering processes.  
6.  Rigorous auditing procedures should be implemented  for all stakeholders in the 
system. This should involve  
•  spot-checks on coupon distribution processes and outcomes,  and on sales of 
subsidised inputs under the programme.  
•  rigorous and substantial end of sales auditing of subsidised sales by both 
parastatal and private sector agencies.  
There should be strong penalties for organisations which either participate in fraudulent 
activities or fail to have proper procedures and penalties for preventing fraud by their 
employees. 
7.  Expansion of the private sector share while further improving performance will require 
other measures to ensure integrity of the supply chain.  Specific measures include: 
a.  Finalization of statutes for the new fertilizer association; 
b.  Establishment of an agreed code of business conduct for fertilizer association 
members; 
c.  A licensing system for agro-input dealers that will provide necessary safeguards 
while allowing them to participate as distributors in the programme;  
d.  Review of fertilizer integrity testing procedures and public dissemination of results; 
e.  Prompt payment by government with assured timely access to foreign exchange to 
minimize currency risk (or allow tenders and payment in US dollars) 
f.  Allowance for currency exchange movements in reimbursement of vouchers. 
g.  The fertiliser and seed associations should collect information from their members 
about annual sales, imports and stocks, and publish aggregate information to 
promote transparency and improved coordination within the fertiliser and seed 
industries.  
h.  Formal agreement between government and the input sector regarding procedures 
and performance standards of private sector and government organisations 
involved in different ways in the input subsidy programme  111
12.4.4 Coupon  redemption 
The majority of the problems encountered by beneficiaries and distributors that have been 
documented in the report (e.g., lengthy queues at outlets, stock shortages, tipping) can be 
resolved to a high degree by timely programme implementation, by better communication and by 
improvements in coupon design, allocation and distribution and in input procurement and 
distribution as recommended above. 
The requirement to sort coupons by location and serial number prior to submission to the Logistics 
Unit should be dispensed with, and options for more rapid processing systems (for example the 
use of bar codes)  should be investigated.  Similarly simpler point of sale systems should be 
developed to dispense with the need to attach a separate cash receipt to each coupon.  
Where multiple donors are involved in supporting the same programme component then payment 
and other administrative procedures should be harmonized or provision should be made to cover 
extra administrative costs. 
12.4.5  Annual programme scheduling  
A consistent theme in recommendation for improvements within the current system is for timely 
and transparent and consistent decision making and implementation. Table 12.1, which was also 
presented in the March 2007 report, sets out a proposed calendar for key annual decisions and 
actions for the timely and effective implementation of the subsidy programme in line with the 
recommendations above. An important issue that was raised in the March 2007 report is the 
difficulties for programme planning implementation presented by the timing of the national budget 
process, as the allocation of funds to tenders for fertiliser purchases (needed in April) can be 
delayed by parliamentary approval of the budget (in June). If it is not possible to amend the budget 
year then it is important that special arrangements are made to ensure that the budget process 
does not delay fertiiser procurement. It is understood that such arrangements were made for 
procurement for the 2007/8 programme.   112
 






Review scale of programme and negotiate private 
and public sector shares 
February 
Announce programme scale and share decisions  End Feb 
SFFRFM tender documents issued  End Feb 
Pre-registration campaign  Feb - Mar 
Finalize programme modalities (target group, 
coupon design, processing etc) 
Mid-Mar 
SFFRFM tender awards  April 
Awareness campaign  March – May 
Coupon Distribution  April - May 
Coupon Redemption  April - Dec 
Coupon Processing and Payment  April - Jan 
 
 
12.5  The Scale and Scope of the Subsidy Programme  
Viewing the issue of scale from the national perspective, there are two major considerations that 
need further examination: the direct costs of the programme and the impact of the programme on 
maize production. 
As discussed in section 8, fertiliser prices have risen substantially since the beginning of 2007. 
This leads to three main alternative courses of action: (a) maintaining both the budget and the 
scale of the programme (in terms of physical quantities of subsidised inputs) at roughly the same 
level with a large increase in farmer contributions; (b) maintaining both the budget and farmer 
contributions at roughly the same level with a large cut in the scale of the programme (in terms of 
physical quantities of subsidised inputs);  and (c) maintaining both the farmer contributions and the 
scale of the programme (in terms of physical quantities of subsidised inputs) at roughly the same 
level, with a large increase in the budget. There are difficulties with each of these approaches. 
First, if farmer contributions increase too much then this will limit the participation of poor farmers 
who most need the subsidy and who make the best use of it. If on the other hand the programme 
is scaled back too much then the ‘indirect’ benefits of higher wages and lower food prices are 
diluted, and these are important elements of the programme’ contribution to reduced food 
insecurity and to wider pro-poor growth. However a large subsidy programme may also be 
inefficient in that it tends to promote displacement rather than incremental input use, and the need 
for the subsidy to stimulate incremental use may decline over time.  Furthermore it may be 
possible to maintain high levels of incremental production with a smaller volume of subsidised 
inputs through improved management of the programme, complementary investments and more 
effective extension advice.  Finally if the budget increases too much then poses problems for fiscal 
and macro-economic management and increases the opportunity costs of the programme in 
reducing government expenditure on other worthwhile investments. Some combination of these 
responses to increased input prices is likely therefore likely. This should be linked to scaling back 
of the programme over time to ensure that it is appropriate to (declining) need.  
Scale should also be examined from the perspective of incremental maize production.  If the 
programme were to operate with increased efficiency in terms of reduced displacement of 
commercial sales, then the production impact from the subsidised fertiliser would rise. This should 
also happen if there is increasing use of hybrid seed and more timely delivery of inputs. How much 
maize should Malawi aim to produce in a good year? Experience with the large 2005/6 and 2006/7 
harvests make this a highly pertinent question, and it is very difficult to make a judgement – but  113
clearly there must be a limit and if displacement of commercial sales was reduced and hybrid 
maize seed increased then in good years a subsidy on 150,000 tonnes of fertiliser will probably 
produce more maize than is needed
50. However these two years were unusually good, and 
decisions need to be made looking at longer term average rainfall conditions, recognising that low 
stable prices are needed in years with lower rainfall – acute food security problems in the past 
have been associated with simultaneous reductions in fertiliser use and rainfall. 
12.6  Longer term options  
A number of important potential innovations can improve the cost effectiveness of the agricultural 
input subsidy programme, or increase the indirect benefits generated by it.  Detailed appraisal of 
these innovations is beyond the scope of the current study, but provision for such appraisal and 
the subsequent design of pilot programmes, should be planned for at an early stage. 
Fertiliser formulations: Many actors in government and the private sector believe that current 
recommended fertilizer formulations may not be the most cost effective, and that a shift from 
blanket to more area specific fertilizer recommendations could lead to increased profitability for 
farmers.  Specifically, the formulation 23:21:0 +4S is relatively costly compared to alternative 
formulations of NPK.  A complete NPK formulation would also be appropriate to many areas where 
Potassium deficiency is becoming evident.  Additional potential trace element deficiencies include 
manganese.  A wealth of on-farm and on-station research data collected over the past decade has 
yet to be exploited to improve and adapt recommendations to the diversity of agro-ecological 
conditions in Malawi.  The proposed agricultural input programme committee could establish a 
sub-committee to rapidly assess this work and make recommendations. 
Promotion of soil conservation practices: The profitability of chemical fertilizer use depends very 
much on soil physical qualities (organic matter, topsoil depth, presence of hoe pans, porosity).  A 
wide range of conservation practices are available to prevent soil erosion and degradation, and 
improve soil qualities, that would increase crop response to chemical fertilizer in the longer term.  
Farmers often lack the incentives to invest in conservation practices that do not have an 
immediate benefit.  One way to provide such an incentive would be to provide farmers who commit 
to participation in a 3-4 year program with an additional input voucher. 
Smart cards: The use of smart cards in place of coupons could potentially reduce transactions 
costs and the potential for fraud. The technological options and their ability to spread into rural 
areas are constantly increasing, while costs are falling. Such cards are already in use by the 
commercial sector and under pilot testing for social protection programs.  Their issue to 
smallholder farmers as part of a comprehensive input subsidy programme would be a major ‘one 
off‘ task presenting many challenges, but it offers potential low cost solutions to a wide variety of 
problems related to prevention fraud, the pan territorial face value systems discussed above, and 
the integration of commercial and subsidised sales. The introduction of appropriate smart cards 
also offers the possibility of very substantial wider benefits to rural people beyond the subsidy 
programme - in terms of agricultural finance, micro finance, remittances, and deepening of the 
financial sector. There are also significant logistical challenges in their use, and major questions 
about intra-household relations where cards are issued to men or women. The potential 
contribution of smart cards as part of the agricultural input subsidy program warrants further and 
thorough investigation. 
Barcoding of coupons; use of barcodes as security features on coupons may be another way of 
improving security and protecting against fraud. Unique barcodes for every coupon with battery 
                                                 
50  We have not conducted a formal analysis of minimum maize prices needed to provide incentives to 
farmers to invest in maize. However consideration of results from the livelihood modelling suggest that in 
2006/7 prices a maize purchasing price of around MK20/kg may in the context of the subsidy programme 
provide about the right incentive for some surplus maize production and allow a rough equilibrium between 
supply and demand – while not undermining the needs of the poor to cheap food. This needs further 
investigation.  114
operated barcode readers able to check numbers against district allocations, for example, may 
pose challenges to criminals seeking to use counterfeit coupons.  
National ID cards: The use of national ID cards offer a further alternative approach to reduction of 
fraud in coupon issue and use. This must be part of a wider policy decision which has 
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ANNEX A.  FURTHER INFORMATION ON ATTRIBUTES OF RECIPIENT AND NON-RECIPIENT 
HOUSEHOLDS  
Table A1: Median Attributes of Households According to the Quantity of Subsidized Fertilizer 
Received in 2006/07. 
1130 households 
Households groups by amount of government subsidized 
fertilizer received  2006/07 
 Median characteristics 
Households 
receiving the most 
subsidized fertilizer 


















Total household income (Mkw/hh)  15,100 11,646  9,172 11,200
Gross value of harvest (Mkw/hh)  9,356 5,970  4,699 5,833
Value of assets* and livestock (Mkw/hh)  15,850 8,755  6,500 8,605
Landholding size (ha)  1.22 .91  .81 .91
Kgs acquired of subsidized government 
fertilizer  100 50  -- 0
Kgs purchased of unsubsidized fertilizer 07  0 0  0 0
Subjective assessment of household 
economic standard relative to community  0 0  0 0
Female headed household (%)  18.2% 26.4%  30.0% 26.7%
Days worked on ganyu labor 2006/07  0 0  0 0
Years of education of hh head  5 4  4 4
Adult equivalents in household  4.48 4.07  3.92 4.04
Can hh read a one page letter in English? (% 
yes)  61.2% 48.7%  47.4% 50.7%
 Can hh write a one page letter in English? 
(% yes)  54.0% 41.6%  39.8% 43.3%
Expenditures for last 12 months on selected 
non-food items (Mkw/hh)  1,892 1,496  1,335 1,496
Social safety net cash benefits (Mkw/hh)  719 880  660 734
Note:  2,591 households include 2,341 households obtaining a maize harvest plus 160 households that harvested no 
maize.   *Assets include mortar/pestle (mtondo), bed, table, chair, radio ('wireless'), sewing machine, kerosene/paraffin 
stove, bicycle, motor vehicle, value of animals owned, beer brewing drum, boat or canoe, fishing net, lantern (paraffin), 




Table A2:  Probit estimates for subsidized fertilizer received in 2006/07. 
  Dependent Variable:  1 if household procured fertilizer from 
commercial sources.  Coefficients are marginal probabilities 
 Full  Sample  North  Center  South 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
=1 if Female headed household (0/1)  -0.073*** -0.111*  -0.077*  -0.097*** 
 (-2.99)  (-1.72)  (-1.82)  (-2.62) 
Age of household head  -0.001 -0.003  0.001  -0.003** 
 (-1.50)  (-1.22)  (0.57)  (-2.23) 
Household size (in adult equivalents) 0.004  0.020 0.009  0.003 
 (0.81)  (1.39)  (1.04)  (0.38) 
Landholding size (hectares)  0.032*** 0.070**  0.030** 0.027* 
 (3.30)  (2.55)  (2.40)  (1.69) 
=1 if household ranks itself in bottom economic tercile  -0.069***  0.002  -0.070*  -0.129*** 
 (-2.97)  (0.039)  (-1.82)  (-3.62) 
=1 if household ranks itself in top economic tercile  0.074*** 0.106 0.033  0.107*** 
 (2.84)  (1.56)  (0.77)  (2.69) 
Number of years household head has lived in village  0.001  0.001  -0.000  0.002* 
 (1.58)  (0.93)  (-0.35)  (1.80) 
=1 if Household head born in village 0.034  -0.026  0.023  0.071* 
 (1.47)  (-0.43)  (0.58)  (1.93) 
=1 if Household incurred death of head in past 3 years  -0.035  0.066  -0.105*  -0.016 
 (-1.03)  (0.61)  (-1.88)  (-0.32) 
Value of social safety net received (000 MKW)  0.010* 0.013  0.054***  0.005 
 (1.81)  (0.88)  (2.95)  (0.71) 
Distance to nearest tarred road (kms) 0.000  0.005***  0.003***  -0.004*** 
 (0.84)  (5.63)  (2.73)  (-4.86) 
=1 if improved road in community -0.041*  -0.074  -0.034  -0.036 
 (-1.83)  (-1.30)  (-0.83)  (-1.07) 
Distance to nearest town (kms)  0.001** 0.001*  -0.003***  -0.001** 
 (2.26)  (1.77)  (-3.35)  (-2.13) 
Distance to nearest ADMARC depot (kms) 0.001  0.002  0.000  -0.004** 
 (1.25)  (0.84)  (0.074)  (-2.10) 
=1 if Member of Parliament resides in community  0.084***  -0.289***  0.010  0.275*** 
 (3.72)  (-4.23)  (0.27)  (7.40) 
=1 if Member Parliament visited community past 6 
months 
-0.023 -0.193***  0.029 0.097* 
 (-0.72)  (-2.75)  (0.50)  (1.80) 
=1 if Central Region  -0.024       
 (-0.77)       
=1 if Southern Region  0.055*       
 (1.79)       
Observations 2551  439  964  1148 








Dependent Variable:  kgs of subsidized fertilizer 
received  
by the household 
 Full  Sample  North  Center  South 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
=1 if Female headed household (0/1) -0.104  22.423**  -18.244***  -1.544 
 (-0.020)  (2.00)  (-2.94)  (-0.36) 
Age of household head  -0.005 0.305  -0.146  0.243 
 (-0.035)  (0.98)  (-0.65)  (1.45) 
Household size (in adult equivalents) 3.136***  3.961* 0.745  0.460 
 (2.75)  (1.83)  (0.41)  (0.40) 
Landholding size (hectares)  2.932** -0.561  6.810**  9.178*** 
 (1.97)  (-0.18)  (2.01)  (13.3) 
=1 if household ranks itself in bottom economic tercile  -7.456 5.194  8.795  -3.073 
 (-1.62)  (0.79)  (1.20)  (-0.78) 
=1 if household ranks itself in top economic tercile  8.641  28.461*** 35.642***  13.850*** 
 (1.59)  (3.40)  (3.92)  (2.96) 
Value of social safety net received (000 MKW)  0.526  -2.055* -3.877**  0.225 
 (0.27)  (-1.94)  (-1.98)  (0.49) 
Number of years household head has lived in village  0.171  -0.045  0.083  -0.243* 
 (1.19)  (-0.22)  (0.43)  (-1.81) 
=1 if Household head born in village 1.557  2.631  2.834  7.949* 
 (0.33)  (0.31)  (0.38)  (1.66) 
=1 if Household incurred death of head in past 3 years  -4.289  -10.254  3.048  3.071 
 (-0.90)  (-1.05)  (0.33)  (0.44) 
Distance to nearest tarred road (kms)  0.215  0.014  -0.099  0.053 
 (1.41)  (0.13)  (-0.41)  (0.48) 
=1 if improved road in community -5.372  -9.236  -5.528  8.673** 
 (-1.21)  (-1.44)  (-0.62)  (2.24) 
Distance to nearest town (kms) 0.029  0.103  0.107  0.033 
 (0.44)  (1.34)  (0.49)  (0.48) 
Distance to nearest ADMARC depot (kms) 0.018  0.019  -0.864**  -0.367 
 (0.060)  (0.12)  (-2.33)  (-1.62) 
=1 if Member of Parliament resides in community  -3.314  17.920**  -9.795  -4.589 
 (-0.71)  (2.18)  (-1.18)  (-1.05) 
=1 if Member Parliament visited community past 6 
months 
-0.815 27.273**  -10.536  8.038 
 (-0.085)  (2.14)  (-0.99)  (1.17) 
=1 if Central Region  -6.099       
 (-0.71)       
=1 if Southern Region  -3.602       
 (-0.42)       
Constant -2.169  32.958 78.447***  54.034*** 
 (-0.18)  (1.47)  (4.36)  (6.89) 
Observations 270  195  396  514 
Robust t statistics in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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ANNEX B: COST BENEFIT METHODOLOGY 
 
The economic cost benefit analysis computes the benefits and costs of the subsidy programme to 
the Malawi economy as a whole, as follows. 
Benefits  Incremental production valued at economic (shadow or opportunity cost) 
prices 
Minus 
Fertiliser/seed costs  the full cost of additional fertiliser and hybrid/OPV maize seed used by 
farmers (amount distributed minus amount displaced) comprising 
programme procurement and distribution costs for fertilisers sold by 
ADMARC / SFFRFM plus programme and farmer payments to retailers 
selling subsidised fertilisers plus programme payments for seed sales. 
Minus 
Farmer costs:  labour and other costs incurred by farmers in obtaining programme fertiliser 
and improved maize seed and in harvesting extra production. 
Minus 
Programme costs:  costs incurred by the government in administering the programme but 
excluding costs of delivering programme fertiliser and improved maize seed 
to farmers (these are included above under full costs of fertiliser and seed). 
Minus 
Efficiency costs:  estimated as 15% of the value of displaced fertilisers. 
  
The relationships between these benefits and costs in the overall economic analysis are shown in 
figure B1, with each of these main items of benefit and cost shown in a circle. We consider 
programme costs, benefits and farmer costs in turn. 
Costs 
Incremental programme costs to be considered in the economic analysis are the costs of 
administering the programme and the costs of incremental seed and fertiliser provided to farmers, 
farmers’ incremental costs, the costs of administering the programme,  and efficiency costs.  
Costs of seed and fertiliser depend upon the unit cost and volume. Reasonably accurate estimates 
of costs of seed and fertiliser unit cost can be derived from programme costs as set out earlier in 
section 4 (although as discussed there may be some under-estimate of overhead costs of 
ADMARC and SFFRFM and of field administration). Quantities of incremental seed and fertiliser 
use as a result of the programme are, however, more difficult to estimate, as these depend upon 
estimates of displacement
51.  As discussed earlier in section 6, we estimate a low rate of 
displacement for seeds but much higher rates of displacement for fertilisers. The analysis is 
conducted with three different rates of displacement (40, 50 and 60%) covering the range of 
estimates presented in section 6, in order to properly represent the uncertainty regarding rates of 
displacement, and to demonstrate the impact of different fertiliser displacement rates on the 
efficiency of the programme.  
                                                 
51 Only the costs of incremental seed and fertiliser use should be considered in the economic analysis, as 
only these seed and fertiliser costs are an extra cost to the country: displaced seed and fertiliser represent a 
‘transfer’ within the economy. Although the costs of displaced seed and fertiliser contribute to the fiscal costs 
of the programme, they do not explicitly enter the economic analysis.   121
 




Looking to the future, international fertiliser and fuel costs (affecting transport costs) have risen 
dramatically since the implementation of the 2006/7 programme: urea and prices are now three 
times what they were 5 years ago, and though they are expected to decline somewhat over the 
next few years, this will not bring them back down to earlier levels. For the ex ante analysis it is 
therefore assumed that fertiliser and transport costs can be expected to average roughly 30% 
above 2006/7 programme levels.  
Farmers’ incremental costs are costs incurred as a result of the subsidy when they buy fertiliser 
that they would not otherwise have bought, in transporting and applying that fertiliser, and in 
harvesting extra yield. Some of these costs are estimated using parameters derived from the 
household survey (1.5 days per household accessing the subsidy, 250MK per household transport 
costs for the fertiliser, a wage rate of 133MK per day), with on farm labour costs derived from the 
household model described in Dorward, A., 2007. . 
Information on programme administration costs is set out in section 4, although as discussed there 
may be some under-estimate of field administration costs.  
Efficiency costs may arise where there is displacement of commercial fertiliser sales by subsidised 
sales. Although these fertilisers and the returns to them are omitted from the economic analysis 
(because expenditure on these fertilisers does not represent an incremental cost to the economy). 
it is possible that there are efficiency costs associated with this transfer of resources, notably (a) 
subsidised fertiliser delivery may be later than commercial delivery leading to lower efficiency of 
use, (b) costs of procurement and delivery may be higher under the subsidy programme, (c) 
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resources were retained by government and used in other ways. It is also possible that there are 
efficiency gains from the subsidy programme, (a) if there are economies of scale and benefits from 
consistent demand that enable fertiliser procurement and distribution costs to be reduced under 
the programme or (b) if farmers’ investments yield higher rates of return than would be obtained by 
government investments in alternative activities (as a result, for example, of farmers investing a 
significant proportion of extra income in high return activities and from high local multipliers from 
such investment and from their consumption expenditure). It is expected that efficiency losss will 
be greater than gains and a 15% efficiency loss is assumed in the analysis.  
 Benefits 
Valuation of the benefits from the programme requires estimates of incremental production and of 
the prices at which to value it.  There are considerable difficulties in developing reliable estimates 
of either of these parameters.  
The impacts of the fertiliser subsidy on production are complex, as farmers need to mobilise 
resources to redeem the voucher, may use the fertiliser on different crops, and may change their 
cropping patterns and farm and non-farm activities in response to the subsidy.  
Increased smallholder crop production and productivity, particularly for maize, is a key immediate 
objective of the subsidy programme and a requirement to meet its broader objectives of promoting 
economic growth and reducing vulnerability to food insecurity, hunger and poverty. Estimating 
increased production as a result of the subsidy is, however, very difficult, as crop production is 
determined by crop areas cultivated and yields obtained by smallholders, with decisions about 
crop areas affected by farmers’ expectations of input and output prices, rainfall, wage rates, and 
availabilities of cash, food, seed, fertilizer and labour. Actual conditions during a season may then 
vary from expectations. Yield\s are affected by similar variables. Different types of farmers and 
farmers in different areas will be affected by these variables in different ways. Separating out the 
impacts of expected and actual subsidized input access from these other variables is very difficult.  
It was intended that data collected on crop areas and production in the household survey would 
provide information on input use and production for different crops, and that this could be 
compared with similar data for the same households in 2003/4 or 2004/5 as recorded in the IHS2. 
However subsequent analysis of IHS2 data suggested that household area and production data 
were not sufficiently reliable for such an analysis, and further difficulties were faced with cleaning 
of area and production data with the AISS. It has therefore not been possible to use household 
data to investigate subsidy impacts on production.  
The national crop estimates provide a source of information on estimates of production of major 
crops. As noted earlier, very large production increases for maize were estimated for 2006/7, 
predominantly as a result of increased yields, but also with a small increase in area. Increased 
yields could be attributed to good rainfall in most areas, increased use of hybrid seeds, increased 
use of fertiliser and possibly more timely planting and weeding as a result of reduced cash and 
labour constraints for poorer households, following the good 2005/6 season harvest. There are, 
however, difficulties in using the maize production crop estimates to determine incremental 
production as a result of the input subsidy. On the one hand it is not clear that crop estimates are 
sufficiently accurate and reliable for such use: for example similarities between maize prices 
following the 2005/6 and 2006/7 harvests (see figures 5.1and 5.2) raise questions about the scale 
of the increase in maize harvest in 2006/7 over 2005/6. The yields estimated in 2006/7 also seem 
to be disproportionately large when compared with production and yields estimated for 2005/6, 
another year with very good rains and a large input subsidy. Further difficulties in using the 
national crop estimates to determine incremental production as a result of the input subsidy arise 
because it is not known how much fertiliser is applied to different crops and it is also very difficult 
to separate out the effects of the fertiliser and seed subsidy from the other variables outlined 
above.  
The March 2007 Interim Report includes regression estimates of the relationship between national 
‘maize fertiliser’ sales and maize production, using crop estimates production and area data 
together with annual rainfall yield indices for hybrid and local maize. Different model specifications, 
each with relatively good fit, generated widely differing estimates of incremental maize production  123
from the 2005/6 and 2006/7 subsidies. Very limited confidence can therefore be placed in 
estimates of incremental production derived from the crop estimates. 
Another approach to estimating the incremental production impact of the subsidy programme is to 
examine sets of alternative assumptions about the key variables affecting incremental production 
from the programme, and to consider the range of estimates of incremental production impacts 
associated with these sets of assumptions. A strength of this approach is that it focuses attention 
on variables that have important effects on incremental production, and hence on important issues 
that need to be addressed when considering how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the programme in the future.  
It is likely that the vast majority of incremental fertiliser use as a result of the programme was 
applied to maize. This was a major emphasis of the programme, and was emphasised in the focus 
group discussions and key informant interviews. As argued in section 6.4, it is also likely that much 
of the subsidised fertiliser used on other crops, such as tobacco, displaced commercial purchases. 
While there will have been some incremental use of subsidised  fertiliser on crops apart from 
maize, it is likely that this is small. We therefore estimate the effect of programme fertiliser and 
improved seed entirely in terms of impact on incremental maize production.  
Incremental maize production is calculated using estimates of incremental grain produced per unit 
of nitrogen fertiliser applied. There is a remarkable lack of high quality and reliable information on 
yield responses to fertiliser on smallholder farms. A wide range of reports were consulted as 
summarised in table B2. This shows estimates of responses to Nitrogen for local and hybrid maize 
grown under different management regimes. Variability is high. The estimates in table B2 may be 
evaluated against wider rules of thumb that smallholder farmers often obtain yields and yield 
responses which are about 50% of those on research station plots, and that farmer managed trials 
and demonstrations generally give yields above farmers’ but below research station yields. 
Incremental yield and production estimates need to allow for moderately late application of a 
substantial proportion of the subsidised basal dressing in the southern region in 2006/7, variation 
in the extent to which basal and top dressings were both applied, common but not universal 
availability of phosphate in Malawian soils (Snapp, 1998), and application of fertiliser to both local, 
OPV and hybrid varieties. We therefore conduct our analysis with three different rates of response 
to nitrogen (10, 15 and 18kg grain per kg N), to represent the uncertainty and variability in fertiliser 
responses under different seasonal conditions, and timing and method of application. Similarly 
three different estimates of differences between (fertilised) local, OPV and hybrid yields are used, 
as shown below in table B1 .   
 
Table B1 Incremental maize production with different scenarios (‘000MT) 
      Displacement  50%  40%  30% 
Grain: N ratio 12  15  18  12  15  18  12  15  18 
    71  413 498 583  481  583  686 549 669 788 
118  460 545 631  528  631  733 597 716 836 
Incremental 
production  from 
hybrid & OPV seed 
163  505 591 676  573  676  778 642 761 881 
Note: Calculated from 174,688 MT subsidised fertiliser with an average N content of 32.6% 
 
Table B1 shows that when considered together, these alternative assumptions allow for a very 
large range of possible increases in maize production as a result of the subsidy, from 413,000 
tonnes to 881,000 tonnes, depending upon programme design and implementation and upon other 
(for example climatic) variables. The potential benefits from reducing displacement, from 
increasing the grain to N ratio, and from including hybrid and OPV seeds within the subsidy 
programme are clear. Potential ways to achieve improvements in these variables are discussed in 
the conclusions and recommendations of the report.  
Incremental production from input subsidy programmes in the future is assumed to be determined 
by the same grain to nutrient ratios as those used to estimate incremental production in 2006/7.  124
Although global climate change is expected to cause increases in rainfall variability in the medium 
to long term, past variation in weather patterns may provide the best guide for expected weather 
patterns over the short to medium term. . 
Valuation of increased maize production is also challenging. Large changes in maize production 
as a result of the subsidy programme have a significant effect on national supply, and this affects 
national prices. It is therefore necessary first to estimate the prices that there would have been 
without the subsidy, and then to estimate prices with the subsidy. Standard economic analysis 
methodology then values incremental production at the average of ‘with’ and ‘without’ subsidy 
prices, where these are prices without other policy induced distortions. Severe difficulties in 
estimated ‘with’ and ‘without’ subsidy prices arise because historical prices (see figure 5.2) have 
been affected by interactions between constantly changing maize market policies (involving at 
different times, for example, export bans, large sales of subsidised imports, and large subsidised 
exports), input subsidy programmes, and seasonal weather and market conditions. Good and bad 
years also lead to exports and imports, but export and import parity prices vary, with regional 
market conditions and between, for example, imports from Mozambique and South Africa.    
To allow for the effects of different market conditions on the benefits from the subsidy, different 
maize prices are used in different analyses.  
For the ex post analysis of the 2006/7 subsidy estimation of both ‘with’ and ‘without’ subsidy prices 
are difficult. We conduct the analysis with two different approaches to determination of undistorted 
without subsidy prices. In both approaches it is recognised that the increased production resulting 
from the subsidy programme should have depressed prices, but export of 330,000 MTs to 
Zimbabwe has removed some of that extra production and that, together with fears of maize 
shortages, has raised maize prices. Thus Lilongwe market prices were at 18MK/kg in May 
(US$130/MT) but by December rose to 30MK/kg (US$214/MT) and while the price in May 2007 
was lower than in May 2006 (20MK/kg, US$142/MT), the price in December 2007 was higher than 
in December 2006 (25MK/kg, US$179/MT). At the same time white maize was being offered on 
the commodity exchange in Lilongwe for US$197/MT and large lots are reported to have been 
fetching around $190/MT.   
We therefore have a situation where one import parity price (from Mocambique) is below local 
market prices which were below the price gained from exports to Zimbabwe (and apparently other 
equivalent export opportunities were available to traders but they were prevented from taking them 
up by the lack of export licences) Prices in early March 2008 were around MK50/kg (a little over 
$300/ton), which is roughly the level of international import prices. This very unusual situation is 
the result of market failures, in terms of information but more importantly government induced risks 
to traders in holding stock, and hence an absence of temporal arbitrage in Malawi.   
Allowing for the normal pattern of maize prices falling in April, the average Lilongwe market price 
for the 12 months following the 2006/7 harvest is likely to have been around 22MK/kg or $160/MT. 
This is with both the subsidy putting extra maize into the market and with 330,000 MTs export to 
Zimbabwe taking maize out of the market. Our estimates for incremental production from the 
subsidy are a little under 700,000MT. The 2007/8 prices should therefore be lower than the 
situation without either subsidy or exports, but they would have been lower still with the subsidy 
but without the exports to Zimbabwe. Given that the 330MT exports are around half of the 
estimated incremental production and that the economic analysis uses an average of ‘with’ and 
‘without’ subsidy prices, we use this year’s average price of $160/MT for the ex post analysis of 
the 2006/7 programme. 
This price, however, seems high when compared to prices that have been observed in the past 
after good or reasonable harvests (see figure 5.2). Thus average prices in 2000/2001 were a little 
under $100/tonne (after a very large harvest in 2001as a result of good rains and the starter pack 
programme), and across the 2003/4 and 2004/5 seasons prices averaged $153/tonne (after 
moderately good rains, and with prices also pushed down by significant sales on the domestic 
markets of subsidized imports). Using 2003/4 and 2004/5 seasons average price as the ‘without 
subsidy’ price and a price of $140 as the ‘with subsidy’ price gives an average price of $147.5 for 
use in the analysis.   125
There are arguments for adding a third, higher price scenario to the two price scenarios outlined 
above. The first of these is that the export opportunities give a price of $200 per tonne for roughly 
half the incremental production, and the lower market prices in Malawi are artificially low as a 
result of the export ban (the recent marked rises are the belated response of the market to the 
tightening as a result of export) and hence all the incremental production should be valued at $200 
as export prices are floor prices not ceiling prices. This however poses questions about lower 
Mocabique import prices. Is Mocambique effectively exporting to Zimbabwe through Malawi, and 
the price differentials reflect transport and transaction costs? This draws attention to these 
transport costs, and for exports the farmgate price should be the Lilongwe price less transport from 
farm to Lilongwe. Since large numbers of consumers are in the rural areas, it would seem 
reasonable to deduct the farmgate- Lilongwe transport cost from the export price. Fertiliser cost 
$35/ton to move from depots (Mzuzu, Lilongwe, Blantyre) to markets. Using the same costs 
(although dry season transport prices might be a bit lower and maize will not be coming from the 
same range of remoter locations as fertiliser went to) that would bring the farm gate price of the 
exports to $200-$35 = $165, which is close to the upper price scenario outlined above.  
Another possible argument for a higher price scenario is that the incremental production has 
staved off international imports. We consider this unlikely for a good year like 2006/7,and 
appropriate import prices should therefore be Mocambique import prices plus internal transport 
prices – which is probably captured by the price scenarios above.  
Ex ante analysis looking into likely benefits and costs in the future needs to consider the effects of 
recent and expected changes in regional and international maize grain prices.  
After steadily falling international maize prices during the 20
th century, prices rose sharply during 
2007. Von Braun, 2007 reports that maize prices are likely to rise by between 30 and 70% from 
2002/3 to 2015 (depending upon growth in biofuel production), while World Bank and FAO/OECD 
forecast prices increases of over 40% over the same period. Prices in late 2007 and early 2008 
are some way above the annual predictions (see figure B1).  
The effects of higher international on prices in Malawi are not, however, straightforward as they 
have to be considered in the context of regional markets. In years when there is a shortfall in 
production across the whole region, then higher international prices will lead to higher import 
prices. This is likely to be a relatively rare occurrence,and in other years there may be downward 
pressure on regional prices as a result of significant shifts out of maize consumption and into 
consumption of wheat and cassava, reported in Zambia and Mozambique (ref Jayne). Northern 
Mocambique is likely to be an increasingly important supplier in the region and particularly into 
Malawi in the future. Taking account of these issues and examining the distribution of average 
annual prices in Nampula, Mozambique, with allowance for transport costs into Malawi, suggests a 
possible fall in regional prices in the future. An alternative view is that regional prices will also be 
affected by upward pressures from rising fertiliser costs and that shifts into cassava will lead to 
falls in supply – counteracting any falls in demand, which may also be affected by increased 
demand for biofuel production. This would suggest increasing regional prices. We therefore 
calculate benefit : cost ratios using three alternative price distribution scenarios for ex ante 
analysis  of the AISP, as shown in table B2.  126
 
Table B2 Price distribution scenarios for ex ante analysis  of the AISP 
 
Season Good Moderate  Poor Very  poor Weighted 
Average 
Probability 25%  45%  25%  5%  
A. Lower Prices 
($/tonne) 
110 140  250 400  173 
B. Medium prices 
($/tonne) 
160 190  250 400  208 
C. Higher prices 
($/tonne) 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure  B1. Information on Recent  and forecast maize and fertilizer prices 
Source: IMF; World Economic Outlook 2007database 
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Annex C: Terms of Reference for the Study  
The Objective 
•  Assess the impact and implementation of the GoM agricultural inputs subsidy and the 
programme of support (programme memorandum is attached) at the national level and 
differential impact on households at the local level.  
•  Provide lessons for future interventions in growth and social protection. 
The Scope 
National level impact: 
•  What impact has the inputs subsidy had on productivity? 
•  What impact has the inputs subsidy had on food security?  
•  What impact has the inputs subsidy had on GoM crop price policy, market distortions and projected 
prices? 
What impact has the support for growth enhancing GoM 2006 subsidy programme had on the private 
sector? It has been suggested that the private sector lost 60% of its business in 05/06. What is the 
evidence for this? What kind of recovery has taken place 06/07?  What has the longer term trend been?  
Implementation and cost effectiveness 
•  How efficient and timely was implementation (disaggregated geographically and by supplier i.e. 
ADMARC and private sector). 
•  How cost effective was the programme? Which is most cost effective in purchasing and delivering 
the fertiliser: private sector or government? Are vouchers the most cost effective way of delivering 
the subsidy? How does the subsidy output compare to equivalent maize import costs? 
•  What is the cost benefit in terms of cost to the Governments budget compared to the increase in 
production? 
The analysis should give results at the national level and disaggregate the results to District level or 
(other relevant geographical area) whenever possible. 
Local level impact – household and community 
Distribution and use of vouchers: 
•  Who got vouchers and who didn’t? Did they get a voucher last year? (requires household profiles 
aligned to national profiling e.g. MVAC or IHS) 
•  Where did the money for the fertiliser come from? 
•  What did households do with the vouchers? If they redeemed them – where and for what and how 
did they use the inputs? If they sold the vouchers or the inputs, to who and how did they use the 
money?   
•  What fertiliser did people choose? Why? 
•  What seeds did people choose? Why? What seeds did they buy or use in addition to the subsidy? 
•  What kind of technical advice did they receive regarding the inputs? 
 
Impact: 
What impact (direct and indirect) has there been on different types of households?  What is the impact 
on agricultural productivity; food security; income; expenditure and coping strategies. 
• Performance  of  fertiliser and seeds? 
•  What intra household impact is there? Of cash or who used inputs? 
•  What impact has there been on ganyu and other employment? 
•  What has the market response been – inputs and outputs? 
Is subsiding fertilizer and seed the appropriate approach to increasing production?  What would be 
more effective? 
What do households think about the programme? Who benefited? Was implementation effective 
(access and choice of inputs)? What communication about the programme did they receive? What 
could be done better? 
   131
Lessons 
•  Who benefits from the inputs subsidy and who doesn’t? How? 
•  What could be changed in the design to enhance the objectives? 
•  Is the price of subsidised inputs appropriate? 
•  Is the size (number of vouchers) appropriate? 
•  What is the fiscal sustainability of the agricultural inputs subsidy? 
•  Lessons for social protection and growth? 
 
Method 
The methodology should include the following: 
•  Analysis of Logistical unit data on commodity dispersed through different type of outlets (private 
sector / ADMARC) correlate these (nationally, regionally, districts, EPAs) to production data and 
food security data. 
•  Analysis of monitoring reports from GoM and programme meetings. 
•  Compare to baseline trends over last 5 years (or longer if the data allows) in agricultural production 
and food security. 
•  Modelling to determine whether and to what extent the subsidy programme caused the results 
observed.  This may draw upon data used by the weather risk management project and/or MVAC 
•  Financial and economic analysis to assess the impact on a national scale. 
•  Semi structured interviews with suppliers – their views and recommendations regarding the 
programme. Do they have appropriate technology and knowledge for future expansion of the 
programme? 
•  In collaboration with NSO need to establish: clear sampling methodology for household level 
research; structured household survey (those that received vouchers and those that didn’t) and 
semi structured interviews with key informant in selected villages. 
•  In depth qualitative research with household and key informants. 
•  Household wealth ranking (linked to MVAC / IHS poverty measures) preferably using an existing 
method in Malawi e.g. IHS, MVAC or DHS asset register. Ranking should include the economic and 
social status: wealth, assets, household size, gender of household head. 
•  Analysis of what determined access to vouchers, beyond the stated criteria. 
 
 
 